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Anotācija 
 
Promocijas darbs pēta, kā dalībvalsts, kurai ir vitāli svarīgas nacionālās intereses kādā 
no Eiropas Savienības (ES) ārpolitikas jautājumiem, spēj ietekmēt ES lēmumus un 
panākt sev labvēlīgu iznākumu. Gadījuma analīzei tiek izmantota Latvija centienos 
ietekmēt tai stratēģiski nozīmīgās ES attiecības ar austrumu kaimiņvalstīm. Balstoties 
uz eiropeizācijas konceptu un uz racionālās izvēles institucionālisma teorētisko pieeju, 
darbs argumentē, ka dalībvalsts spēj panākt ietekmi ES ārpolitikā ar šādiem 
mehānismiem: argumentu sniegšana, kooperatīvā kaulēšanās, kontaktēšanās ar citām 
dalībvalstīm, koalīciju izmantošana, lobēšana ES institūcijās un valsts iekšējās 
kapacitātes stiprināšana. Empīriskie pierādījumi apstiprina šo mehānismu 
nozīmīgumu. Jo izteiktākas bijušas Latvijas nacionālās intereses, jo vairāk no 
minētajiem mehānismiem tikuši izmantoti, lai panāktu sev vēlamo ES lēmumu.  
ATSLĒGAS VĀRDI: Eiropeizācija, ārpolitika, racionālās izvēles institucionālisms, 
nacionālās intereses, ietekmes  mehānismi, Latvija.  
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Abstract 
 
This study explores how a member state with high intensity of national preferences in 
some European Union (EU) foreign policy issue can influence EU decision-making 
and achieve a preferable outcome. Latvia is used as a case study. The study analyses 
how Latvia seeks to influence EU relations with its Eastern neighbours, which is great 
strategic interest for the country. Drawing on the concept of Europeanization and a 
rational choice institutionalism this study argues that a member state can better attain 
the preferable outcome through the following uploading mechanisms: presenting 
arguments, cooperative bargaining, contacting other member states, using coalitions, 
lobbying the EU institutions and bolstering domestic uploading capacity. Empirical 
evidence confirms the relevance of the suggested mechanisms. The higher the 
intensity of preference the more of these mechanisms have been used. 
 
KEYWORDS: Europeanization, foreign policy, rational choice institutionalism, 
national preferences, uploading mechanisms, Latvia 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A typical description is that the big member states exert much more influence in the 
European Union (EU) than the small ones (Moravcsik 1998). This means that the 
small states are left with little choice other than to follow the ‘rules of the game’ set 
by the big member states. However, it would be difficult to capture the development 
of the Union’s “special relationship with neighbouring countries” (Art 8 (1) TEU) 
without taking into account the contributions of the smaller members. Even they can 
use the EU “to correct the imbalance which exists in their relations with…countries 
like Russia” (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008:171). Such EU initiatives as the Eastern 
Partnership or the Northern Dimension are largely advanced by smaller states. It 
indicates that not only the size (material power) matters. A member state with limited 
resources, but a higher intensity of preference, may achieve greater influence (Cox & 
Jacobson 1973). By utilizing immaterial power assets such as using skills to promote 
ideas, bargaining national preferences, building coalitions and employing lobbying a 
small state may attain the preferred outcome (see, e.g. Tallberg 2006, 2010, Björkdahl 
2008, Bunse 2009, Jakobsen 2009, Panke 2010, 2012, Howard Grøn & Wivel 2011, 
Nasra 2011). 
This study explores how ‘the smallest of the small’ in the EU seek to influence 
the Union’s foreign policy. In so doing, it examines Latvia as a case study. It looks at 
how Latvia seeks to project its national preferences in the EU relations with its 
Eastern neighbours, which is the foreign policy dimension that is of the greatest 
strategic interest for the country. Latvia represents an interesting case in EU policy-
making. On the one hand, it is one of the smallest member states, which joined the EU 
in 2004. Hence, Latvia faces ‘double structural disadvantages’ in the EU (a 
‘smallness’ and a ‘newness’1), suggesting that it may be among the least likely to 
have an influence on EU policy decisions. On the other hand, its geographical 
location at the EU ‘frontline’ (external border) indicates that it has specific interests 
pertaining to its immediate neighbourhood. This means that it cannot simply free-ride 
in developing the EU’s special relationship with its neighbours, but instead it needs to 
put an effort into influencing EU policy to align closer to its own preferences.  
                                                 
1
 The concept ‘newness’ is often used in the case of the ten member states, which joined the 2004 EU 
enlargement. However the concept needs to be reviewed, because more than ten years have already 
passed since their joining. They have adjusted to the EU working procedures and gained experience in 
EU policy-making, for instance, through their rotating EU Presidencies. 
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Through investigation a member state’s influence, this study contributes to the 
scholarship on Europeanization of foreign policy. A member state’s influence or 
uploading, as it is often called in EU policy-making literature, is an important part of 
Europeanization (for a discussion see Chapter 2). Through uploading a state projects 
its national preferences to the EU level (Börzel 2003, Wong 2005, Miskimmon 2007). 
Europeanization is an “on-going, interactive and mutually constitutive process of 
change” (Börzel 2003), linking the national and the EU levels, where uploading its 
essential part: a member state first proactively seeks to project its preferences to the 
EU (Major 2008) and afterwards downloads them (adapts to the EU). 
Research Problem 
This study addresses the puzzle for existing explanations of a member state’s 
influence on EU foreign policy, which, viewed through the Europeanization 
framework, can offer additional interpretations on how a member state can influence 
EU foreign policy. To date, Europeanization in foreign policy has been preoccupied 
mainly with downloading, with less attention being paid to uploading. The leading 
scholars have “identified this deficiency as the most pressing question” in future 
research on EU governance (Bulmer & Lequesne 2002, cited in Copsey & Pomorska 
2010). A need to pay more scholarly attention to uploading increases even more after 
the Lisbon Treaty becoming operational in 2009, which substantially advanced 
cooperation in the foreign policy area.  
While the recent scholarship on Europeanization in foreign policy has focused 
also on uploading, these studies compared a larger group of states without an in-depth 
analysis on the process itself with its causal mechanisms. As a result, the dominating 
mechanism of Europeanization in foreign policy is ‘socialization,’ meaning inducing 
a member state into the “norms and rules of a given community” through e.g. 
‘normative suasion’ (Checkel 2005) 2. However, the empirical evidence shows that the 
effects of socialization are weak or even absent (Schimmelfennig 2005, Bailer 
2009:13, Pollack 2010:25), arguably because it “suffer[s] from the long-time need to 
produce results” (Falkner 2011:15). Indeed, today’s EU foreign policy-making 
involves highly complex issues, such as the EU economic sanctions against the third 
                                                 
2
 Socialization has mostly been attributed to downloading (adaptation), yet its meaning is unclear. E.g. 
one proposed mechanism of socialization in CFSP is ‘normative suasion’ of actors ‘persuading’ others 
(Checkel 2005, cited in Juncos and Pomorska 2006). Persuasion indicates on the pro-active behaviour. 
Some scholars mentioned socialization as an uploading mechanism (Müller and Alecu de Flers 2009)   
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countries, demanding the Union’s swift reaction. Arguably, there should be more 
efficient mechanisms than socialisation involved. This shows how current scholarship 
on Europeanization of foreign policy may need to be refined to address the uploading 
process. 
Another problem is that the existing literature on Europeanization of foreign 
policy has only marginally focused on Latvia. With some exceptions of very general 
studies (see e.g. Galbreath 2013), no systematic academic research has been carried 
out on Europeanization of Latvia’s foreign policy or on Latvia’s uploading efforts in 
EU relations with its Easter neighbours.  
Finally, better understanding of Latvia’s ability to influence the EU policy 
towards its Eastern neighbours is of relevance because in the first half of 2015 Latvia 
assumes the role of the EU Presidency. It has put forward the task of advancing the 
EU Eastern Partnership as its key foreign policy priority. Hence, its ability to pursue 
the EU’s common preferences becomes something more than only a matter of its own 
uploading issue. This study aims to stimulate the scholarly interest in this direction.  
Scientific Importance of the Study  
The significance of this study lies in its contribution to the existing research. First, the 
Europeanization scholarship in foreign policy often focuses on the big old, or the 
small old member states. This study fills this gap by exploring a small new member 
state Latvia. In this way it addresses the task put forward by the prominent scholars 
Wong and Hill (2011) to include in the research on Europeanization of foreign policy 
also the new members to know the roles played by these ‘frontline states’.  
Second, to date Europeanization scholarship in foreign policy has been 
predominantly concerned with downloading. To fill this gap, this study provides 
empirical evidence on the uploading dimension of Europeanization.  
Third, the scholars examining uploading in foreign policy used to focus on the 
outcome, and there is little evidence about the process itself with the causal 
mechanisms. If mentioned, these mechanisms are mainly drawn from a constructivism 
approach with socialization as the key mechanism
3
. The novelty of this study is that it 
introduces additional mechanisms from the rational choice institutionalism theoretical 
                                                 
3
 While socialization has been presented as following the logic of appropriateness, the empirical 
evidence shows the opposite: in CFSP working parties socialization followed the rational calculus 
(Juncos & Pomorska 2006)  
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perspective. It empirically demonstrates that such mechanisms as cooperative 
bargaining, lobbying, and coalition building are of critical importance for uploading. 
Thereby this study contributes in providing more comprehensive picture of 
Europeanization of national foreign policies. 
Fourth, the existing scholarship on Europeanization of foreign policy has only 
marginally focused on Latvia. Although there have been studies on Latvia’s foreign 
policy interests in the EU, highlighting its geographical preferences in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, the question on how exactly Latvia uploaded them and whether it has 
been successful in achieving its preferences remains unanswered. The novelty of this 
study is that it explores in what ways Latvia pursues its interests in EU foreign policy. 
Fifth, by looking at Latvia’s uploading in EU foreign policy under the Lisbon 
Treaty, this study contributes to a better understanding of how the member states 
operates within this new EU institutional environment. 
Finally, through exploring Latvia’s uploading in EU policy towards Eastern 
neighbours, it contributes to a better understanding of this trajectory of EU policy vis-
à-vis its Eastern neighbours. Given today’s changing geopolitical realities in the EU’s 
Eastern neighbourhood, and the role the EU seeks to play there, exploring the 
individual member states contribution in this EU policy direction is an urgent task.   
Research Aim and Questions 
The aim of this study is to explore how a member state, with limited resources but 
greater intensity of preferences, can influence EU foreign policy. I use Latvia’s 
projection of its preferences as a case study. 
The research questions are the following:  
1) Given its intensely held preferences, how can a member state influence EU 
foreign policy-making and its outcome? 
2) In what ways can a member state project its preferences into EU foreign policy, 
in situations where member states have conflicting interests? 
The main interest here is to capture how the uploading process occurs. I draw on the 
preliminary knowledge that there has been a correlation between the national 
preferences and their reflection in EU decision outcome, and trace the process, 
showing how uploading took place and what mechanisms were involved, allowing 
Latvia to attain the preferable outcome.   
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Framework for Analysis  
This study engages in explanations of a member state’s influence on EU foreign 
policy, viewed through the Europeanization framework and institutionalism’s 
theoretical perspective. The hypotheses draw on rational choice institutionalism 
assumptions that member states in pursuit of their preferences act as goal-seeking 
actors (‘rational utility maximizers’). 
Uploading deals with a member state’s influence. In International Relations, 
influence is used together with the concept of ‘power’ (for a discussion see Chapter 
4.3.)  Power is the potential, which a person or group has “to realize their own will in 
a social action even against the resistance of others” (Weber 2007/1914). Thereby 
power focuses on influencing ‘social’ or collective actions, i.e. content of EU 
decisions (Thomson 2011:189). Influence is a proportion of the used potential of 
power, where this proportion depends on the preference intensity (ibid). In the case of 
high preference intensity, a member state puts in enormous mobilising efforts to 
attain its goal (Tallberg et al. 2011:9). Thus, a state with limited resources but higher 
intensity of preference may achieve greater influence (Cox & Jacobson 1973:4).  
In this study, the intensely held national preferences is an independent 
variable, understood as arising from a member state’s geographic proximity with a 
respective third country (for a discussion see Chapter 3.4), creating interdependence 
in terms of economic welfare and security, that is, so-called ‘first order’ core national 
interests (Mearsheimer 2001:46). Consequently, in EU policy-making a member state 
is not expected to sacrifice its ‘first order’ national interests if they conflict with 
other’s preferences or ‘lofty European ideals’ (Thomson 2011). 
In the uploading process, a member state projects its preferences. Influence 
exists when preferences are reflected in EU policy decision. But how exactly does the 
uploading process occur? Here, causal mechanisms help to “provide an ordering 
system that describes the potential cause-effect relationship” (Scharpf 1997:31). 
Contrary to the constructivism advocated mechanism of socialization, uploading 
“shares many similarities with rational choice, interest based accounts” (Wong 
2005:9), allowing for the capturing of uploading with its mechanisms (for discussion 
see Chapter 3.2.). The most recent studies on Europeanization in foreign policy 
identified important uploading mechanisms such as bargaining, lobbying, and 
coalition building (e.g. Sepos 2008, Fiott 2010, Alecu De Flers 2012, Baun & Marek 
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2013). These uploading mechanisms can be attributed to a strategic action. However, 
while these studies singled out the above mechanisms, they have not traced how 
exactly they operate in practice. 
In this respect, extensive scholarship on the decision-making in the EU 
Council offers useful mechanisms. The most prominent of them are ‘arguing’ and 
‘bargaining.’ Arguing seems to be of particular importance in EU foreign policy – in 
the CFSP working parties member states reportedly use arguing 71% of the time and 
bargaining only 29% of the time (Naurin 2007:25). Smaller states can successfully 
influence the EU through persuasive advocacy, by building coalitions, and by using 
their EU Presidency (see, e.g. Tallberg 2008, Bunse 2009, Jakobsen 2009, Panke 
2010). In addition, a ‘small state’s ideal behaviour’ is acting as a lobbyist, a self-
interested mediator, and a norm entrepreneur (Hovard Grøn & Wivel 2011:523).  
Accordingly, this study borrows the above mechanisms to trace the uploading 
process in EU foreign policy. First, two important uploading mechanisms  – 
‘presenting arguments’ and ‘cooperative bargaining’ – are introduced and used here 
synonymously to a member state’s formal interventions in EU working parties. While 
these two are highly important mechanisms, practitioners recognize that “the formal 
EU working groups are only the surface, while the real work happens behind the 
scenes” (Interview No. 28.12.2012, PermRep). Thereby, the formal uploading 
mechanisms should be complement by the informal ones. Informal contacts with other 
member states, using like-minded coalitions, and lobbying the EU institutions can be 
effective informal means of influence. Also, bolstering the domestic uploading 
capacity indirectly helps to influence the EU level (for discussion see Chapter 3.4). 
First, ‘presenting arguments’ or arguing is an effort to persuade others by 
giving reasons (Elster 2007:405). From the constructivist ‘logic of appropriateness,’ 
actors “present arguments and try to persuade each other” and “their preferences are 
open for redefinition” (Checkel 2007:13). Actors are expected to be sincere and never 
use arguments as a strategic asset. But then EU foreign policy-making would be 
purely a ‘truth seeking’ exercise. By contrast, rationalists consider that arguing can be 
used strategically. ‘Competitive arguing’ (Naurin 2007:11) or ‘rhetorical action’ 
Schimmelfennig’s (2001) have been singled out as a strategic use of arguments to 
persuade opponents. I use ‘presenting arguments’ to mean strategic action, which 
involves giving reasons based on scientific evidence or on shared values to persuade 
others (Panke 2010).  
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Second, ‘bargaining’ is a prominent mechanism in EU Council negotiations. It 
means reaching agreement through credible threats and promises (Elster 2007:419). 
At the first glance, EU foreign policy-making does not resemble this type of 
interaction: usually, the national representatives use “very elegant rhetoric, referring 
to the EU common norms and values” (Interview No 1. . However, bargaining can 
also have a soft or cooperative form, involving a great deal of ‘give-and-take.’ Recent 
studies show that in EU foreign policy cooperative bargaining helps to reach a 
compromise decision (Thomas 2011). The rational choice institutionalism scholars 
single out cooperative bargaining is the most typical mode in EU Council negotiations 
(Thomson & Holsti 2006). I use ‘cooperative bargaining’ to mean justifying the 
national position, ‘voicing national concerns,’ hinting towards ‘red lines’ as implicit 
threats (Panke 2010:31), and at the same time signalling for flexibility to compromise.
 Third, ‘contacting other member states’ is an important uploading mechanism. 
It involves informal exchange on preferences and seeking others’ support on an ad 
hoc basis (Bőrzel 1998). Member state’s well-developed contacts with other states, 
the so-called ‘network capital,’ allows for accessing others through informal channels 
(Naurin & Lindhal 2014). Member states can gain influence in the EU/ESDP by 
using consultations and identifying like-minded supporters (Björkdahl 2008:138). 
Furthermore, informal pre-negotiation consultations can help to improve the capacity 
of strategic reasoning, and at the later phase, consultations may be important for 
building coalitions (Engelbrekt 2008:13). Small states in particular seek contacts with 
big member states to gain support (Panke 2010:28). 
Fourth, ‘building or joining like-minded coalitions’4 is another informal 
mechanism that may increase influence, particularly attractive for smaller member 
states (see, e.g. Naurin & Lindahl 2008). Joining coalitions is especially popular 
among smaller states, while initiators are the bigger countries (Panke 2010:205). 
Coalition building is a form of strategic action. It means joining or initiating a like-
minded group of states, coordinating activities and defending the same position in EU 
policy formats at various levels. 
Fifth, ‘lobbying EU institutional actors’ is frequently used by member states 
(Panke 2012). Lobbying is a ‘unilateral action’ where formal institutional rules are 
absent (Scharp 1997:47). Member states directly contact EU institutions, which set 
                                                 
4
 The term ‘like-minded coalition’ is widely used in practice. It means that member states establish 
coalitions based on similar/ like-minded views on specific issues.  
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agenda or chair (Panke 2012). In EU foreign policy, lobbying the High Representative 
(HR) for the CFSP and the European External Action Service (EEAS) is relevant. 
Lobbying is particularly important for small states – while EU institutions consult 
with big members on their preferences towards third countries such as Russia, smaller 
states need to lobby pro-actively to be successful (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008:173). 
Sixth, ‘bolstering the domestic uploading capacity’5 is of crucial importance 
indirectly helping a member state to influence the outcome (Panke 2010:20). For 
uploading a state needs a high-quality national position, otherwise “even the most 
enlightened preferences will fail to make a practical difference” (Scharpf 1997:51). 
Subsequently, in line with rational choice institutionalism and drawing on the 
scholarship on the decision-making in the EU Council and the studies on small state 
influence in the EU this study introduces the following hypotheses: 
H1: Given intensely held national preferences, a member state Latvia can influence 
EU foreign policy through six uploading mechanisms: (1) presenting arguments, (2) 
cooperative bargaining, (3) contacting other member states, (4) using coalitions, (5) 
lobbying the EU institutions and (6) bolstering the domestic uploading capacity.  
H2: The higher the intensity of preference, the more of the above mechanisms are 
mobilised in helping Latvia to attain its preferred EU decision outcome. 
In exploring preference projection, this study introduces the following variables: the 
independent variable – intensely held national preferences, the dependent variable – a 
member state’s influence on EU foreign policy outcome, the conditions – EU foreign 
policy-making environment. As the main focus is on how Latvia seeks to influence 
the EU level, there should be correlation between the variables, i.e. “positive value in 
both the independent and the dependent variables” (Beach & Pedersen 2013).  
The national preferences with variation on the degree of intensity are an 
independent variable. The distinction is made across the variation in terms of the 
degree of intensity of preference, which ranges from high to low. A high intensity of 
preference exists when there is strong domestic pressure on foreign policy-makers. A 
medium intensity exists when there are clear domestic interests, but no immediate 
pressure on policy-makers to secure a particular outcome. A low intensity of 
                                                 
5
 Bolstering the domestic capacity “sits on the fence” between the mechanism and the condition for 
successful uploading (Major 2008:64). It can also be seen as a prerequisite of the previous five. 
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preference equals a political preference – the issue ranks highly in a government’s 
political statements, but there is no domestic pressure on foreign policy-makers. 
Research design is illustrated in the following way:  
Independent 
variable  
Causal mechanism of uploading  Dependent 
variable  
Intensely held 
national 
preferences  
(high, medium, 
low intensity). 
1. Presenting arguments; 
2. Cooperative bargaining; 
3. Lobbying the EU institutions; 
4. Consulting with other member states; 
5. Building or joining coalitions; 
6. Bolstering domestic uploading capacity. 
Influence on EU 
policy outcome.  
 Within-case study on Latvia (3 sub-cases).  
 Europeanization concept & rational choice 
institutionalism. 
 
Table 1: Research design  
Outline of the Study 
The study proceeds as follows. After the literature review (Chapter 2) the theoretical 
framework is introduced in Chapter 3, providing reasons for using the 
Europeanization concept. Rational choice institutionalism is outlined as a theoretical 
basis through which uploading can be explained. Further, determinants of national 
preferences are discussed. The chapter proceeds by looking at EU institutional 
environment with policy-making rules and key actors. It then addresses the issue of a 
member state’s influence in EU, as well as different uploading mechanisms. 
Methodology is presented in Chapter 4, consisting of the operationalization of 
the variables and uploading mechanisms. The reasons are provided for selecting a 
qualitative analysis. It explains using the within-case study on one country and 
process-tracing in order to recreate how the three cases unfolded in practice. It also 
describes case selection, as well as the ways of collecting empirical observations. 
Chapter 5 provides empirical findings from the within-case studies on Latvia. 
They draw upon three EU foreign policy dossiers: 1) the EU economic sanctions 
towards Belarus (2011-2012); 2) the EU-Russia visa-free travel regime (2011-2014); 
and 3) the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (2011-2013). The findings are 
interpreted in the context of the hypothesized uploading mechanisms. Conclusions are 
presented in Chapter 6, also outlining the shortcomings and prospects for further 
research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: UPLOADING DIMENSION OF 
EUROPEANIZATION IN FOREIGN POLICY 
First, I review academic literature related to Europeanization of the foreign policy. I 
focus in particular on its uploading dimension, as it deals with member state’s 
influence on the EU. Second, I review literature related to member state’s influence 
on decision-making process in the Council of the EU. Third, I look at the studies on 
smaller and new member state’s foreign policy experiences in EU, since Latvia also 
belongs to this category. I identify gaps in literature, which this study seeks to fill in. 
Literature on Europeanization of Foreign Policy 
In literature on Europeanization foreign policy is a newcomer. For a long time 
Europeanization studies excluded foreign policy due to the lack of EU cooperation in 
this policy area. In contrast to many sector policies, foreign policy was perceived as 
domaine réservé of the member states, which were not willing to transfer to the EU 
level. Scholarly interest appeared with an increase of EU foreign policy cooperation, 
especially with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
in 1993. However, the most remarkable growth in the academic literature followed the 
entering into force of the EU Lisbon Treaty that substantially enhanced EU-level 
cooperation in the foreign policy. 
In the 1990s, significant studies were published on foreign policies of member 
states operating within the EU. Hill (1996) explored the interaction of national and 
EU foreign policies in the context of creation of the CFSP. Manners and Whitman 
(2000) introduced a framework for comparative analysis in studying the national 
foreign policies within the EU. They suggested three elements to form part of a 
comparative analysis framework: foreign policy change, foreign policy process, and 
foreign policy action. Many studies followed this approach. Among others, Tonra 
(2001) compared the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, Aggestam (2004) – the UK, 
France and Germany, Major (2008) – the UK, France and Germany, Müller (2012) – 
the UK, France and Germany, Alecu de Flers (2012) – Austria and Ireland.  
Notwithstanding these contributions, the first comprehensive study on 
Europeanization of foreign policy was edited by Wong and Hill (2011), which in a 
systematic way compared a large group of member states, including big and small, 
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old and new countries.
6
 Yet, the authors were not “able to provide detailed data on a 
number of later entrants,” among others, Latvia (2011: 212). Hence, they put forward 
the task to include also these states in the studies on Europeanization of foreign policy 
to know “what are the roles played by ‘frontline states’” (ibid). In this context, a 
substantial contribution is a recent study on Europeanization of foreign policies of 
new member states edited by Baun and Marek (2013), which captures the twelve 
newcomers. However, given the broad coverage, the authors could evaluate 
Europeanization of foreign policies only in a general way.  
While the comparative studies mentioned above significantly developed our 
understanding of Europeanization of foreign policy, including the uploading 
dimension, they examined Europeanization without going into detail of how the 
causal process occurred. This shortage has been addressed by a number of in-depth 
studies on single cases, among others, Torreblanca – on Spain (2001), Economides 
(2005) – on Greece, Wong (2006) – on France, Miskimmon (2007) – on Germany, 
Pomorska (2007, 2011a, 2011b) – on Poland. Notwithstanding these contributions, 
there is a need to add new in-depth case studies on individual states given the 
dynamic changes in the conceptualization of Europeanization.  
Together with the rapid growth in studies of the Europeanization of foreign 
policy, scholars have developed an understanding on conceptualizing Europeanization 
in foreign policy. Today there is a general consensus that Europeanization is a two-
way process, consisting of uploading and downloading. Yet, for a long time scholars 
investigated only downloading (see, e.g. Tonra, 2001, Torrebanca 2001, Denca 2010, 
Moumotzis 2011). Only recent studies captured uploading. Important here have been 
the efforts of Wong (2005, 2007), who conceptualized Europeanization in foreign 
policy as an interactive on-going process between national and EU levels. Hill and 
Wong (2011) consolidated this conceptualization by providing empirical evidence on 
a large part of member states. This pattern has been further used, for instance, by 
Baun and Marek (2013) on foreign policy Europeanization of new member states. 
The Uploading Dimension with its Mechanisms 
With regards to the uploading dimension, such authors as Economides (2005), 
Edwards (2006), Miskimmon (2007), and Major (2008) analysed exclusively 
                                                 
6
 F.Charillon and R.Wong on France, P.Daehnhardt on Germany, E.Brigi on Italy, M.Aktipis and 
T.Oliver on the UK, H.Larsen on Denmark, C.Tsardanidis and S.Stavridis on Greece, E.Barbé on 
Spain, H.Haukkala and H.Ojanen on Finland, K.Pomorska on Pland, S.Kajnč on Slovenia.  
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uploading. Miskimmon (2007) focused on Germany, Major (2008) – on France, the 
UK and Germany, and Müller (2011) on France, the UK and Germany. 
Uploading with its causal mechanisms has been underexplored in the existing 
literature. One way of explaining uploading in foreign policy has been to use 
indicators, introduced by Hill (1996), who focused on member states’ attitudes and 
public opinion, and the impact of socialization. Scholarship that is more recent further 
advanced the indicator-based approach (Wong 2005, Gross 2009, Hill & Wong 2011, 
Müller 2011). Yet these studies have not ‘opened the black box’ of the causal process, 
and thus it does not help to understand how exactly a state projects its preferences. 
Important uploading mechanisms have been introduced by Miskimmon in his 
study on Europeanization of Germany’s foreign policy, i.e. (1) discursive influence, 
(2) institutional export, (3) example setting, (4) and agenda setting (2007:192). 
Miskimmon’s approach was further developed by Major in her study on uploading in 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by Germany, France and UK – 
from a constructivist perspective. She proposed six mechanisms: (1) agenda setting, 
(2) example setting, (3) multilateral cooperation, (4) ideational export and preference 
shaping, (5) administrative commitment, (6) and political capacities. 
Furthermore, Alecu de Flers (2012:121-122) in her recent study on 
Europeanization of foreign policies of Austria and Ireland, empirically showed 
instances of bargaining, when these small, neutral member states “participation in the 
CFSP can be understood as [having] been based on cost/benefit analyses and the 
maximization of utilities.” Relevant for this study is the author’s findings on the cases 
of bargaining (ibid, 122), describing this as its cooperative form: “While the notion of 
national interests has been retained, Irish and Austrian policy-makers have been 
actively seeking to reach common positions with the other EU partners” (ibid).  
Similarly, Kavakas (2001:143) showed that a state’s ability to influence EU 
foreign policy is related to constructive participation and reputation as a promoter of 
common EU interests. He underlined in this context the importance of (1) a good 
reputation as a cooperative partner that cares for the Union as a whole, (2) well-
prepared policy initiatives, (3) and extensive consultations and preparative diplomacy 
with fellow member states to prepare them for initiative (Kavakas 2001:143). 
With regards to the new member states, Baun and Marek (2013) demonstrated 
that they gradually moved from unsophisticated methods, e.g. blocking the common 
EU decisions, towards smarter uploading mechanisms: persuasive advocating, 
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cooperative behaviour and showing flexibility to compromise. Moreover, while their 
national preferences remained the same, they improved their ways of uploading. 
Copsey and Pomorska (2010, 2014) contributed to the scholarship of uploading 
Europeanization by studying Poland’s influence in the EU Eastern neighbourhood 
policy. They advanced such important variables of a member state’s influence in EU 
as skilled alliance building, administrative capacity, persuasive advocacy, and 
domestic political strength (Copsey and Pomorska 2014).  
The table below shows uploading mechanisms and their expressions singled 
out by the existing scholarship on Europeanization in foreign policy. 
Mechanism Observed actions 
Socialization - “Projection of national preferences, policy models and ideas to the EU level” 
(Checkel 2005; Müller & Alecu de Flers 2009). 
Discourse/ 
Ideational 
influence 
 
- Ideational export (Germany): promoting German ideas on the EU in 
conjunction with its key partners (Miskimmon 2007:129).  
- A vital component of ideational export is the influence of policy discourse in 
shaping the options open to policy-makers (ibid). 
- Discourse influence (Germany): emphasizing the need for Europe to deal with 
its own backyard (ibid). 
- Ideational export (‘Big three’ – the UK, Germany, and France) is essential of 
discourses with the goal to shape policy options (Major 2007). 
Persuasion - France’s uploading involved leadership and persuading others to come along 
(Charillon & Wong 2011:25); Paris focused on convincing others to show its 
intellectual superiority rather than to reach consensus (ibid).  
- New member states improved argumentation skills by more convincing 
reasoning, technical justifications, and better presenting of their individual 
assistance for the sake of common benefit (Raik & Gromadzki 2006: 21). 
Institutional 
export  
In the case of Germany “most clearly visible in the export of the Fischer plan 
which became the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe” (Miskimmon 2007). 
Example-
setting 
- Germany, France, the UK – ‘Big three’ outward oriented positioning in 
ideational or material questions (Major 2008). 
- Germany - commitments to the Capabilities (Miskimmon 2007). 
Agenda-setting - The ‘Big three’ – advancing of particular ideas; use of opportunities of the EU 
Presidency; usually at the beginning of policy cycle (Major 2008). 
- Germany – a great success in the European Council; consistency, pro-activity 
(Miskimmon 2007). 
- Germany helped decisively to set agenda to move ahead the Eastern 
Partnership in 2009 (Daehnhardt 2011:49). 
Coalition-
building  
- The ‘Big three’ – coalition-building (Major 2008). 
- “France started to explore the tracks of coalition building before expressing 
national preferences” (Charillon & Wong 2011:30). 
- Germany was successful in building bilateral alliances with Poland and 
Sweden to move ahead the Eastern Partnership in 2009. Berlin built coalitions                                               
with willing partners to forge secure neighbourhood (Daehnhardt 2011:49). 
- Poland together with the Visegrad Group promoted Eastern Dimension, and 
together with Sweden tabled a proposal at EU Council (Pomorska 2011a:176). 
- Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland hampered the idea of EU common 
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defence by changing the Constitutional Treaty (Haukkala & Ojanen 2011:162)  
- New member states actively used coalitions, succeeding to keep the Eastern 
neighbourhood on the EU agenda. In the energy policy, the Baltic common 
approach has been highly important (Galbreath et al. 2008: 48).   
- Cyprus pressured Turkey by using a coalition with Greece (Sepos 2008: 124). 
Lobbying - The Baltic politicians “did important lobbying efforts” to include the South 
Caucasus countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Kesa 2011: 93); 
- Poland’s lobbying led to the Eastern Dimension concept being discussed in 
mid-2006 (Pomorska 2011a:176); 
- Malta put continuous ‘lobbying efforts’ in the European Commission, the 
Foreign Affairs Council, and the European Parliament (Fiott 2010).  
Compromise-
seeking 
behaviour 
Lithuania shifted from being a trouble-maker to a pragmatic and cooperative 
approach, while the policy priorities remained the same (Vilpišauskas 2013). 
The EU solidarity expression with Estonia stimulated it to be even more 
consensus-oriented in the EU policy vis-à-vis Russia (Kasekamp 2013). 
Framing - By calling for the EU solidarity, Greece framed the FYROM recognition as a 
matter of national security (Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2011:120). 
Bargaining  - Without Cyprus EU membership Greece counter-threatened to veto the 
Eastern enlargement (Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2011:120).  
- Greece linked the question of FYROM’s recognition to the recognitions of 
Croatia and Slovenia, which has been sought by other EU states (ibid, 121). 
- Irish and Austrian participation in the CFSP has been based on cost/benefit 
analyses: their national interests retained, while they sought to reach common 
positions with EU partners” (Alecu De Flers 2012). 
Administrative 
commitment 
The ‘Big three’ – mechanism (or condition) for successful uploading. Resources 
(staff power, expertise, competences) support state’s influence (Major 2008). 
Political 
capacities 
The ‘Big three’ – mechanism (or condition) (Major 2008). 
Table 2: The uploading mechanisms in the Europeanization literature on foreign policy 
As can be seen, not all the above mechanisms would work in the case of a small new 
member state, such as Latvia. It cannot rely on political capacities and weight, or on 
institutional export. Also, agenda-setting is problematic. In practice, the agenda is in 
most occasions determined by the big member states, and only exceptionally (as an 
EU Presidency) small members succeed to include their highly salient issues on EU 
foreign policy agenda. If the big member states disliked a specific proposal of a small 
state, they would never let it pass (Kavakas 2001). 
At the same time, the above studies show that the uploading process in foreign 
policy may involve various mechanisms, not only widely recognized socialization. 
Especially, the latest studies on Europeanization in foreign policy demonstrate that 
uploading indeed has “similarities with the rational choice approach” (Wong 2006, 
Wong & Hill 2011, Alecu De Flers 2012, Baun & Marek 2013). Yet, while these 
studies have identified important uploading mechanisms such as arguing, bargaining, 
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lobbying, or coalition-building, most often they have not ‘opened the black box,’ 
showing how these mechanisms operate in EU foreign policy-making. Given that 
these causal mechanisms have been broadly analysed in other EU policy areas, they 
can be helpful in answering the research question of this study on the ways in which 
Latvia could project its preferences in EU foreign policy. As noted before, the EU 
foreign policy-making under the Lisbon Treaty is no longer exclusive, but operates 
under the same pattern as in the EU Council in general. 
Overall, the Europeanization studies in foreign policy have only generally 
described the uploading process without in-depth analysis of how it occurs. The 
studies inadequately addressed how causal mechanisms of uploading operate. 
Therefore, there is an obvious need for additional in-depth studies on the uploading 
dimension. The studies of Miskimmon (2007) and Major (2008) are the most valuable 
for this particular study as the authors described uploading both as the result of, and 
the process by which the mechanisms influenced, foreign policy. Importantly, Major 
(2008) explored the uploading dimension as a defining property of Europeanization, 
which is a good basis for additional work. These studies however focused on the three 
biggest member states, suggesting such uploading mechanisms as the agenda setting, 
the institutional export, and the example setting, which could not work in the case of 
small member states such as Latvia. 
Influence in the EU Council Decision-making 
Uploading in EU foreign policy has been indirectly analysed by an extensive study 
edited by Thomas (2011). A group of authors explored how member states overcome 
their divergent preferences to reach compromise in the CFSP. The authors, building 
on the so-called normative institutionalism, tested various uploading mechanisms 
drawn on alternative theoretical approaches in their ability to produce the positive 
CFSP outcome (a compromise). In particular, they introduced ‘cooperative 
bargaining’ as an alternative to ‘socialization’ (‘normative suasion’).  
Furthermore, an important part of literature is related to a member state’s 
influence in the EU Council decision-making (Odell 2010, Naurin 2008, Panke 2010, 
Dür & Mateo 2011, Lehtonen 2009, Thomson 2011a, 2011b). In relation to the 
research questions of this study, the volume of Thomson (2011a), built on rational 
choice institutionalism, is especially useful as he explored the causal process between 
the national preferences and the outcomes in different EU policy areas. Thomson 
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(ibid) developed ‘informal bargaining’ as the main way of negotiating in the EU 
Council. His empirical findings showed that all member states – old and new, are able 
to influence the EU policy outcome through bargaining. 
In exploring a small state’s influence in the EU significant work has been done 
by Panke (2011), contributing to the liberal scholarship. She examined all the small 
member states’ (19 out of 27) uploading strategies in the EU Council, concluding that 
small, new member states face more severe structural disadvantages, and thereby they 
are by far less active and successful in defending their interests. Bunse (2009) 
explored how small states can exert influence in the EU through the EU Presidency. A 
small state’s influence in the EU has been examined also by Lehtonen (2009), who 
concluded that unanimity rule strengthens their position through the veto-right. In 
terms of uploading mechanisms such as building coalitions, Rūse (2010, 2011) from 
the rational choice institutionalism perspective explored how member states use 
institutionalized coalitions to increase their bargaining power in the EU. The volume 
of Wivel (2010) on small states’ influence in the EU introduced so-called ‘small state 
smart strategy.’ Similarly, Howard Grøn and Wivel (2011) in their study on small 
states’ influence stressed that post-Lisbon decision making in EU foreign policy 
requires even more ‘smart strategy’ by acting as lobbyist, self-interested mediator, 
and norm-entrepreneur. Notwithstanding the importance of these studies, they 
however focused only on small, old and wealthy member states. By exploring a small 
new member state, Latvia, this study seeks to contribute to the research on member 
states’ strategic behaviour in the EU. 
Studies on the New Member States’ Foreign Policies in EU 
Only recently new member states appeared as a part of this research (see e.g. 
Pomorska (2008, 2011), Kaminska (2013) – on Poland, Kajnč (2011) – on Slovenia). 
The newest member states’ influence on the EU has been analysed by Copsey and 
Haughton (2009). Copsey and Pomorska (2010, 2014) analysed Poland’s influence in 
EU Eastern policy, introducing such variables of uploading as alliance building, 
persuasive advocacy, and administrative capacity. In a similar way, Vilpišauskas 
(2011, 2013) demonstrated that the success of the Baltic States’ uploading depends on 
their domestic policy continuity and coherence. Importantly, Baun and Marek (2013: 
216-217) in analysing Europeanization of foreign policy concluded that none of the 
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new member states have “surrendered their rights to assert specific national interests, 
even if it goes against the European mainstream.”  
Especially the question posed by Wong and Hill (2011) on “what are the roles 
played by ‘frontline states’ in the EU policy towards neighbours” requires additional 
scholarly attention, is argued here. In exploring the roles of small new member states 
at the EU ‘frontline’ in EU, Pastore (2013) compared how Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia pursued their geographic preferences in EU foreign 
policy. It was shown that these countries, despite their ‘double disadvantages,’ 
improved their uploading skills through compromise-seeking behaviour, persuasive 
deliberation, lobbying, and using like-minded coalitions (Ibid). While these countries’ 
uploading success has been mixed, their preference projection in EU foreign policy 
has been visible (ibid). This study provides additional empirical evidence to this end.   
There are relevant studies on the Baltic States on the new member states’ 
participation in the EU policy towards their neighbourhood. Among others, a valuable 
work edited by Berg and Ehin (2009) examined how the Baltic States’ accession to 
the EU changed their relations with Russia. One contributor in this study, Sprūds 
(2009), provided an in-depth analysis on the Baltic-Russian relations that underline 
changing patterns in Latvian-Russian relations resulting from Latvia’s increasing 
dependency on Russian gas. Europeanization of the Baltic States has been analysed 
by Vilpišauskas (2011, 2013), who linked uploading success to domestic factors, 
especially consistency of domestic policy, cooperation with the EU institutions and 
use of the EU Presidency. Made (2011) explained Estonia’s activities in the Eastern 
partnership as a need for ‘shining in Brussels,’ arguably a strategic action.  
Regarding Latvia, most of the literature touches upon related aspects of this 
study without paying attention to its research question. One exception is a 
contribution of Galbreath and Lamoreaux (2013) into the volume edited by Baun and 
Marek (2013). They very generally examined the Europeanization of Latvia’s foreign 
policy, concluding that country’s foreign policy preferences have been 
operationalized not only through the EU but also through NATO and cooperation with 
the U.S. (Galbreath & Lamoreaux 2013: 112-125). With regards to changes of the 
Latvian foreign policy after joining the EU, important studies have been accomplished 
during 2006-2008 by the Commission of the Strategic Analysis operating under the 
President of Latvia, with the authors encouraging the Latvian policy-makers to 
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actively promote the country’s priorities in EU Eastern neighbourhood policy onto the 
EU agenda (see e.g. Ozoliņa 2006, 2007, 2008, Bungs, 2006, Rostoks, 2007, 2008).  
In terms of downloading Europeanization in Latvia, a substantial contribution 
has been made by Timofejevs-Henriksson (2013) who studied Europeanization of the 
Latvian foreign aid policy. He concluded that a driving force of Latvia’s 
implementation of development cooperation commitments has been a wish to be 
recognized as “modern and European” (Timofejevs-Henriksson 2013: 277). A 
contribution from both downloading and uploading perspectives has been produced 
by Akule (2007). She offered a valuable insight into the Latvian domestic changes 
after joining the EU. Especially, she looked at the “cases where the Latvian officials 
have succeeded in lobbying,” concluded that “results of the lobbying done by Latvian 
officials within EU institutions seem to prove that the level of Europeanization – 
active participation in EU policy-making - is rather high” (Akule 2007). This study 
furthers analysis in this direction.   
The ten new, post-communist member states’ experience in the EU has been 
analysed by the recent study edited by Beacháin, Sheridan and Stan (2012). From the 
comparative perspective, a group of authors, among others Ozoliņa on Latvia, 
explored whether the EU membership has created a positive change in ten new 
member states. In terms of the EU foreign policy the authors concluded that the new 
member states “play disproportionate role in formulating policies towards the EU new 
neighbourhood” (Beachán et al. 2012:224). Here Ozoliņa (2012:146), inter alia, 
showed that Latvia’s interest in EU foreign policy concentrates to its neighbourhood, 
opting for European Neighbourhood Policy to help sharing its reform experiences.  
Research related to the three empirical case studies, dealing with Latvia’s 
relationships with the Eastern neighbours, has been considerably well analysed. One 
particular issue, well covered in literature related to this study, is Latvia’s relations 
with Belarus in the light of the EU sanctions towards Belarus in 2011 - 2012. Linked 
with one of the sub-cases of this study – the EU economic sanctions towards Belarus, 
the volume edited by Sprūds (2012) helps to understand the Latvian economic 
interests and actions towards Belarus. Among others, Bošs, Kļaviņš, Pelnēns and 
Potjomkina analysed in detail the Latvian-Belarusian economic cooperation in the EU 
context. Furthermore, the authors explained the reasons behind the Latvian choice to 
defend its domestic economic interests instead of the EU idealistic values in the case 
of EU economic sanctions towards Belarus. This study furthers analysis in this 
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direction by looking into how Latvia uploaded this highly salient issue for the country 
to the EU level.  
The issues on the Eastern Partnership have gained growing scholarly attention, 
including on the Baltic States’ role in this EU policy, given that both Lithuania and 
Latvia during their rotating EU Presidencies focus on advancing the Eastern 
Partnership, and arranging the summits in Vilnius in November 2013 and in Riga in 
May 2015. In this context, scholars have indirectly touched upon Latvia’s uploading 
endeavours in EU foreign policy towards Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (see, e.g. 
Vargulis 2013, Kuzņecova, Potjomkina &Vargulis 2013).  
Against this background, this study contributes to the existing research in a 
numerous ways. It explores uploading dimension of Europeanization by introducing 
additional uploading mechanisms. It provides empirical evidence on the uploading 
process by exploring Latvia. By looking at Latvia’s uploading in EU foreign policy 
under the Lisbon Treaty, this study contributes to a better understanding of how the 
EU foreign policy-making operates within this new EU institutional environment.  
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, given the research question of how a 
member state can influence the EU foreign policy, I explain the choice of theoretical 
perspective, that is, why an analysis of a member state’s influence on the EU foreign 
policy is embedded in the Europeanization framework. In so doing, I juxtapose 
various concepts for analysing the relationship between the national and the EU 
foreign policies and introduce the concept of Europeanization. I proceed with an 
explanation of the Europeanization concept and of how, for the purposes of this 
study, Europeanization is understood as a wider process through which member 
states project their national preferences to the EU level. 
Second, as Europeanization is a concept without its own methodology, it is 
combined with meta-theoretical approach, which may be used for testing hypotheses 
on uploading. I set out the reason for selecting rational choice institutionalism to 
explain uploading. Third, given that the departure point (independent variable) in this 
study is member state’s national preferences, which are supposed to explain its 
influence on the EU policy-making process and outcome, I clarify the meaning of 
national preferences and their intensity. Fourth, I discuss the EU foreign policy-
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making environment, which, in line with rational choice institutionalism, constrains 
individual preference projection. Fifth, the understanding of influence on EU foreign 
policy is discussed, and various uploading mechanisms are introduced from a rational 
choice institutionalism perspective. 
3.1. Various Concepts of EU Foreign Policy Analysis  
In explaining the relationship between the national and the EU foreign policy, it is 
necessary to define the meaning of ‘foreign policy’ and to clarify what determines the 
national and the EU foreign policy. I further discuss various concepts for analysing 
the relationship between the national and the EU foreign policies and introduce the 
concept of Europeanization. 
3.1.1. National and EU Foreign Policy 
There is no consensus among scholars on definition of ‘foreign policy’. Hill (2003:3) 
suggested that foreign policy is “the sum of official external relations conducted by an 
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.” Here, ‘an independent 
actor’ could also include “phenomena such as the European Union” (Hill 2003:3). In 
contrast, Carlsnaes (2002) limited foreign policy exclusively to only nation-states. He 
defined foreign policy as:  
“Those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, 
commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives 
acting on behalf of sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, 
conditions and actors - both governmental and non-governmental – which 
they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy” 
(Carlsnaes 2002:335).  
This definition captures actor’s intentions, state centrality and purposeful behaviour 
(Carlsnaes 2002, White 2004:11) and therefore is more suitable for this study, which 
explores a member state’s influence on EU foreign policy. 
With regards to the meaning, foreign policy can be understood in its 
traditional sense, which include the political, diplomatic and security dimensions, but 
it can also be understood in a broader sense covering the external relations, e.g. 
foreign trade and development policy (e.g. Wong 2005, Hill & Wong 2011). In this 
study, the wider sense of foreign policy is used for the reason that it focuses on EU 
foreign policy agenda. Usually the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is charged with 
other EU sectoral issues (e.g. EU visa policy, energy policy, and the EU economic 
sanctions), which emerge in the EU relations with the third countries. At the same 
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time, these sectoral issues are touched here upon only as far as they appear to be on 
the FAC political agenda.  
The question of what determines the national and the EU foreign policy is part 
of a deeper ontological understanding about the relations between ‘an actor’ (a 
member state) and ‘an institution’ (EU). Applied to the research question of this 
study, it is useful to clarify whether a member state or the EU account for the 
development of national foreign policies in the EU. In the following, the two 
approaches – ‘actor-based’ (state-centric) and ‘EU-as-actor’ (EU-centric) - are 
discussed, and advantages of Europeanization underlined.  
3.1.2. ‘Actor-based’ and ‘EU-as-actor’ Approaches 
The relationship between the national and the EU levels is one of the main issues in 
foreign policy theory. There are two rival schools - the ‘actor-based’ and the 
‘institution-based’ (White 1999; Carlsnaes & Smith 1994, Carlsnaes 2002).  
Actor-based (state-centric) approach 
The actor-based approach assumes that the national level explains the member states 
interaction in the EU. Individual states act as goal-seeking actors, pursuing their 
national preferences, which are independent from the EU institutional environment. 
The actor-based approach is advocated by realists, and assumes that nation-states are 
the key actors in the anarchic international system. Prominent realist scholar 
Morgenthau in his 'Politics Among Nations' ([1948] 2006) argued that nation-states 
might transfer their sovereignty to supranational organizations if it suits their 
preferences. Similarly, Waltz (1979) explained the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) as a response to the bipolar international system after 
the World War II. In a rationalist account, a state’s foreign policy derives from its 
material capabilities. From this perspective, Latvia as a small and arguably new state 
would not have any possibility to influence EU foreign policy.   
Intergovernmentalism, a version of realist theory, used in the EU studies, 
assumes that the EU is an instrument for big member states to realize policies that 
otherwise would not be possible. Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993, 
1998) makes a step forward by taking institutions into account. While liberal 
intergovernmentalism acknowledges the EU role it has been criticized because 
national representatives have little flexibility for making compromises beyond their 
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national preferences. Following this approach, a typical EU foreign policy outcome 
would be the ‘lowest common denominator’ if the national preferences converge.  
EU-as-actor (EU-centric) Approach 
The opposite approach – the ‘EU-as-actor’ approach, takes EU institutions and EU 
foreign policy as a given. This approach is represented by constructivism, sociological 
institutionalism and neofunctionalism. Constructivism assumes that interaction of 
member states within the EU leads towards incremental changes of their foreign 
policy interests and identities, and can result in an autonomous EU foreign policy. 
The EU is a sui generis foreign policy actor (White 2001, Nuttall 2000, Carlsnaes & 
Smith 1994). The EU foreign policy is different from a member state: the EU owns 
the ‘normative power’ and thereby is able to project its values and norms (Manners 
2006). Constructivism considers that the process leading to the convergence of EU 
foreign policy is driven by ‘socialization’, which changes national interests (Tonra 
2001, Jørgensen 2004).  
The EU-as-actor approach also appears in the neofunctionalism. Contrary to 
constructivism, neofunctionalism explains the development of EU policies as 
purposeful behaviour through the political spill-over processes (Haas 1968). It 
assumes that member states follow a cost-benefit calculation and that the interaction 
at the EU level reinforces a member state’s individual action. The benefits from 
cooperation in one area create a spill-over, which results in increasing foreign policy 
integration, emerging in EU ‘actorness’ (Øhrgaard 2004, cited in Beach 2012:212).  
Both the actor-based and the EU-as-actor approaches have been criticized for their 
limits in analysing relations between the national and the EU levels. The first one has 
been criticised for understanding institutional constraints only in how states as 
rational actors avoid ‘exogenous institutional processes’ (Carlsnaes 1992:251). The 
EU-as-actor approach has been criticized for its simplified understanding of the EU as 
a ‘normative power’, and its weakness is especially evident in analysing EU relations 
with third countries such as the United States, China and Russia (Wong & Hill 2011; 
Thomas 2011). Often behind the declared satisfaction with EU decisions, member 
states have conflicts and hidden strategies for reaching their preferred outcomes 
(Smith 2004:21). Furthermore, the EU-as-actor approach has been criticized as it does 
not allow for analysing EU foreign policy-making as a process, that is, how policy 
emerges, and from whom and why (Clarke & White 1989, White 2001:29).  
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Europeanization – Bridging the Divide 
There have been continuous scholarly efforts to bridge the divide between both 
approaches. Manners and Whitman (2000) advocated for a separate foreign policy 
analysis, “appropriate for the transformational foreign policies of EU member states, 
characterized by the impact of membership.” They introduced a framework for 
comparative analysis of national foreign policies, consisting of (1) foreign policy 
change, (2) foreign policy process (domestic and bureaucratic) and (3) foreign policy 
action (with or without the EU) (Manners & Whitman 2000:6-13). 
Besides the above-mentioned approach, the Europeanization concept also 
seeks to bridge the divide between the actor-based and the EU-as-actor schools. 
Contrary to the full-fledged actor-based perspective, Europeanization takes into 
account the EU environment in which the national foreign policies develop (Wong 
2005:135). The Europeanization focuses on the dynamics of EU foreign policy-
making, including the mechanisms of uploading, while recognizing important role of 
the EU institutional environment. Given these considerations, the Europeanization 
concept is suitable for this study. I will further discuss Europeanization as a 
framework for explaining member state influence on EU foreign policy. 
3.1.3. Using the Europeanization Concept in Foreign Policy 
Europeanization has become a widely used term for capturing how ‘Europe matters’ 
in various EU policy areas (Börzel 1999, 2002, 2003, Olsen 2002, Cowles et al. 2001, 
Tonra 2001, Radaelli 2003, 2004, Bulmer & Burch 2005). Europeanization draws on 
the new institutionalism approach (March & Olsen 1989), assuming that institutions 
play an important role in member state’s interaction within the EU. Initially applied in 
EU ‘first pillar’ areas, Europeanization gained importance also in the area of foreign 
policy, following rapidly developing cooperation in this area. Explicit use of 
Europeanization in foreign policy started with a study of Tonra (2001). Since then it 
was increasingly used in exploring the relationship between the national and the EU 
levels (see, e.g. Torreblanca, 2001, Smith 2000, Wong, 2005, Major 2005, Pomorska 
2007, 2011b), Juncos & Pomorska 2006, Hill & Wong, 2011, Moumoutzis, 2011, 
Müller 2011, Alecu de Flers 2011, 2012, Baun & Marek 2013). 
While the Europeanization concept has been applied in foreign policy, initially 
scholars, such as Tonra (2001), captured it only as the downloading process. This 
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followed Ladrech’s (1994:69) seminal definition of Europeanization as “an 
incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that 
EU political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making.” Gradually this one-dimensional understanding 
changed. An important step forward was made by Wong (2005), who with his 
substantial study on Europeanization of French foreign policy shifted the debate by 
showing that states are not passive recipients of EU demands but rather they pro-
actively seek to influence the EU level. This stimulated scholarly interest to 
investigate uploading in foreign policy (see, e.g. Miskimmon 2007, Major 2008, 
Wong & Hill 2011, Müller 2011, Alecu de Flers 2013, Baun & Marek 2013). 
Why is it important for the member states to project their preferences? By 
uploading, states seek to ‘Europeanize’ and ‘domesticate’ EU policy-making 
(Connolly 2008:14). Wong (2007:326) argued that through uploading a member state 
seeks 1) to increase influence in the world, 2) to influence policies of other member 
states, and 3) to use the EU as cover. Uploading can also be a “proactive strategy to 
manage the EU-level constraints” (Müller 2011:20), to avoid the EU decisions that 
conflict with their national interests (Miskimmon 2007), or to reduce costs in cases 
when states pursue controversial policies (Gross 2009:18). It can provide ‘voice 
opportunities,’ which is of particular interest for smaller states (Müller 2011:19).  
3.1.4. Defining Europeanization and its Uploading Dimension  
The majority of scholars agree that Europeanization is an on-going interactive 
process, consisting of uploading and downloading This interactive nature of 
Europeanization is reflected in Radaelli’s (2003) definition, which is suitable for this 
study: it treats states not as passive recipients of EU demands (being ‘Europeanized’) 
but as active contributors. Radaelli (2003) defines Europeanization as 
“Processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, shared beliefs and norms which 
are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and 
politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures, and policies”   
This definition identifies the dynamic nature of Europeanization. By stating that the 
process starts ‘first’ at the EU level, it captures uploading as the defining property of 
Europeanization. It takes into account the EU institutional environment, within which 
member states operate. However, this definition “blurs the boundaries between cause 
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and effect, dependent and independent variable” (Major 2008:31). Therefore 
bracketing between the uploading and downloading dimensions is recommended. 
Methodologically it helps to analyse Europeanization through different stages, 
allowing to capture a member state’s influence on EU foreign policy.  
Drawing on the conceptualization of Major (2008) and Miskimmon (2007) 
and then slightly modifying it, Europeanization can be depicted in the following way: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Europeanization dimension 
Following this, uploading is identified as a ‘defining property’ of Europeanization, 
whereas downloading – as ‘accompanying property’ (Major 2008:55). Uploading, as 
defined by Wong and Hill (2011b: 3), is a projection of national ideas, preferences 
and models from the national to the supranational level, a pro-active attempt of a 
member state to project its national preferences to the EU level. In this way, a 
member state “contributes to the development of common EU foreign policy.” 
Miskimmon (2007:6) has defined uploading as when  
“Member states ‘project themselves’ by seeking to shape the trajectory of EU 
policy in ways that suit national interests.” 
This definition is suitable for this study. First, it follows the actor-based approach, 
assuming that member states are the main actors in EU foreign policy-making. 
Second, it clearly makes the link between a member state’s national preferences and 
pursuit of them to influence the content of outcome, i.e. trajectory of EU policy. 
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3.1.5. Uploading Embedded in Rational Choice Institutionalism 
As Europeanization is a concept without its own methodology, one can proceed with 
either the actor-based or the institution-based approach (Hėritier 2000). In the area of 
foreign policy, Europeanization has been used in combination with the new 
institutionalism theoretical approach (see, e.g. Tonra 2000, Denca 2011, Mennon 
2011, Pomorska 2011a, 2011b, Alecu de Flers 2012). New institutionalism is suitable 
in that it not only acknowledges the role of member states but it also stresses the 
impact of institutions on member state interaction (Jupile & Caporaso 1999). This 
study agrees that institutional environment is crucial, in particular under the Lisbon 
Treaty, which substantially strengthened the institutional framework for EU foreign 
policy-making. Without taking into account the institutional constraints, uploading 
can be interpreted as a “slightly modified version of intergovernmentalism or liberal 
intergovernmentalism” (Denca 2009:45). 
New institutionalism traditionally has been divided into three branches: 
historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms (Hall & Taylor, 1996), 
which vary in their “views about the nature of reality and relationship between the 
structure and agent” (Rosamond 2000:114). All three branches assume that 
‘institutions matter,’ meaning that they create formal and informal rules within which 
member states operate. For analysing Europeanization, rational choice and 
sociological institutionalisms have been applied most of all. Both of them explore the 
member states’ interactions within the given institutional environmet. However, their 
logic differs. While sociological institutionalism follows the ‘logic of 
appropriateness,’ rational choice institutionalism perceives member states as goal-
seeking actors following their preferences (‘logic of consequentialism’) (March & 
Olsen 1998:949). Recently one more branch - normative institutionalism, has been 
advanced as a suitable framework for analysing uploading in the CFSP (Thomas, et 
al. 2011). I further discuss these branches in more detail.  
Sociological institutionalism assumes that institutional environment 
“constitutes who we are, our identities as social beings” (Pollack 2010:24). It 
considers that institutions shape actor (member state) identities and preferences. From 
this perspective actors, facing a conflicting situation, do not follow their preferences, 
but take into account “socially constructed roles and institutional rules” (ibid). They 
interact according to appropriate behaviour, i.e. do “the right thing” (March & Olsen 
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2005:3). At a deeper level, it can be understood as a logic of habitual action, when 
choices are made almost automatically without reaching the level of conscious 
decision-making (Beach 2012:145).  
When applied to the context of EU foreign policy-making, sociological 
institutionalism expects member state’s compliance to the institutional rules and 
norms. Member states interact in EU foreign policy through the process of 
‘socialisation’, which means “inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community” (Checkel 2007:5). Through socialization via interaction member states 
are supposed to engage in ‘truth-seeking.’ They “miss their rational motivations 
behind the process” (Juncos and Pomorska 2006), and change their preferences. 
However, as demonstrated by Juncos and Pomorska (2006) socialisation in the CFSP 
working groups in fact followed a ‘strategic calculus.’  
Second branch of new institutionalism – rational choice institutionalism – 
draws on actor-based approach and ‘logic of consequences.’ Rational choice 
institutionalism is built on methodological individualism, goal-seeking action under 
institutional constraints (Pollack 2006:4). Originally developed by American scholars 
in 1970s, rational choice institutionalism has been used for studying EU policy-
making, including Europeanization (see e.g. Schimmelfenning 2001, 2003). The 
benefit of it in exploring uploading is that member states are assumed to pursue their 
consistent national preferences, where they are constrained by institutions.  
From the rational actor perspective, member state’s influence on the EU level 
has been extensively studied by intergovernmentalism (see, e.g. Keohane 1984, 
Moravcsik 1993, 1988, Wallace & Wallace 1996). It assumes that member states are 
key actors in the EU. Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism draws on the 
three-step model, connecting preference formation at the national level with an 
intergovernmental EU-level bargaining and a model of institutional choice (Pollack 
2010:20). This approach assumes that national preferences derive from member 
states’ domestic economic (material) interests. For instance, it assumes that behind the 
‘rhetoric idealism’ of EU-15 support for the 2004 enlargement there were 
“measurable economic and geopolitical benefits” (Moravcsik & Vachudova 
2005:206). Regarding the second step, preference projection, it takes the form of 
interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). From this perspective, bargaining takes 
distributive (hard) form with the EU institutions having little influence (Pollack 
2010:21). 
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Although liberal intergovernmentalism may be useful for exploring uploading, 
its relevance has been questioned due to neglecting the role of institutions, and 
thereby many scholars do not opt for it. In this approach, the national representatives 
do not have flexibility; they are only agents representing domestic interest groups. If 
influential domestic groups seek to achieve their preferences through the state level, 
governments face bargaining with a high potential for conflict, and the outcome will 
be zero-sum or deadlock (Moravcsik 1997:521). In addition, this approach explains 
decision-making at the highest political level (intergovernmental conferences), rather 
than a day-to-day decision-making in the EU Council, which this study deals with. 
Accordingly, rational choice institutionalism is more suitable for this study. 
First, it assumes that member states are goal-seeking actors and have consistent 
preferences. They make choices based on their preferences, and they act strategically 
(‘logic of consequences’). Second, rational choice institutionalism takes into account 
the constraining role of EU institutional environment. Overall, the rational choice 
institutionalism accepts Moravcsik’s rationalist assumptions, while it rejects his 
‘institution-free’ model of intergovernmental bargaining (Pollack 2010:21).  
In the scholarship on Europeanization, rational choice institutionalism has 
been applied for exploring downloading through the mechanism of conditionality 
(Börzel & Risse 2006, Schimmelfennig 2003, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005), 
whereas in uploading it has not been used. Yet, uploading, where member states are 
“primary actors of change [..,] shares many similarities with rational-choice interest-
based accounts” (Milward 1992, 200, Bulmer & Burch 1999, Laffan & Stubb 2003, 
cited in Wong 2005:9). Rational choice institutionalism as a theoretical framework 
has been used in extensive studies on member states’ interaction in the EU Council by 
Thomson and Holsti (2006), by Thomson (2011a, 2011b), as well as by Dür and 
Mateo (2010a, 2010b), thereby providing a good basis for this study.   
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that member states pursue their 
preferences within the institutional constraints. Here one needs to clarify the meaning 
of institutional constraints since liberal intergovernmentalism also takes the role of 
institutions into account. In contrast from the latter, rational choice institutionalism 
treats institutional constraints as both formal and informal institutions (see, e.g. 
Thomson 2011a, Scharpf 2012). Institutions, which are “humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction,” consist of formal (e.g. laws, 
voting procedures) and informal constraints (e.g. codes of conduct) (North 1991:97). 
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Especially in EU foreign policy-making it is not sufficient to take only formal 
institutional constraints into account, as this policy area is driven by informal 
consensus. These constraints also include “the potential players in that game” 
(Mennon 2011:85). Thereby, the institutional constraints are formal and informal 
rules, “adherence to which depends only on the actors themselves” (Thomson 
2011a:8). They together with the EU actors’ preferences and uploading efforts form 
the EU foreign policy environment. 
Apart from rational choice institutionalism, a very similar version of new 
institutionalism, which may be useful for exploring uploading, is so-called ‘normative 
institutionalism.’ This approach has recently been advocated by a number of scholars 
as a ‘robust theory’ to explain EU foreign policy-making (Schimmelfennig & Thomas 
2009, Thomas 2011, Thomas & Tonra 2012). Contrary to sociological 
institutionalism, normative institutionalism advocates such causal mechanisms as 
bargaining (cooperative) and ‘rhetoric entrapment’ to reach the EU compromise 
agreement (ibid). This is a crucial step forward, showing that EU foreign policy-
making is not exclusive EU decision-making fora, consisting only of socialisation, but 
also involves bargaining. One confusion, however, is that normative institutionalism 
assumes that “national preferences are exogenous to institutions,” while at the same 
time suggesting that the “habit of consultation has produced a partial convergence.” 
This leads to the question on using the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and ‘logic of 
consequence.’ i.e. “where does consensus stop and convergence begin” (Menon 
2011:208-209). Normative institutionalism also overlaps with rational choice 
institutionalism in terms of uploading mechanisms by using the same mechanism of 
informal cooperative bargaining
7
.  
At the same time a number of aspects of normative institutionalism should be 
taken into account, as it provides relevant uploading mechanisms, namely, 
‘cooperative bargaining.’ Furthermore, bargaining is here contrasted to socialisation – 
the main mechanism of sociological institutionalism. In this way, it reveals that the 
EU foreign policy-making is not different from the other EU policy areas, as argued 
by the constructivist scholars (see, e.g. Checkel 2007), but as a result of increased 
institutionalization in EU foreign policy is similar to Council’s decision-making in 
                                                 
7
 R.Thomson (2011a) drawing on rational choice institutionalism analyzes the EU decision-making as 
‘informal cooperative bargaining’, whereas D.Thomas (2011) applies ‘informal cooperative 
bargaining’ as a property of the normative institutionalism. 
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general. It concludes that in EU foreign policy environment, with its consensus rule 
and consultation reflex, ‘cooperative bargaining’ is a more efficient mechanism than 
socialization. By recognizing ‘bargaining’ as the main mechanism, which is perceived 
as a property of rationalism, normative institutionalism shares crucial elements of the 
rational choice institutionalism approach, which is the basis for this study.  
Accordingly, this study chooses to rely on rational choice institutionalism. It 
places an emphasis on national preferences, while recognising the importance of the 
institutional environment. Actors’ pursuit of their preferences does not imply that 
“preferences are always stable or that actors are always fully aware of the 
consequences as uncertainty belong[s] to interaction process” (Thomson & Holsti 
2006:6). The essence of this approach is that actors are constrained by institutions in 
their pursuit of preferences (Thomson 2011a).  
I further discuss the main components of the uploading process. In answering 
the research question of how a member state can influence EU foreign policy in the 
case of intensely held references, one needs to clarify the meaning of national 
preferences, influence, uploading mechanisms, and EU foreign policy environment. 
3.2. Uploading Process and its Components  
The following issues should be clarified in order to explore uploading. Firstly, how to 
define influence? Secondly, what is meant by national preference? How to sort out 
what is an intensely held national preference in EU foreign policy, an independent 
variable in this study? Thirdly, what is understood by EU foreign policy environment? 
Fourthly, what causal mechanisms from the rational choice institutionalism 
perspective can be involved in uploading?  
3.2.1. Concepts of Influence and Power  
Uploading is a process of influencing. In the political science, ‘influence’ is one of the 
main concepts, used together with the concept of ‘power.’ Although these concepts 
are important, there is no consensus on their meaning. In International Relations, the 
power of a state is linked to ‘power resources’ such as territory, population, wealth 
and military force (Morgenthau [1948] 2006). In difference from this ‘power-as-
resources’ approach, ‘relational power’ approach assumes that power expresses 
relations among actors, where one actor causes change in the behaviour of others. In 
Dahl’s famous definition of power, actor “A has power over B to the extent that he 
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can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957:202). In 
Weber’s ([1922] 1978:53) definition power is the “probability that one actor within a 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” In the context of EU foreign 
policy-making this definition seems to be more suitable: here power focuses not only 
on influencing other actors, but also on the content of EU policy (Thomson 2011a: 
188). Understanding ‘influence’ as only ‘changing others’ behaviour could be too 
narrow. As rightly noted by Thomson (2011a: 188), depending on decision-making 
rules, actor A does not always need to persuade actor B to influence the decision 
outcome (ibid). Accordingly, in this study influence is seen as related to change of 
others’ behaviour and the content of EU decisions. Influence exists when preferences, 
which are purposefully projected by a member state, are reflected in EU foreign 
policy outcome (Major 2008:44). 
Influence is closely related to power. The concept of power has been divided 
in the ‘three faces’ of power. The ‘first face’ is related to the preference projection, 
based on the definitions just mentioned. The ‘second face’ is based on Bachrach and 
Barats (1962:948) so-called ‘non-decision-making,’ meaning intentionally preventing 
some issues from being discussed. The ‘third face’ of power is based on Lukes 
(1974), who broadened the understanding of power by also including the ability to 
shape others’ preferences. In this study, I primarily focus on the ‘first face’ of power, 
which is linked to the preference projection. The ‘second face’ refers to the exercising 
power at the agenda-setting stage, which is not the focus of this study. Also the ‘third 
face’ is too broad and involves shaping of others’ preferences. 
Influence and power are often used as synonyms (see, e.g. Wallace, 2005). A 
number of scholars from the rational choice perspective distinguish power from 
influence (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman 1994, Thomson et al. 2006). This 
study follows this approach, which assumes that power is a potential, while influence 
is the proportion of this potential put into effect, where the proportion used depends 
on the preference intensity (Thomson 2011a: 189). Some actors may have resources 
but no specific interests, while an actor with limited resources but higher intensity of 
preferences may achieve more (Cox & Jacobson 1973:4). 
Thomson (2011a: 189) noted that Weber’s discussion on power foresees that a 
broad range of resources contribute to an actor’s power, including immaterial power 
resources, such as contact networks (ibid), explaining why some actors with a high 
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intensity of preference can have better influence than others who care less about the 
issue (Cox & Jacobson 1973:4). This leads to the question about the preference 
intensity, which is a departure point for this study. 
3.2.2. National Preferences   
As Richardson (2012:339) put it, one always has “to look for the ‘interest’ of any actor 
or institution,” thereby preferences are “a good starting point if we are to understand 
[the] Europeanization process.” Moravcsik’s (1997:523) liberal intergovernmentalism 
holds that member state preferences determine their willingness to invest resources in 
attaining a particular outcome. Member states demonstrating high preference intensity 
can better attain the goal, characterized as a so-called ‘paradox of weakness’ 
(Schelling 1960, cited by Bailer 2009:7). Thus, a small member state Belgium 
managed to delay a decision in the EU Chocolate directive (COM (95) 7221) due to 
its extremely intense preference (Bailer 2004). I further clarify how to conceptualize 
national preferences, and how to determine their intensity. 
First, preferences are understood as the “way how actor orders the possible 
outcomes of an interaction” (Frieden 1999:42). Preference formation is the building 
block of liberal intergovernmentalism, where national preferences “emerge through 
the domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence” 
(Moravcsik 1993:481). Moravscik (1997:539) argued that domestic economic 
(material) preferences are even more crucial than national identity and security 
concerns: “pressure from economic special interests tends to dominate over security 
concerns. Hence, domestic societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state 
behaviour by shaping its preferences” (ibid, 513). From this perspective in EU policy-
making, “the configuration of state preferences matters most,” superseding the 
configuration of the member states’ aggregate power (as realists argue), or the 
configuration of institutions (as institutionalists argue) (ibid).  
This study does not deal with the national preference formation but uses them 
as the independent variable. In order to explain preference projection, the preferences 
“should be taken as given.” (Keohane 1984:116) For methodological reasons the 
preference formation is therefore out of focus, or, in other words, “desires themselves 
are left unexplained” (Elster 1986:38, cited in Carlsnaes 1992:251).  
Scholars generally agree that national preferences are the ‘departure point’ in 
analysing EU decision-making (Haverland & Liefferink 2012:180, Thomson 
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(2011a)). Various theoretical approaches treat preferences differently. Contrary to the 
EU-as-actor school, which expect transformation of national preferences, the actor-
based school sees preferences as fixed. How does rational choice institutionalism 
position itself between the two opposite approaches? The assumption that actors’ 
preferences are fixed has been empirically refuted by prominent psychologist theorists 
Tversky and Kahnneman (1986), showing that actors’ preferences change during 
interaction. Here, Bunse (2009:7) provided useful clarification that “contrary to other 
versions of rational choice theory, rational choice institutionalism accepts that the 
sources of preferences [...] may not all be exogenous.” In interaction with institutions 
member states accommodate some of their norms and institutional values (North 
1990, Peters 2005, cited in Bunse 2009:7). 
In this context, Scharpf (2011:12-13) drew a crucial distinction between “the 
relatively stable actor interests and highly contingent policy preferences.” While 
interests should be treated as given “preferences may change in result of conditions 
and events change, while underlying ‘interests’ of all actors remain stable” (ibid, 13). 
However, for methodological reasons it is useful to treat preferences as fixed in the 
short term” (Naurin 2010:37). 
Intensely Held National Preferences 
The concept of ‘preference intensity’ has been criticized due to the difficulties of its 
measurement. The main problem is that preferences are not directly observable; only 
actor’s behaviour is observable (Frieden 1999:40). In order to deal with this problem, 
scholars determine preferences by observation, assumption, or deduction (Ibid, 53-
54). Deduction derives preferences in accordance with the existing theories. By using 
actors’ features, theory can predict a particular set of preferences (Ibid, 61).  
The scholarship highlights such determinants of a state’s preferences as its 
size, societal interests, dependency, ideology and historical experiences (Copsey & 
Haughton 2009:264). The size or self-perception of size (Thorhallson 2006) of a state 
determines its behaviour. A historical experience and self-perception of vulnerability 
are relevant for the new member states’ preferences, where the “nature of their post-
communist transition appears significant” (Copsey & Haughton 2009:263).  
For this study, which focuses on Latvia, a small new member state located on 
the EU ‘frontline,’ the ‘smallness’ and perceived vulnerability, as well as historical 
experience, are important determinants for preferences. But especially, Latvia’s 
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geographical proximity with the large country Russia, the EU eastern neighbour of 
strategic importance, plays a decisive role. Wong and Hill (2011:224) rightly asked, 
“Where do interests come from if not from some sense of one’s location, 
geographically and culturally?”  
A state’s geographical position vis-à-vis a particular neighbourhood is a 
relevant determinant of national preferences (Schimmelfennig 2003:166). Geographic 
proximity can place member states in different positions within EU policy towards 
specific third countries (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008:170). Geographic proximity is 
related to two key issues – security and economic welfare.  
In the case of smaller states in the Baltic Sea region, which are affected by a 
great power such as Russia, geographical location is a dominating factor for a state’s 
security policy (Engelbrekt 2002:99). National security is in the centre of a state’s 
foreign policy. Thereby, Latvia’s security concerns would trigger uploading of 
security-related issues in EU policy towards Russia and other eastern neighbours.  
Yet, geographic proximity with Russia, a resource-rich country, suggests also 
Latvia’s specific economic interests, leading to intensely held preferences in the EU. 
In terms of economic welfare, geographic proximity provides opportunities for gains 
in trade and investment, e.g. by reducing costs of transport (Schimmelfennig 
2003:166). Geographical position “can be understood as a proxy variable for “the 
imperatives induced by interdependence and [..] increase in opportunities for cross-
border trade and capital movements” (Moravcsik 1998:26, Schimmelfennig 
2003:166). Economic cross-border ties with a neighbouring country can lead to a 
member state’s specific preferences in EU, where the domestic economic groups can 
pressure a government in EU talks (Copsey & Haughton 2009:268).  
It is important here is to distinguish between security and economic welfare – 
the ‘first order’ concerns from so-called ‘second order’ concerns, which are mainly 
‘ethical’, related to the normative values (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008:179). In EU 
foreign policy-making “such basic interests relating to country’s survival remain 
fixed” (Wong & Hill 2011:224). In result, one may expect that “states will necessarily 
sacrifice second order ‘non-security’ concerns if they clash with first order core 
national interests” (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008:179).  
Accordingly, this study follows those scholars, who determine a member 
state’s preferences in EU as arising from its geographic proximity to a third country, 
creating interdependence in terms of security and economic welfare. 
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3.2.3. EU Policy-making Environment 
From the rational choice institutionalism perspective, interaction of national 
preferences and institutions determine EU policy outcomes (Plott 1991, cited in 
Thomson 2006:9). In rational choice institutionalism, ‘institutions matter’ in a way 
that they provide opportunities and constraints for rational actors, seeking to attain 
their preferences (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995, cited in Börzel 1998:263). From the 
intergovernmentalism perspective, a state seeks to achieve its preferred outcome 
under the constraints imposed by preferences of other member states (Moravcsik 
1007:521). In contrast, from the sociological institutionalism perspective, institutions 
have a decisive impact on national preferences.  
Rational choice institutionalism treats EU institutions as constraints where 
actors pursue their fixed preferences. Institutions provide rules and practices, 
conditioning actors’ behaviour, through which the collective choices are made 
(Thomson 2006:9). Institutions are “the rules of the game;” they reduce uncertainty 
and provide a stable structure for human interaction (North 1990:97-99). Institutions 
can be formal and informal rules of decision-making, as well as “potential players of 
the game” (Mennon 2011:85).  
I further address two questions. First, I look at what formal and informal EU 
foreign policy-making rules are relevant for uploading. Second, I examine what are 
the key actors in EU foreign policy-making.  
Formal and Informal EU Decision-Making Rules 
With regards to EU foreign policy-making rules, one should distinguish between the 
formal unanimity voting and informal consensus, applied in practice. Foreign policy 
is one of the few EU policy areas, which has preserved the intergovernmental 
character. It means that almost all EU foreign policy decisions should formally be 
taken by unanimous voting. The Lisbon Treaty did not abandon the unanimity rule.  
Scholars agree that the unanimity rule is more advantageous for ‘smaller’ 
member states. Under unanimity, member states can veto a decision. Unanimity rule 
means that the least interested actor should also be on board (Beach & Pedersen 
2013:109), and EU actors interested in a particular EU foreign policy decision “will 
much more take into account the interests of small states” (Thomas 2011). 
In practice, however, formal unanimity rule does not determine EU foreign 
policy-making, which instead is guided by informal consensus. The consensus rule is 
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not identical with unanimity, and it may de facto include opposing parties who do not 
veto proposals.
8
 Therefore ‘consensus’ is considered to be a sort of ‘mystery:’ an “ill-
defined decision-making rule” (Heisenberg 2005, cited in Lehtonen 2009:36). In fact, 
formal rules do not determine which actors succeed in uploading, but informal 
consensus determines (Thomson et al. 2006) national preference projection. 
While the ‘consensus culture’ stimulates member states’ compromise seeking 
behaviour (Thomas 2010), it also reflects “the actual distribution of power” (Thomson 
2011a). Competing member states’ interests at the end turn into EU decisions, which 
are not equally advantageous for all member states. Especially, if a member state has 
intensely held national preferences, in order to influence the outcome, it can “put 
enormous mobilising efforts” (Tallberg et al. 2011:9). This leads to question of who 
are the key actors in EU foreign policy-making? What role do the EU institutions, 
member states and private actors (interest groups) play?  
Key Actors in EU Foreign Policy-making 
In the informal consensus-based decision-making in the EU Council, member states, 
especially the more powerful ones, play a decisive role, especially the ‘bigger’ ones, 
e.g. those forming the ‘German-French alliance’ (Tallberg et al. 2011:21). Under the 
Lisbon Treaty increasingly important actors are the EU institutions, especially the 
High Representative (HR) for the CFSP, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and the European Commission. Private actors in EU foreign policy, which is 
not a ‘distributive’ EU policy area, are less important.  
Institutional Actors 
With regards to the institutional actors in EU foreign policy-making, the EU 
represents the most institutionalized form of foreign policy-making (Wong & Hill 
2011:230). Establishment of the CFSP in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty marked 
the official beginning of the common foreign and security policy, when the EU 
officially “promised to create a much more effective European foreign policy” (White 
2001:94). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 established the High Representative for the 
CFSP. The area continued to develop at an unexpected speed with the most crucial 
changes under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The Lisbon Treaty marked a shift of 
competences to Brussels. The HR is supported now by the EEAS as a permanent 
                                                 
8
 The member states are only asked if anyone has an objection, and if none of them has explicit 
objections, the proposal is adopted. 
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chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The European Parliament (EP), 
the European Council, the Council, the HR with the EEAS, and the Commission, all 
have specific formal roles in EU external action and the CFSP (Title V, TEU).  
The EP formal power is modest, where it has only consultative rights in the 
main EU foreign policy issues. However, in practice, the EP has more influence in EU 
foreign policy because of its increasing role in external functions. The Council’s 
problem to formulate the common policy further stimulates the EP engagement in 
foreign policy (Tallberg et al. 2011:42). Notwithstanding a general importance of the 
EP, this study considers the Parliament’s role as limited in EU foreign policy.  
The HR and the EEAS role is substantial as they provide a permanent 
chairmanship in the Council. The HR chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), and 
the EEAS provides chairmanship of the Council working groups. They also set 
agenda, draft decisions and mediate them until the final decision, as well as represent 
the EU in third countries. Given these broad functions, the EEAS challenges the 
position of member states in the EU foreign policy (Tallberg et al. 2011:40-41).  
Apart, the Commission is an important institutional actor. While under the 
Lisbon Treaty the Commission’s role has been scaled down, it still continues to play a 
crucial role in the EU’s external action system. The Commission is often seen as the 
EEAS competitor: ‘turf battles’ have been observed in the EU external action 
(European Parliament study, evaluation of the EEAS, 2013). The Commission is the 
key institutional actor in visa issues, and economic and trade relations with third 
countries. It also has a mandate to negotiate the EU agreements with these countries. 
It is therefore important to take into account the Commission’s role when analysing a 
member state’s influence on the EU relationships with neighbouring countries. 
How do these key institutional actors matter in terms of a member state’s 
uploading possibilities? Smaller member states traditionally benefit from permanent 
EU institutions, which mediate member states’ interests and help to reach a 
compromise. The Commission is perceived as an institution that small states can rely 
on when seeking influence (Howard Grøn & Wivel 2011:526). In a similar way, 
smaller states may benefit from permanent institutions in the area of foreign policy – 
the HR and the EEAS. Their limited resources do not allow them to make new 
contacts and efficiently make lobbying efforts with every rotating Presidency. Instead 
developing stable long-term relationships with the EEAS suits their interests better.  
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This demonstrates that the EU institutional actors – the HR, the EEAS and the 
Commission – have substantial implications on EU foreign policy-making. Given 
these influential actors, however, what is the role of member states?  
Member States 
Arguably, “despite the increasing role of Brussels-based institutions”, in EU foreign 
policy-making with its intergovernmental character member states remain the key 
actors (Gross 2009:4). Formally, member states have lost their influence for the sake 
of institutional actors, but under the informal consensus rule the informal power of the 
big member states have a critical importance (Tallberg et al. 2011:21). For instance, 
the German-French alliance has usually been perceived as an engine for EU 
integration. In the area of foreign policy, a large country like Germany is playing an 
increasingly important role. “Germany has been successful in influencing the 
development of CFSP to mirror its own national preferences” (Miskimmon 2007:1), 
and it effectively pushes its influence through the new EU institutional actors. 
If big member states determine the EU foreign policy-making, it raises the 
question about the role of smaller states. The evidence shows that sometimes these 
countries can be even more successful than the larger ones. The national preference 
intensity, expertise and experience may play a crucial role. Smaller states with 
specific geographic interests can be successful in the EU, for instance, Belgium with 
its engagement in the Central Africa (Nasra 2011), the Netherlands in Indonesia, and 
the Nordic countries in the Baltic States (Tallberg et al. 2011:24).  
Thereby, the EU foreign policy environment with its informal decision-
making rules and influential involved actors, in particular the big member states, 
‘constrains’ an individual member state’s preference projection in a way that it 
requires it to seek not only formal, but also informal ways to exert influence. I further 
discuss what uploading mechanisms can help a member state to attain its preferred 
outcome. 
3.2.4. The Uploading Mechanisms 
This study explores uploading, that is, projection of national preferences. Thereby, it 
focuses on the causal process between the preferences and the EU decision outcome. 
The causal process is important, because without exact knowledge of how 
Europeanization takes place, it is difficult to capture the individual member states’ 
46 
 
inputs in the EU common policy (Miskimmon 2007:10). In the causal explanation, the 
causal mechanisms are central (George and Bennett 2005:12-21). Mechanisms help to 
“provide an ordering system that describes the potential cause-effect relationship,” 
where “actors select their best available course of action under the circumstances” 
(Scharpf 1997:31). George and Bennett (2005:137) defined causal mechanisms as  
“Ultimately unobservable physical, social or psychological processes through 
which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts, or 
conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities.” 
This study employs the mechanism-based approach by seeking to capture how, and in 
what ways, a member state can achieve the preferable EU foreign policy outcome. 
Important uploading mechanisms in EU foreign policy have been introduced 
by Miskimmon in studying Europeanization of Germany’s foreign policy, namely, (1) 
discursive influence, (2) institutional export, (3) example setting, and (4) agenda 
setting (2007:192). Miskimmon’s approach was developed by Major in her studies on 
uploading in the ESDP by the three largest member states - Germany, France and UK 
- from a constructivism perspective. She proposed such mechanisms as (1) agenda 
setting, (2) example setting, 3) multilateral cooperation, (4) ideational export and 
preference shaping, (5) administrative commitment, and (6) political capacities. 
As can be seen, not all of the above-mentioned mechanisms would work in the 
case of smaller new member state, such as Latvia. It cannot rely on material and 
political power and capacities, or institutional export, given its limited administrative 
resources and experience in EU foreign policy-making. Also, agenda-setting is hardly 
possible: in practice, the agenda is most often determined by big member states, and 
only exceptionally (as the EU Presidency) small members succeed to include their 
salient issues in EU foreign policy agenda. If the big member states dislike a specific 
proposal of smaller state, they would never let it pass (Kavakas 2001).  
Another broadly recognized uploading mechanism in EU foreign policy, 
advocated by sociological institutionalism is socialisation. While socialization has 
been a broadly recognized mechanism, the empirical evidence shows that its effects of 
are often weak (Zürn & Checkel 2005:1047). For this reason, the most recent studies 
on Europeanization of foreign policy have sought to identify other important 
mechanisms of uploading. In this respect, arguing, bargaining, lobbying, and coalition 
building have been singled out (for discussion see Chapter 2). While these studies 
have singled out these mechanisms, their main focus has been on the outcome instead 
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of on the process of uploading. In other words, they have not opened the ‘black box’ 
of causal process, showing how exactly these mechanisms help a member state to 
achieve its preferences.  
The above mechanisms have been broadly explored in other EU policy areas, 
and therefore can be helpful in this study. The extensive scholarship on decision-
making in EU Council offers various mechanisms. The most prominent of them are 
arguing and bargaining. Apart from these two, member states may use such 
mechanisms as contacting other member states, using coalitions, and lobbying the EU 
institutions. Relevant for this study is the scholarship on the smaller states’ influence 
in the EU, showing that they can successfully upload through persuasive advocacy, by 
building coalitions, and by using their EU Presidency (see, e.g. Tallberg 2008; Bunse 
2009; Jakobsen 2009; Panke 2010). 
In particular, arguing and bargaining have been thoroughly analysed. Arguing 
seems to be especially important in EU foreign policy-making: in the CFSP working 
parties’ member states use arguing 71% of the time, while bargaining only 29% 
(Naurin 2007:25). However, typically, arguing and bargaining have been presented as 
‘property’ of two opposite logics. Arguing in the constructivists’ logic of 
appropriateness is truth seeking that leads to transformation of preferences, while 
bargaining is associated with egoistic and conflictual behaviour. Nonetheless, the 
evidence shows that “correlation between egoistic concerns and conflictual approach 
and between a common interest attitude and a problem-solving approach is less than 
perfect” (Elgström & Jönsson, 2000:686). In fact, the functional (argumentative) 
persuasion can converge with bargaining (Grobe 2010:10).  
Apart from arguing and bargaining, member states may use such mechanisms 
as contacting other member states, building or joining coalitions, or lobbying the EU 
institutions. I further examine these uploading mechanisms in more detail. In 
particular, I look at how arguing and bargaining can be used from the rational choice 
institutionalism perspective, which is the theoretical basis for this study. To avoid 
confusion of associating ‘arguing’ with the constructivist approach, instead of 
‘arguing’ I use the term ‘presenting arguments.’ Similarly, instead of using 
‘bargaining’ in the sense of liberal intergovernmentalism understanding, I use the 
term ‘cooperative bargaining.’  
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(1) Presenting Arguments 
Arguing is a widely employed way for uploading in the Council decision-making 
(Panke 2010:25). The most arguing takes place in the CFSP working parties, which 
could be linked with the unanimity rule: “if actors have veto power, others are 
‘forced’ to listen” (Naurin 2007:7).  
Arguing can be understood as an effort to persuade others by giving 
reasons (Elster 2007:405). Arguing has been advocated by the constructivist scholars, 
associated with constructivist ‘logic of appropriateness,’ being called as ‘norm-based 
arguing,’ ‘normative suasion,’ ‘persuasion,’ ‘deliberation,’ or ‘communicative action’ 
(Checkel (2007:13). Constructivists assume that actors “present arguments and try to 
persuade each other;” the actors internalize new understandings of appropriateness 
because it is ‘right thing to do.’ (Checkel (2007:13). Risse’s (2000:7) ‘logic of 
arguing’ draws on Habermas theory of communicative action where actors argue, 
being opened to persuasion and the power of the better argument. From a 
constructivist perspective, actors never use arguments as a strategic asset. In practice, 
EU foreign policy-making involves divergent and conflicting member state 
preferences. But to change preferences when they derive from the ‘first order’ core 
national interests are extremely complicated. Conceptually, this raises doubts about 
whether arguing is indeed a ‘truth seeking’ exercise. 
Rationalists draw attention to this inconsistency. Member states may use 
arguing and interact “without making explicit offers, but nonetheless achieve 
particular outcomes” (Héritier, 2007). Apparently, arguing may be used strategically. 
Elster (1989:101) pointed out that argumentation in the EU should be conceptualized 
as rational action. Naurin (2007:11) distinguished ‘cooperative’ and ‘competitive’ 
arguing, where the first means sincere arguing, and the second – the ‘rhetorical 
action’9 (ibid, 11). Also Grobe (2010) showed that arguments influence the decision 
outcome, especially if they transmit new causal knowledge, causing changes in 
member states’ positions. He calls this type of arguing ‘functional persuasion’ to 
distinguish it from ‘sincere persuasion’ (Grobe 2010:10). 
Arguing can be used strategically in EU foreign policy-making, as shown by 
Müller and Alecu de Flers (2009) – member states may use norm-based arguments, 
                                                 
9
 The term ‘rhetorical action’ has been introduced by Schimmelfennig (2001), meaning that arguments 
are used strategically to persuade opponents, rather than to reach a common understanding. 
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‘framing’ their preferences on the basis of common EU policy principles, norms, 
values and already taken decisions to secure legitimacy of their positions. The 
consensus-based EU foreign policy-making motivates the “strategic utilization of 
norm-based arguments or normative suasion” (Müller & Alecu de Flers 2009:15).  
There could be some confusion with using the term ‘arguing’. Rationalist 
scholars classify strategic arguing as a form of bargaining - ‘integrative bargaining’ 
(Lehtonen 2010:57), or “soft bargaining tactics” (Dür & Matheo 2010:684). As this 
study draws on rational choice institutionalism, it could be reasonable to follow the 
latter scholars, who maintain the rationalists’ approach that equals the EU decision-
making to bargaining. Yet, this would neglect the fact that ‘arguing’ is the most 
common way in EU foreign policy-making, and that practitioners, when speaking 
about member states interventions in EU foreign policy, invoke ‘arguing’ with 
surprising frequency. 
Against these considerations, this study uses the term ‘presenting arguments’ 
to distinguish this uploading mechanism from ‘arguing’ in the constructivist 
understanding. Presenting arguments is understood as a strategic action, where 
changes of member states’ positions are not expected to lead to the changes in 
preferences. It is understood as giving reasons to persuade others (Panke 2010). This 
uploading mechanism typically takes place in the formal EU working parties.  
(2) Cooperative Bargaining  
Another prominent mechanism in the EU Council negotiations is ‘bargaining’ (Bailer 
2004, Thomson et al. 2006, Tallberg 2008, Naurin 2010, Panke 2010, Dür & Mateo 
2010b). According to Moravcsik (1993:481), the decision-making consists of defining 
the preferences, which is followed by bargaining to reach the preferred outcome. 
From the rational choice institutionalism perspective, bargaining has been highlighted 
by Europeanization scholars in the case of downloading, with the mechanism of 
‘conditionality’ understood as a “bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward” 
(Schimmelfennig 2003). In the case of uploading, bargaining has been mentioned as a 
“way to reconcile conflicting preferences and can effectively lead to Europeanization 
in EU policies” (Conceição-Heldt 2006:146-147). 
Bargaining can be equated with strategic action (Nash 1950, cited in Nieman 
2012:381). It has been defined as ‘divide-a-dollar’ game with actors’ making offers 
and counteroffers (Elster 2007:403), as “reaching agreement through credible threats 
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and promises” (ibid, 419), or as an “insistence on getting as much as possible for him-
or herself, without caring about the consequences for others” (Elgström & Jönsson 
2011). Initially, EU foreign policy-making does not resemble this type of interaction. 
Practitioners recognize that during the formal interventions in EU working parties 
“the national representatives use very elegant rhetoric, referring to ‘our EU common 
values and interests,’ avoiding reference to the domestic problems” (Interview No. 1,  
28.12.2012, PermRep). Yet, bargaining can also have a cooperative form, involving a 
great deal of ‘give-and-take.’ Bargaining can be ‘competitive’ and cooperative 
(Scharpf 1997), or ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ (Dür & Mateo 2010b). 
While bargaining has been a widely recognized mechanism, only recently 
scholars started to apply it to the foreign policy (see, e.g. Thomas 2011, Thomas & 
Tonra 2012, Alecy de Flers 2012, Baun & Marek 2013). Important steps were made 
by Thomas (2011) and Thomas and Tonra (2012), showing that bargaining in its soft 
(cooperative) form helps to reach agreement on EU foreign policy. This corresponds 
to rational choice institutionalism, which suggests that cooperative bargaining is the 
most typical mode in EU Council negotiations (Thomson & Holsti 2006).  
Constructivists assume that ‘side-payments’ and ‘trade-offs’ are not a common 
practice when formulating EU foreign policy, but that procedural EU discourse with 
consultations prevails (Larsen 2004:76). Larsen (2004) referred to Tonra (1997, 
1998), insisting that national representatives “perceive themselves as engaged in the 
collective policy-making, which contributes to formation of their foreign policy 
identity.” Later Tonra (Thomas & Tonra 2012) seemingly changed his standpoint, 
suggesting that bargaining can better explain EU foreign policy-making. 
Unlike competitive bargaining associated with ‘zero-sum’ game, cooperative 
bargaining is a ‘win-win’ game. In its competitive (distributive) form, bargaining is a 
building block of liberal intergovernmentalism. Here, bargaining can include even 
veto threats. Rational choice institutionalism is more flexible and recognizes that 
rational actor behaviour can be compatible with cooperative behaviour. The extensive 
study “the European Union decides” (Thomson et al. 2006) demonstrates that 
cooperative bargaining has the highest explanatory value. Cooperative bargaining, in 
which states seek for mutually beneficial compromises, is the most typically used in 
the EU Council negotiations (ibid). Importantly, all the member states – big and 
small, old and new – use cooperative bargaining, as shown by Thomson (2011a:17): 
“cooperative bargaining is the most accurate prediction of decision outcomes both 
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before and after 2004 enlargement.” Dür and Mateo (2010b:562) showed that small 
states in particular rely on soft bargaining and signalling flexibility to compromise. 
Thereby, cooperative bargaining is one of the key uploading mechanisms in 
EU foreign policy-making. I use the term ‘cooperative bargaining’ to mean strategic 
action, justifying the national position, voicing national concerns, hinting towards ‘red 
lines’ as implicit threats (Panke 2010:31), signalling for flexibility to package-deal 
compromises. The main motivation of member state’s bargaining efforts is clarifying 
its position to its partners thus facilitating compromise agreement. 
In this study, ‘presenting arguments’ and ‘cooperative bargaining’ are used 
synonymously to the member states’ formal interventions within the Council 
framework, whether it takes place within the working groups, COREPER, PCS or at 
the FAC ministerial level.  
Apart from the formal interventions in the Council formats, member states 
may use informal uploading mechanisms, which help with the preference projection. 
The informal character of EU foreign policy-making stimulates member states to seek 
for additional informal ways of preference projection. Drawing on the existing studies 
on member state’s influence on the EU Council decision-making, I introduce such 
mechanisms as ‘contacting other member states,’ ‘building or joining coalitions,’ 
‘lobbying the EU key institutional actors,’ and ‘bolstering the domestic uploading 
capacity,’ which are further discussed in detail.  
(3) Contacting Other Member States  
Contacting other member states is an important uploading mechanism. It involves 
informal contacts, exchange of information on preferences and/or seeking support on 
an ad hoc basis (Börzel 1998). Björkdahl (2008) demonstrated that smaller member 
states through bilateral consultations with other states can identify like-minded 
supporters and mobilise support for specific initiatives (ibid, 138). Such bilateral 
contacts may involve different levels and channels of communication (Rūse 2011).  
Member States’ well-developed contacts with other states - so-called ‘network 
capital,’ which allow accessing others through informal channels and thereby seek to 
influence other’s national positions to attain the preferred outcomes (Naurin & 
Lindhal 2014). The network capital is important for a member state’s ability to build 
alliances and exchange information, and thus to exert influence in the EU (ibid). 
Some states are particularly effective in using networking. Among them the most 
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demanded networking partners are influential member states, where smaller and less 
influential member states seek contacts with influential partners (ibid). 
Contacting other member states is relevant in all the EU policy-making stages, 
while the reason for contacts may be different, starting from comparing preferences at 
the initial stage until asking for very concrete support at the late stage. Especially, at 
the early stage of decision-making when the initial positions of other member states 
are collected, informal consultations are of the utmost importance to clarify others’ 
preferences. In the pre-negotiation phase, when member states seek to understand the 
problem and its possible solution, informal consultations with other member states 
can be extremely useful. Informal pre-negotiation, interaction and information 
exchange, can help them to improve the “capacity of strategic reasoning [..] 
recognition of ‘traps’ including early warning [..], and the formulation of well-
conceived policy recommendations” (Engelbrekt 2008:13). At a later phase of policy-
making, consultations may be important for building of like-minded coalitions. Small 
states may seek contacts and cooperation with big member states and form strategic 
bilateral partnerships (Panke 2010:28). 
In this study, I use the term ‘contacting other member states’ to mean bilateral 
and multilateral ad hoc consultations of a state aiming to identify like-minded 
supporters and mobilise support. This is an informal uploading mechanism, which a 
member state can use in addition to the formal interventions in the EU Council. 
(4) Building or Joining Coalitions 
Using coalitions is another informal uploading mechanism, especially attractive for 
small member states (see, e.g. Naurin & Lindahl 2008). Joining coalitions is one of 
the most popular uploading mechanisms among smaller states, while initiating them is 
more common for larger countries, according to Panke (2010:205). EU foreign 
policy-making formats such as the FAC, the PSC and the COREPER create 
opportunities to build like-minded coalitions (Björkdahl 2007:138-139) and help 
small states to ‘punch above their weight’ (Nugent 2006).  
Coalitions in the EU decision-making are understood as a “set of actors that 
coordinate their behaviour in order to reach the goals they have agreed upon” 
(Elgström 2001, 13), or a “set of parties that explicitly coordinate among themselves 
and defend the same position” (Odell 2010:624). A coalition of member states sharing 
preferences is perceived by outsiders as more credible (Ibid). Even under the 
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unanimity rule, member states seek to find allies in order to avoid reputation 
repercussions when blocking a proposal themselves (Rūse 2011:49), which is also the 
case of EU foreign policy-making.  
Coalition building includes member states’ coordinating their behaviour in 
order to reach goals they have agreed upon (Rasch 1997, cited in Rūse 2011:45). In 
order to create a coalition, the initiator approaches like-minded states or seeks to 
attract neutral ones (Panke 2010:26). In EU policy-making process, coalitions in the 
Council meetings through one coalition member on behalf of the group may present a 
common statement and a common position paper. 
Preference proximity is a strong stimulus to build coalitions (Tallberg & 
Johansson 2008). The ad hoc coalitions seem to be more common in the EU Council, 
although there are also insitutionalized coalitions, such as the Benelux Group. Not 
always all the parties in an insitutionalized coalition have the exact same preferences. 
Especially, in EU foreign policy, national preferences can vary depending on a 
member state’s specific interests on the EU relations with third countries. 
In this study, I will use the term ‘building or joining coalitions’ to mean a 
strategic action and coordinated behaviour. It involves joining or initiating a group of 
like-minded member states, coordinating activities among themselves and, at various 
levels, defending the same or a similar position in EU foreign policy-making formats. 
(5) Lobbying the EU Institutional Actors  
Lobbying the key EU institutional actors is a frequently used uploading mechanism 
(Panke 2012). While scholarship, exploring lobbying, has focused on non-
governmental actors, states “often use lobbying strategies” (ibid, 129). It has been 
shown that the higher the intensity of preference, the more actively a state uses 
lobbying (Panke 2010). Lobbying is particularly important for smaller states. As 
Schmidt-Felzmann (2008:173) has put it, while the Commission consults large 
member states on their preferences in developing common policies towards third 
countries, such as Russia, small member states, on the contrary, pro-actively lobby the 
Commission and other member states. Howard Grøn and Wivel (2011:523) suggested 
that an ideal type of a small state’s ‘smart strategy’ to exert influence in the EU is 
acting as a lobbyist. 
Lobbying is understood as ‘unilateral action’ where formal institutional rules 
are absent (Scharp 1997:47). It is an informal way to influence policies in arenas in 
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which lobbyists have no formal competences (Panke 2012:130). During this informal 
interaction, member states directly contact EU institutions that are in charge of 
agenda-setting or are chairing meetings (ibid). In the case of EU foreign policy-
making it involves lobbying such key institutional actors as the HR, the EEAS, the 
Commission, as well as the EU Presidency. Due to the monopoly of initiative, 
lobbying the EU Commission at the drafting stage of policy proposals is very 
important (Thomson and Holsti 2006, Panke 2010). States can also lobby the rotating 
Presidency, which is, for example, responsible for agenda-setting and chairs the 
COREPER meetings (Tallberg 2010, Panke 2010:28). 
In lobbying the EU institutions, states seek to influence EU policies through 
arguing (providing reasons and exerting persuasion efforts) or through bargaining 
(highlighting national concerns as ‘red lines’) (Panke 2010). Lobbying the EU 
institutions is more successful, the more people of a member state can contact 
institutions directly (Mazey and Richardson 1993, cited in Panke 2010:121). Timing 
is also important. Member states, which instead of waiting until the formal proposal is 
presented lobby the institutions at the earliest possible stage, are more successful 
(ibid). In foreign policy, the EEAS has the monopoly of initiative, which means that 
lobbying it at the drafting stage of a proposal is of particular importance. 
In this study, I use the term ‘lobbying’ to mean an informal uploading 
mechanism, which involves a member state contacting the key EU institutional actors 
(the HR, the EEAS, the Commission), which are in charge of drafting (or giving input 
into) policy decisions or chairing meetings.  
(6) Bolstering the Domestic Uploading Capacity 
Bolstering the domestic uploading capacity sits ‘on the fence’ between the mechanism 
and the condition for successful uploading (Major 2008:64). It can also be seen as a 
prerequisite or „a booster” of the previous five points. In other words, ‘doing proper 
homework’ indirectly influences EU foreign policy outcomes. This study, however, 
follows the approach of Major (2008) and Panke (2011) by treating the ‘bolstering the 
domestic uploading capacity’ as a specific uploading mechanism, which indirectly 
helps a member state to effectively participate in EU negotiations (Ibid, 20). 
In order to project national preferences in EU formats, a state needs to ‘do its 
homework.’ Firstly, a state needs to have adequate capacities in order to be able to 
upload its national preferences. Otherwise “even the most enlightened preferences 
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will fail to make a practical difference” (Scharpf 1997:51). The domestic capacity to 
develop a unitary position depends on an effective coordination mechanism between 
the responsible institutions. Coordination of parties involved in developing the 
national position is related to an early phase of decision-making. Coordination means 
the ‘act of working together’ where activities are directed towards the same goal 
(Nedergaard 2008:3). Successful coordination depends on effective channels of 
communication, as well as on the expertise of the actors (ibid). 
Coordination capacities are important in a successful uploading of national 
preferences. The precondition for engaging in other uploading activities is to develop 
national positions. A member state without well-elaborated or delayed positions 
reduces opportunities to successfully influence EU policy-making (Panke 2010b:809). 
This, however, can be a complicated task because the line ministries may have 
conflicting interests. Disruptions and delays could have many reasons, for instance, 
domestic veto players or cooperation problems between the line ministries, e.g. 
disruptive or un-cooperative administrative working conditions (ibid, 809). Not only 
line ministries’ preferences may reflect its bureaucratic self-interests (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013:112), but also the ministries like the Ministry of Economics may 
indirectly represent the interests of domestic business lobby for their specific 
economic projects with third countries. Consequently, a battle to secure the line 
ministries’ specific interests in the national position can be expected, and the main 
coordinator of EU affairs, the Foreign Ministry, may face considerable difficulties in 
promoting a position that closely reflects governmental preferences (ibid, 113). 
Smooth coordination procedures pertain to the speed of the development of 
national positions. Delays in the production of instructions hinder national 
representatives from making their voices heard (Panke 2010b:807). Besides the speed, 
a precondition is also the quality of positions. Line ministries are not able to formulate 
the national positions if there is a shortage of experts. The higher the expertise on 
technical issue, the more successfully a state can put other uploading mechanisms into 
use. The empirical evidence shows that the least active smaller member states are the 
newcomers, facing shortcomings in expertise, especially for technical issues (ibid). 
In new member states, the lack of administrative capacity and experience 
usually hinders production of a high quality position; yet, the main shortcoming is the 
lack of continuity and coherence in policymaking (Panke 2010:809). Hence, the 
political capacity is of utmost importance. If there is a strong consensus among 
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political elites on particular policy issues, which does not change after elections, then 
Europeanization is more likely to happen (Vilpisauskas (2013:139). In this study, I 
use the term ‘bolstering the domestic uploading capacity’ to mean the administrative 
capacity (experience, expertise, and coordination procedures), as well as political 
capacity in the sense of its coherence and continuity. 
In light of the above considerations, this study hypothesizes that given 
intensely held national preferences, a member state can influence EU foreign policy 
through six uploading mechanisms: (1) presenting arguments, (2) cooperative 
bargaining, (3) contacting other member states, (4) using coalitions, (5) lobbying the 
EU institutions and (6) bolstering the domestic uploading capacity. In the following 
chapter on methodology, I operationalize the suggested causal mechanisms. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The next stage in the research process is to translate hypotheses into an operational 
research design (Mair 2008:178). This chapter introduces research methods, research 
design with variables, empirical indicators, and operationalizes them. It outlines the 
case selection and data collection for empirical observations. 
As this study explores the uploading process with the mechanisms involved, 
more suitable are qualitative methods - they are able to capture the aspects that 
quantitative methods cannot, that is, ‘opening the black box’ of causal process. 
However, one should take into account that when positivists use qualitative methods, 
they should follow the same logic of inference as the quantitative methods (King et 
al. 1994). That is, to start with hypotheses deductively derived from theory, 
operationalize concepts, carefully select cases when choosing a small number of 
them, and use variables as they focus on what causes the outcome (Della Porta & 
Keating 2008:29-30). This study follows the positivist epistemological framework, 
i.e. starting with hypothesis deductively, operationalization of concepts, and selecting 
cases to test the theory. Neo-positivists recognize that not only variables determine 
the outcome, but the context as well, e.g. institutions as constraints (ibid, 30), which 
is relevant for this study. 
Qualitative methodologists use causal analysis through within-case studies that 
involves exploring relationships through detailed investigation of the process between 
variables (Tansey 2007:2). This study uses the within-case analysis and process-
57 
 
tracing of one individual country. Latvia is selected as a typical case, i.e. the least-
likely case when it comes to uploading (Eckstein 1975, George & Bennett 2005), 
though could also be justified on the basis of convenience sampling (also called 
availability) ((Tansey 2007:11). The advantage of convenience sampling lies in its 
convenience – the sample is drawn in the way that is the easiest for a researcher 
(ibid). In order to discern the causal process one needs to trace not only the sequence 
of events, but also the causal mechanisms, that involve tracing empirical expressions 
of theorized causal mechanisms (Beach & Pedersen 2013:34). The latter is facilitated 
by having access to relevant documents, knowing the language in which they are 
written, and understanding the institutional and political context within which the 
process being traced takes place. 
As EU foreign policy-making and national processes that precede and 
accompany developments in Brussels is dominated by in-camera settings “behind the 
closed doors,” it can be difficult to collect data. Therefore, interviews are a few of the 
most commonly used sources of evidence from respondents who actually participated 
in the case under investigation (Beach & Pedersen 2013:134). In order to cope with 
the eventual measurement bias, the triangulation approach is applied by collecting 
observations across different types of sources (for a discussion see section 4.6.). 
4.1. Case Study Methods and Process-tracing 
Scholars of Europeanization in foreign policy suggest relying on in-depth case studies 
and process-tracing. According to George and Bennett (2005:5-6) the case study 
represents a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to [..] test 
historical explanations that may be generalizable.” Gerring (2004:341) defines it as “a 
study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units.”  
The case study methods may include both “within-case analysis of a single 
case and comparisons of a small number of cases,” where “the strongest means of 
drawing inferences from the case studies is use of combination of within-case analysis 
and cross-case comparisons within a single study” (George & Bennett 2005:18). 
Accordingly, this study relies on within-case analysis by comparing three different 
sub-cases: Latvia’s preference projection in EU foreign policy in (1) EU economic 
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sanctions on Belarus 2011-2012, (2) the EU-Russia visa-free travel regime 2011-
2014, and (3) the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 2011-2013
10
. 
As mentioned before, the case study methods allow us to examine 
hypothesized causal mechanisms (George & Bennett 2005:19), in ways in which 
quantitative methods are not helpful. The quantitative analysis focuses on the 
outcomes, but “if we want to move beyond correlation to causation, we need to reveal 
the decision-making processes” (George & Bennett 2005:46). Case study methods are 
more suitable for assessing how a variable mattered in the outcome (ibid, 25). 
This study follows those scholars who see the potential of associating the 
within-case studies with process-tracing, which is an important, even indispensable, 
element in case studies (George 1979). Process-tracing is especially useful for 
exploring causal process which connects variables (George & Bennett 2005). 
Relevant for this study, which applies the deductive approach, is that process-tracing 
can contribute to testing theories (ibid, 206). Embedded in the positivist perspective, it 
becomes a ‘theory oriented process tracing,’ involving identifying the intervening 
causal process with causal mechanism (ibid). 
George and McKeown (1985:35) defined process-tracing as a method of 
within-case analysis to evaluate the “decision process by which various initial 
conditions are translated into outcomes.” Process-tracing seeks to uncover the stimuli 
of actors, decision-making process, the actual behaviour, and the effect of institutional 
setting (ibid, 35). Later, George and Bennett (2005:206) defined process-tracing as the 
method, which  
“attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and 
causal mechanisms – between an independent and dependent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” 
Thus, process-tracing allows for testing hypotheses of causal mechanisms, and 
thereby seeks to answer the research question of this study regarding the ways in 
which a member state can project its preferences into EU foreign policy. 
 
 
                                                 
10
Further dimension of cross-case comparisons is available in a separate article, examining Latvia’s 
uploading in the context of small new member states (Pastore, G. (2013). Small new member states in 
the EU Foreign Policy: Toward ‘Small State Smart Strategy. Baltic Journal of Political Science, 2013 
(2), 67-84) 
 
59 
 
Tracing the Causal Mechanisms  
George and Bennett (2005:12, 21) argued that causal mechanisms are central to a 
causal explanation, and that the case studies and within-case analysis are the best 
methods in examining causal mechanisms. While the mechanism-centred explanation 
has received a wide recognition, one should be careful in choosing this approach. As 
Gerring (2010:1500) indicated, although mechanisms are important, it is a “secondary 
element of causal assessment – not a necessary condition.” Gerring is also sceptical 
about how methodologically tractable the causal mechanisms can be, because “within 
every co-variation there is a mechanism, and within each mechanism is a mechanism, 
therefore at some point, a study must arrest the empirical process” (ibid). Therefore, 
researchers should be confident that they know what Xs and Ys (the independent and 
the dependent variables) are present (ibid, 1518). 
Often process-tracing has been used to trace the empirical process (a sequence 
of events) between an X and a Y, while the causal mechanism remains ‘black-boxed.’ 
This descriptive approach does not explain how an outcome was reached, which is 
why Beach and Pedersen (2013:33) argued that in process-tracing the focus should be 
on the causal mechanism. In the theory-testing variant, the mechanism should be 
theorized together with empirical expressions of the mechanism. The case study then 
assesses whether the predicted empirical evidence is present. 
Mechanisms are more than a series of intervening variables. Here, it is 
necessary to open the black box of causality as much as possible (Bunge 1997, cited 
in Beach & Pedersen 2013: 39). A mechanism linking the micro-level to the macro-
level of institutions deals with how actors are involved in transferring influence from 
the national to the supranational level (ibid), and thereby is relevant for this study.  
4.2. Operationalization of Variables and Causal Mechanisms 
This section specifies and operationalizes variables and causal mechanisms. Key to 
the research design is “translation of abstract theoretical concepts into systematized 
concepts,” which involves defining the relevant parts of the concept and their 
relationship (Beach & Pedersen 2013:46). Defining concepts could be complicated. 
For instance, abstract concepts such as ‘national interests’ are important, but it is 
difficult to empirically evaluate them “unless they are defined in a way they can be 
observed and measured” (King et al. 1994:109). If the concept cannot be measured 
directly, specific indicators of the concept, which can be measured, are used. 
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With regards to the independent variable, it should be conceptualised in a way 
that includes characteristics that are causally relevant for the causal mechanism 
(Beach & Pedersen 2013:48). In this study, the independent variable is intensely held 
national preferences, the dependent variable – a member state’s influence on the EU 
decision outcome. In order to investigate the causal relationships between the 
variables, this study introduces the following uploading mechanisms – presenting 
arguments,’ ‘cooperative bargaining,’ ‘contacting other member states,’ ‘lobbying the 
EU institutional actors,’ using coalitions,’ and ‘bolstering the domestic uploading 
capacity.’ Further, conceptualization and operationalization of variables and 
conditions, as well as the uploading mechanisms, are provided. 
Independent Variable – Intensely Held National Preferences 
In order to minimize the risk that actors do not disclose or miscommunicate 
preferences (Frieden 1999, Thomas 2011:5), examination of various combinations of 
preferences, including geographic proximity, economic interests, policy proposals and 
official statements, is recommended (Thomas 2011:6). This study draws on existing 
scholarship and operationalizes national preferences on the basis of geographical 
proximity. Geographical proximity can be perceived as a proxy variable
11
 for “the 
imperatives induced by interdependence and, in particular, [..] exogenous increase in 
opportunities for cross-border trade and capital movements,” which determine 
national preferences” (Schimmelfennig 2003)12.  
National preferences can be operationalized as member states’ initial positions 
before the first meetings in working groups in the EU Council. Usually, states 
formulate their initial national positions before entering into EU debates. The 
problem, however, is that positions and preferences may differ over time and 
depending on who articulates them, and in which context. As Thomson (2011a:39) 
noted the positions reflect actors’ behaviour in the form of statements, rather than 
their hidden preferences, which are “private to themselves and cannot be measured” 
yet “positions reported do appear to reflect actors’ underlying interests.” Irrespective 
                                                 
11
 A proxy variable in itself is not in a specific interest, but it is a measurable variable, which is used 
instead of variable, which cannot be measured.  
12
 F.Schimmelfenning (2003) explores member states’ preferences on Eastern enlargement on the basis 
of their geographic position vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe as a proxy variable for „the 
imperatives induced by interdependence and, in particular, the [..] exogenous increase in opportunities 
for cross-border trade and capital movements.”   
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of whether the position represents the underlying preference or not, they “influence 
other negotiators’ perceptions of the policy space” (Cross 2012:76). 
This study introduces the following empirical indicators for national preferences: 
 Data showing a member state’s interdependency with the respective EU 
neighbouring country – cross-border trade and capital movements; 
 Interest-based governmental statements, speeches and official documents; 
 National positions on specific EU foreign policy issues; 
 Foreign policy-makers and experts agreeing that these are intensely held national 
preferences (semi-structured interviews); 
 Media coverage on the particular issue. Intensity of preference can be determined 
by people agreeing that it ‘is an immediate and urgent problem,’ compared to 
others (Börzel (2003:10)13. 
In the research design, I treat national preferences with variation on the degree of 
intensity as an independent variable. The distinction is made across the variation of 
the independent variable in terms of the degree of intensity, which ranges from high 
to low. First, a high intensity of preference is when there is a strong domestic pressure 
on the national representatives, second – a medium intensity when there are clear 
domestic interests, but no strong domestic pressure on the national representatives to 
secure the particular outcome, and third – a low intensity when there is a political 
preference (official statements), but no immediate domestic pressure. 
Dependent Variable – Influence On the EU Decision Outcome 
The dependent variable is a member state’s influence on EU foreign policy outcome. 
The main interest is to understand how a member state projects its preferences. With 
regards to the result, this study limits itself with the preliminary knowledge that some 
influence existed as preferences became reflected in EU policy decisions. In other 
words, the first step before starting to explore the uploading mechanisms is to clarify 
whether there has been a correlation between the national preference and the outcome. 
I assess the correlation between the preferences and the EU decision outcome 
drawing on the governmental statements, documents, national positions and semi-
structured interviews. During the interviews, correlation is operationalized through 
the following question: “Given that these EU foreign policy issues were of particular 
                                                 
13
 T.Börzel referred to the EU environmental policy (2003).  
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importance for Latvia, in what respect did Latvia influence the decision outcome?” If 
respondents answer that a member state succeeded to reach a particular outcome, it 
means that it was achieved because its actions caused it (Thomson 2011a:203). 
The Causal Mechanisms 
In the absence of large-n studies, causal mechanisms help distinguishing between 
genuine causality and ‘spurious correlation’ (Heritier 2008:69). A mechanism-based 
understanding of causality focuses on how causal forces are transmitted through the 
series of parts of a causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen 2013:28-29). For 
conceptualizing the mechanisms, I follow the approach of Beach and Pedersen 
(2013:108-110), which includes a number of steps. First, developing a causal theory, 
second – reconceptualization of causal theory as a mechanism, and third – 
operationalization of the mechanism. 
The first step is to reformulate the descriptive model of the uploading 
dimension of Europeanization, embedded in rational choice institutionalism, into a 
causal theory. A causal theory leads to a number of predictions. First, it means that a 
state’s effort to pursue its national preferences depends on their intensity. Assuming 
that preferences are intensely held, a state will act strategically to attain the preferred 
outcome. The strategic action is understood as an action deriving from preferences, 
and is the way to achieve goals given the anticipated actions of others, differential 
capabilities, and knowledge (Frieden 1999:44). Second, Latvia will influence 
(modify) the decision outcome by applying various uploading mechanisms. Third, one 
should expect that the EU policy outcome reflects a member state’s preferences as 
mediated by EU foreign policy-making rules and other EU actors’ preferences and 
interaction. A causal theory of the uploading dimension of Europeanization is 
illustrated in the following way: 
 
 
Figure 2: A causal theory of uploading dimension of Europeanization  
Intensely held national 
preferences 
Uploading mechanisms  
Influence on EU decision 
outcome 
EU policy-making 
environment 
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The second step in developing the causal mechanisms is to reconceptualise the causal 
theory as a mechanism (Beach & Pedersen 2013:110). Accordingly, in this study the 
causal theory is reconceptualised in the following parts: (1) intensely held national 
preferences, (2) utilization of uploading mechanisms, and (3) the EU foreign policy 
decision that reflects the national preference. The third step is to operationalize the 
mechanisms into a set of case-specific predictions about the expected evidence. 
Further, I operationalize the hypothesized uploading mechanisms: (1) 
presenting arguments, (2) cooperative bargaining, (3) consultations with other 
member states, (4) using coalitions, (5) lobbying the EU institutions, and (6) 
bolstering the domestic uploading capacity. One should note that operationalization 
and measuring of arguing and bargaining empirically is problematic (Naurin 2007:4). 
However, some “methodological price” should be paid” (ibid, 19). 
(1) Presenting Arguments 
Empirically, it seems to be problematic to distinguish strategic arguing from sincere 
arguing, as well as arguing from cooperative bargaining as they are all related to 
cooperative behaviour (Naurin 2007:14). Arguing involves justifying one’s position, 
but justification is also important in cooperative bargaining; this indicates that reason-
giving is not evidence of arguing (ibid, 15). Naurin (2007:18) therefore suggested that 
one needs to know the motivation behind giving reasons: whether actors tried to 
change each other’s minds, or only to facilitate reaching the compromise decision. If a 
member state intervenes at EU meetings, arguing in favour of its position to clarify it 
and to facilitate compromise instead of seeking to persuade others to change their 
minds, then it indicates the presence of strategic arguing (ibid, 10). 
This operationalization does not allow us to be certain that arguing is strategic 
or sincere, as Naurin (2007:19) recognised; asking interviewees if they were “open to 
changing their minds raises complicated issues of political correctness.” It could be so 
that some member states seek to persuade others to change their minds, while they 
themselves are not open to do the same. Thus, operationalization based on motivation 
is not ideal, because one cannot be sure if arguing is sincere or strategic, but this is the 
“methodological price to be paid” (ibid 19).  
As this study treats the national preferences as given, in line with rational 
choice institutionalism a member state is therefore expected to argue strategically. 
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Thus, a state is expected to clarify positions to facilitate compromise. No preference 
change, but an adjustment of position, is expected. 
Presenting arguments is operationalized through the following empirical indicators:  
 Rhetorical speech acts during the formal interventions in order to “persuade 
others of one’s preferred course of action” (Naurin 2007:13); 
 Providing reasons and persuading efforts to reach a compromise (Panke 2010); 
 Giving reasons to clarify the position to facilitate a compromise; 
 Attempts to change others’ actual positions, but not the national preferences.  
Presenting arguments is assessed through the following interview questions: 
 Did you make interventions in order to explain why Latvia holds a specific 
position? Did you provide reasons to clarify your position to change others’ 
minds (preferences) or to facilitate a compromise? 
(2) Cooperative Bargaining 
Cooperative bargaining is operationalized through the following empirical indicators: 
 Voicing national concerns (not direct threats) and hinting towards ‘red lines’ 
as implicit threats (Panke 2010:31); 
 Issue-linking and trading, where the outcome can be a compromise in a form 
of a ‘package-deal’ (Lehtonen 2011:45, 92);  
 Offering concessions and side payments; 
 Matching fixed preferences, seeking for compromise satisfying others;  
 Coming up with compromise proposals, accommodations and promises, and 
signalling flexibility (Dür & Mateo 2010b). 
 ‘Cooperative bargaining’ is assessed through the following interview questions: 
 Did you voice national concerns and hint towards ‘red lines’? Did you offer 
concessions and side payments? Did you use a pro-active approach at the 
outset of the discussion or reacted during the decision-making process? Did 
you demonstrate flexibility? Did you put forward a compromise proposal? 
Both arguing and bargaining in this study are understood as a part of ‘formal 
interventions’ in EU foreign policy-making formats. An intervention is understood as 
an explicit statement, a direct way in which states make their positions known to 
others. When national representatives make a formal intervention, they explicitly 
associate themselves with a particular draft under consideration (Cross 2013:91). 
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Such interventions commit actors to a particular position that is recorded. 
Interventions may be pro-active to influence the content of the proposal and to be 
reflected in the decision, or may be used reactively when national representatives 
express dissatisfaction without negatively influencing the process by veto (ibid, 5). 
(3) Contacting Other Member States  
Contacting other states is operationalized through the following empirical indicators: 
 Seeking informal contacts with other large and small member states in order to 
exchange information and to gain support for the preferred course of action. 
Contacting other member states is assessed through the following interview questions:   
 Did you seek contacts with other member states, which have the greatest 
potential to influence the positions you take on specific EU issues? In which 
policy-making phase did you contact them, e.g. initial, during the debate or in 
the final stage? Which channels of communication (meetings/ visits to the 
capitals, informal corridor talk, phone, e-mail) did you use? 
(4) Building or Joining Coalitions 
Building or joining coalitions is operationalized through the following indicators: 
 Approaching like-minded states or seeking to attract neutral ones to establish an 
ad hoc coalition;  
 Joining  coalitions initiated by others; 
 Coordination of activities with the same like-minded partners through the EU 
policy-making process; 
 Presenting the same/similar statements, or position paper in EU meetings;  
 Delegating one coalition member to implement an uploading mechanism (e.g. 
lobbying the EU institutions) on behalf of the group. 
Building or joining coalitions is assessed through the following interview questions:  
 Have you joined coalitions initiated by other member states with the aim to 
increase the possibility of influencing an outcome the closest to your national 
preference? Did you coordinate your positions prior to the formal meetings? Did 
you present a common position? 
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(5) Lobbying the EU institutions  
Lobbying as contacting EU institutional actors to informally influence the outcome is 
operationalized through the following empirical indicators: 
 Informally contacting representatives of the EU institutions, responsible for 
agenda-setting, chairing meetings, drafting compromise decisions;  
 Contacting representatives of EU institutions with the purpose of giving reasons 
and clarifying one’s position or signalling national concerns.  
Lobbying is assessed through the following interview questions: 
 Have you contacted the EEAS, the European Commission, the rotating EU 
Presidency, or the European Parliament in the cases of your intensely held 
preferences? For what purpose? To obtain additional information, give reasons, 
and clarify your position or to express national concerns (red lines)? In which 
phase of the decision-making did you contact them, e.g. during the initial, pre-
negotiation, or decision-drafting phase? Did all the levels – expert and political – 
contact the EU institutional actors with the same position?  
(6) Bolstering the Domestic Uploading Capacity 
Domestic uploading capacity, including administrative and political capacity, 
indirectly helps a member state’s uploading. Bolstering the domestic uploading 
capacity is operationalized through the following empirical indicators: 
 Coordination of the national positions among various governmental institutions; 
 Ensuring administrative capacity (budget and staff), coordination practices in 
developing the positions (‘timing and quality of instructions’); 
 Ensuring political consensus, coherence and continuity of the national position 
under the course of policy-making. 
Bolstering domestic capacity is assessed through the following interview questions: 
 How did you pull your domestic resources in preparing a well-elaborated national 
position? Did you receive timely and high quality instructions? Did you feel that a 
lack of domestic coordination and knowledge, as well as conflicting interests (of 
line ministries) diminished Latvia’s ability to successfully influence EU foreign 
policy outcome? 
 How did you evaluate the domestic political consensus, consistency and 
coherence to ensure high-quality national position? 
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Given these considerations, conceptualization and operationalization of the uploading 
process with its mechanisms have been accomplished and shown in the table below: 
Empirical indicators   
 
Variable; 
uploading 
mechanism  
Evidence used to measure prediction  
Intensely held national 
preferences (reflect domestic 
concerns/pressure, caused by 
geographic proximity). 
Independent 
variable 
Measured on the basis of geographic 
proximity; using evidence from 
interviews, public, internal documents of 
the government, mass media coverage. 
During formal interventions:  
- trying to persuade others of 
one’s preferred course of action;  
- giving reasons to clarify 
national position to facilitate the 
compromise. 
1. Presenting 
arguments  
Measured using participants accounts 
from interviews: 
Did you make interventions in order to 
explain why Latvia has a specific 
position? Did you provide reasons to 
clarify your position to change others’ 
minds (preferences) or to facilitate a 
compromise? 
During formal interventions: 
- voicing national concerns;  
- signalling red lines; 
- expressing of dissatisfaction 
on the expected outcome; 
- signalling flexibility, making 
conciliatory statements, 
proposal for compromise 
2. Cooperative 
bargaining  
Measured using participants accounts 
from interviews: 
Did you voice national concerns and hint 
‘red lines’? Did you offer concessions 
and side payments? Did you use a pro-
active approach at the outset of the 
discussion or reacted during the decision-
making? Did you demonstrate flexibility? 
Did you put forward a compromise? 
-cooperative attitude, 
information sharing. 
 Did you share information at the outset of 
decision-making? Did others share 
information? 
Considering the policy positions 
of other member states,  
 
Informal consultations with 
member states, collecting 
information on others’ views 
clarifying others’ preferences.  
3. Contacting 
other 
member 
states  
Measured using participants accounts 
from interviews: 
- How did you collect information on 
other member states’ preferences? Did 
you contact other member states before 
the formal EU working groups? 
Contacting the EU institutions 
(the HR, the EEAS, the 
Commission) providing reasons 
or highlighting national 
concerns and red lines. 
 
4. Lobbying 
EU 
institutional 
actors 
 
 
Interview questions:  
- Did you approach EU institutions? Did 
you give reasons for the national decision 
proposal or voice national concerns or 
readiness to block proposal? At what 
decision-making stage did you do it? Did 
you involve all levels (expert and 
political) in lobbying efforts? 
Approaching like-minded states 
to establish ad hoc coalition. 
Coordination of activities 
5. Building 
or joining 
coalitions 
Interview Questions:  
Did you seek like-minded peers? 
Did you initiate a coalition? 
Did you join a coalition? 
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through policy-making process. 
Presenting common positions 
during the EU meetings. 
Did you coordinate the national position 
before the formal interventions?  
Coordination of the national 
positions.  
Ensuring administrative 
capacity (budget and staff), 
coordination practices in 
developing the positions 
(‘timing and quality of 
instructions’). 
6. Bolstering 
the domestic 
uploading 
capacity  
Interview Questions:  
- How did you pull together resources in 
preparing the national position? Did you 
receive timely and high quality 
instructions? Did a lack of domestic 
coordination, knowledge and conflicting 
interests diminish the ability to attain 
preference? 
Ensuring political consensus, 
coherence and continuity of the 
national position under the 
course of policy-making. 
 
 Questions of interviews: 
- How did you sense that there was a 
domestic political consensus, consistency 
and coherence to ensure a high-quality 
national position? 
EU foreign policy decision 
outcome reflects a national 
preference. 
Dependent 
variable  
Measured using participants’ accounts 
from interviews, showing correlation 
between the preferences and decision. 
Table 3: Conceptualization and operationalization of the uploading mechanisms 
4.3. Case Selection 
Case selection is an integral part of a research strategy. Selection of cases should be 
justified in terms of theoretical criteria, where such criteria as ‘historical importance’ 
are unacceptable (Levy 2008:7). The main criterion for the selection of a case is its 
relevance to the research objectives (George & Bennett 2005). In theory-testing case 
studies, careful selection of cases is crucial. Selecting a case that fits the researcher’s 
hypothesis can create a problem of overestimating causal effects (Levy 2008:8).  
In this study, Latvia is selected as a typical case. A typical case selection is 
advisable in theory-testing process-tracing strategies (Beach & Pederesen 2013:146), 
especially in a mechanism-centred research designs (ibid) where one should know 
beforehand that the outcome is present (the correlation between X and Y) (ibid). 
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The figure below illustrates that Latvia as the least-likely case still belongs to the 
typical cases category (ibid). 
 
 
Figure 3: Case selection in mechanism-centred designs (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). 
Latvia is one of the smallest, as well as one of the newest member states, and 
therefore may be expected to be one of the least likely member state to exert 
influence. It is a least-likely case in terms of structural power. Member states are 
usually measured in terms of economic power (GDP) and political power (votes in the 
Council and EP). In the EU, under the qualified majority voting, Latvia’s voting 
weight is only around 1%. 
Despite these disadvantages, evidence shows that Latvia has been able to 
influence (modify) EU foreign policy on specific issues. This study focuses on these 
cases, which demonstrate a positive value in the dependent variable as the primarily 
interested in what mechanisms helped to attain the preferred outcome. 
In order to accomplish the within-case study on Latvia, it is necessary to 
carefully select the sub-cases. In theory-testing version of process-tracing the focus is 
not on the causal effects of X on Y, but on the process in between, which means that 
“to study the mechanisms in-between X and Y, we already know that there is a causal 
relationship between them” (Beach & Pedersen (2013). Here, the selection of the 
dependent variable with preliminary knowledge is eligible because the theory-testing 
process-tracing aims at exploring whether the hypothesized causal mechanism was 
present (George & Bennett 2005, Coller et al. 2004, Levy 2008). Therefore, both 
independent and dependent variables should be present (Beach & Pedersen 
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2013:147). Accordingly, this study follows the above approach, and the sub-cases are 
selected so that they represent a positive outcome in the dependent variable. 
4.4. Empirical Material – Collection and Evaluation of Observations  
A crucial part of the case study is the evaluation process where empirical observations 
are assessed. In a process-tracing case study, it is necessary to assess the content and 
accuracy of empirical observations before they can be admitted as evidence of the 
presence of a causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen 2013:120). The collection of 
observations (primary and secondary) should avoid cherry-picking and seek to collect 
empirical material that would allow us to determine whether the predicted mechanism 
is present (ibid, 123). This requires a considerable background knowledge, which 
means that the observation should be evaluated on the basis of “who is speaking to 
whom, for what purpose, and under what circumstances” (George & Bennett 
2005:100). Observations should be evaluated relative to what is known about the 
actors, their intentions, interactions and situation (ibid, 126). 
Third, assessing the accuracy involves critical evaluation of measurement 
(Beach & Pedersen 2013:127). In order to cope with unreliable measures, I follow the 
recommendation to apply triangulation – a collection of various independent 
observations from different types of sources (interviews and documents) (ibid, 128).  
Sources of Evidence/ Data 
Process tracing requires collection of large amounts of data, ideally from a wide range 
of resources. This study uses primary, as well as secondary sources. Primary sources 
consist of semi-structured interviews, EU and Latvian government foreign policy 
documents. Given that EU foreign policy decisions are not made by formal voting, 
but under informal consensus, it is impossible to rely on voting (Bailer 2010:751). 
Here, interviews are the most frequently used sources. Tansey (2007:4) suggested 
relying on interviewing, especially elite interviews, because the process-tracing often 
aims at getting evidence about political developments at the highest level, where elite 
actors are critical sources. As opposed to Tansey’s assumptions, I suggest that in EU 
foreign policy-making, elite interviews are less important. The main part of decision-
making in fact occurs at the EU working group level, involving experts and highest 
civil servants, who participate directly in EU foreign policy-making. The direct 
participant accounts offer a more direct measure of the causal mechanism and thereby 
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help avoiding the measurement bias (Beach & Pedersen 2013:134). Through focused 
questioning, a researcher can “reconstruct political episodes on the basis of testimony 
of respondents” (Tansey 2007:5). Apart from interviews I also use governmental 
documents. 
Primary sources are complemented with secondary sources of the existing 
studies and media sources. The media sources are used as a background material 
about the context in which decisions were made. The accuracy of media sources can 
be difficult to assess, and they are used as supplement evidence in process-tracing 
only when these observations are triangulated with other types of sources as a 
supplement (Beach & Pedersen 2013:143). 
To sum up, in order to test hypotheses on the uploading dimension, a within-
case study of one individual country is conducted. Latvia is used as a typical case, a 
least-likely case. In order to capture uploading with its mechanisms, I rely on the 
process-tracing method, acquiring empirical evidence by using triangulation, i.e. 
different sources of observation, in particular semi-structured interviews. To avoid the 
potential risk of observation bias, the interviews were held with the Latvian foreign 
policy-makers in Riga and its diplomatic representations, as well as the 
representatives from EU institutions – the EEAS and the Commission. For empirical 
observations, 30 interviews have been conducted in Riga and Brussels, involving 
various levels of officials, directly involved in EU foreign policy-making on the 
respective EU dossiers, covered by the three sub-cases of this study. 
5. WITHIN-CASE STUDY ON LATVIA 
5.1. Determinants of Latvia’s Foreign Policy 
Latvia is one of the smallest and newest EU member states, a post-communist 
country, located on the easternmost border of the EU and bordering the EU’s largest 
neighbour by territory Russia. These features determine Latvia’s national preferences 
in EU foreign policy and its ability to attain them.  
With regards to ‘smallness’ and ‘newness,’ Latvia is one of the smallest 
member states in terms of economic power (GDP) and political power (number of 
votes in the Council). Although EU foreign policy-making is not based on formal 
voting, there is some ‘shadow of votes’ with large member states being more 
influential. Smaller states’ weakness is even more visible in the case of small new 
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member states, among which is Latvia. “Time in the EU matters,” therefore the new 
member states have limited capacity to influence the EU foreign policy outcome 
(Goetz 2005:254). Limited experience, expertise and lack of resources make 
uploading challenging. 
After regaining independence in 1991, Latvia started its foreign policy from 
scratch, with the Foreign Ministry’s staff of around thirty people. The country was 
poorly prepared for the role of an independent international actor (Pabriks & Purs 
2001:119), not to think of being an active member of EU foreign policy-making. Over 
time Latvia strengthened its domestic uploading capacity. Yet, after joining the EU as 
a member state Latvia faced enormous challenges. With limited capacity, it was 
impossible to react to information coming from Brussels, while it was increasingly 
important to respond to EU foreign policy initiatives (Galbreath 2013:115). 
Gradually Latvia developed its administrative capacity and skills to participate 
in Brussels-led processes. Latvia started carving out niches in specific EU foreign 
policy issues. There was an expectation that Latvia would become a more active 
player in EU policy towards the post-Soviet states: Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and 
Moldova, as its development cooperation budget would grow (Rostoks 2010). Yet, 
this was interrupted by the country’s severe economic crisis in 2009 with the Foreign 
Ministry being one of the most affected (ibid, 2010). Recovering from the crisis 
allowed it to gradually return to the pre-crisis foreign service staff numbers. 
Apart from administrative weakness, Latvia same as other post-communist 
countries also faces political weakness. A common feature of the post-communist 
countries is unstable institutional and policy regimes, resulting in “neglecting 
Europeanization through the domestic institutions” (Goetz 2005:276). As shown by 
Sprūds (2008:105), the Baltic States’ domestic political environment has been 
dominated by “unclear rules of the political interaction, attempts to mobilise and 
manipulate with society” resulting in a situation when an influential role has been 
played by “informal actors.” This is also reflected in these states’ foreign policy-
making, which has been complicated and ambiguous, with institutions being 
underdeveloped, elite using foreign policy for domestic goals (Skak, 1996, Sprūds 
2008:105). In a similar way, Vilpišauskas (2011, 2013) noted that a lack of 
consistency in domestic policies in the Baltic States, originating from policy-makers’ 
dependency on domestic interest groups prevents governments from convincing the 
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EU partners. Thereby it could be so that administrative and political weakness may 
diminish Latvia’s uploading capacity. 
Thus, in relation to the research question, Latvia seems to be the least likely 
member state to influence the outcome of EU foreign policy. On the other hand, its 
geographic proximity to EU direct neighbours of strategic importance suggests 
intensely held national preferences in the EU agenda towards this neighbourhood. 
Geographic proximity for Latvia primarily means Russia. After regaining 
independence in 1991, Latvia’s foreign policy concentrated on security, to a large 
extent, meaning that it focused on its neighbouring country Russia (Dreifelds 1996:5-
15) perceived as “the only and overwhelming threat to Baltic independence” 
(Timofejevs-Henriksson 2013:146). For this reason Latvia’s political elite perceived 
integration in international institutions as essential, where the EU membership was 
believed to provide Latvia ‘soft’ security guarantees (Pabriks & Purs 2001:142). 
Thus, geographic position is one of the main factors determining Latvia’s foreign 
policy preferences in this EU direction. 
Furthermore, due to its Soviet experience, it is important for Latvia to “redress 
from the dominance from which they have suffered” (Galbreath et al. 2008:16). Thus, 
given its geographical position, one may expect that Latvia with its strong interests in 
its immediate neighbourhood and despite its relative weakness would pro-actively 
seek to project them at the EU level. 
Characteristics of the Latvian Foreign Policy-Making Process 
The Latvian Constitution puts foreign policy in the hands of Parliament and especially 
the Foreign Minister, while the President has a representative role in international 
relations. The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the most visible in 
exercising foreign policy. Furthermore, EU policy coordination in Latvia is a 
prerogative of the Foreign Minister. While the Cabinet of Ministers approves national 
positions for the EU, the Foreign Minister has the main role in developing EU policy 
(Galbreath 2013). The MFA is formally responsible for “coordinating the 
development and implementation of the EU policies” (MFA, Coordination of EU 
[affairs] in Latvia). The MFA prepares the national position for the European Council, 
and develops positions on the external economic relations and the CFSP (ibid). 
While the role of MFA is to define general guidelines and principles of 
Latvia’s foreign policy, the Saeima (the national Parliament) has a more consultative 
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role. As a result, the Saeima is less engaged in national foreign policy-making. As 
argued by Rostoks (2010), the Latvian parliament needed to re-establish the link with 
the MFA, where the annual foreign policy debates in the Saeima may serve as 
facilitator. 
Latvian foreign policy-making and coordination of EU policy is in its entirety 
in the hands of the Foreign Ministry. Thus, the MFA and the Foreign Minister are the 
key players in terms of Latvia’s uploading dimension of Europeanization. 
5.2. Selection of the Sub-cases 
In the within-case study on Latvia, three sub-cases are used to trace uploading 
mechanisms. The sub-case selection is justified by relevance to the research 
objectives, i.e. to explore how a member state can influence EU foreign policy. In so 
doing, first, I choose those EU dossiers where Latvia had intensely held national 
preferences, which were reflected in the EU decision outcome. Second, the three sub-
cases are selected with variation in the independent variable to test how the intensity 
of preferences determined the choice of uploading mechanisms. 
First, all three EU foreign policy dossiers involve important and salient issues 
for Latvia, caused by its geographic proximity to the respective third countries. Case I 
“The EU sanctions on Belarus (2011-2012)” involves a high intensity preference – it 
deals with Latvia’s direct neighbour, a close business partner, with whom Latvia has 
economic interdependency. Case II “The EU-Russia visa-free travel (2011-2014)” 
involves the domestic business interests, but also security concerns. Case III “The 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (2011-2013)” represents strong national 
preference for Latvia for its broader ‘first order’ security concerns, given Ukraine’s 
relevance for the whole post-Soviet space. The three sub-cases are selected with a 
preliminary knowledge on a positive value in dependent variable. It means that there 
was some influence on the part of Latvia exerted on the EU foreign policy decision 
outcome, that is, Latvia’s preferences were reflected in EU decision.  
Second, the three sub-cases are selected with the variation in the independent 
variable. While all three selected sub-cases reflect Latvia’s intensely held national 
preferences, at they the same time vary in terms of their intensity. Case I “The EU 
sanctions on Belarus (2011-2012)” reflect extremely high domestic pressure, whereas 
Case II “The EU-Russia visa-free travel (2011-2014),” medium intensity: while there 
was a general domestic interest and public sensitivity, there was no immediate 
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domestic pressure on the foreign policy-makers. Case III “The EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement (2011-2013)” represents low intensity: while the issue was 
high on the government’s political agenda, there was no interest on the issue from 
neither economic interest groups, nor other eventual veto players. 
Finally, in order to trace the uploading process with its mechanisms, the 
conditions are kept constant. I select the EU foreign policy dossiers, which cover the 
period from the end of 2010 when the European External Action Service became fully 
operational, in this way covering the same EU institutional framework and the post-
Lisbon Treaty policy-making rules and procedures. 
5.3. Case I: EU Sanctions Towards Belarus (2011-2012) 
The European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013, in its evaluation of EU policy towards 
Belarus, ranked Latvia as one of the ‘biggest slackers’ in terms of “putting pressure 
on Belarus for political liberalisation” (ECFR Scorecard 2013, 137). How could 
Latvia receive such an assessment even though, together with the EU and the U.S., it 
kept promoting democratic changes in the neighbouring Belarus? The answer lies 
within the different intensity of national preferences between Latvia and most of the 
EU members. Being a direct neighbour with intense cross-border links, Latvia found 
that it could not support economic sanctions against Belarus: “Why should it support 
sanctions, which in no way helped liberalisation of the Lukashenko regime, while at 
the same time cause damage to Latvia” (Rostoks, 26.03.2013). In words of the 
Minister of Economy Pavļuts: “We have on many occasions asked our EU partners 
what they believe these sanctions will lead to” (Gebert, 2013:3). This chapter 
addresses how Latvia sought to upload its intensely held (geographic) preferences. 
After the crackdown of December 2010 elections in Belarus, EU relations with 
Minsk returned to a low point. EU debate on economic sanctions reached its peak in 
February-March 2012. While this very sensitive issue was discussed behind closed 
doors, mass media speculated on EU’s “economic embargo” on Belarus and broad 
sanctions on state-owned companies. Nonetheless, the de facto outcome was 
surprisingly modest. The March 2012 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) agreed only on 
limited sanctions against few business people and companies, who were actively 
backing Lukashenko. Partly, this seemed to be the result of the “firm resistance from 
Latvia (backed by Slovenia)” (Kłusiňski 2013). The policy-makers agreed: “if Latvia 
would not put on the brakes to some partners’ eagerness for broad sanctions the 
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outcome would be different” (Interview No. 10, 13.02.2013, MFA). Thus, when 
stakes are high even a small, new member state can influence EU policy outcome. 
Accordingly, this EU dossier is suitable for tracing the causal process and the 
mechanisms, given that there is previous knowledge on the causal relationship 
between the national preferences and the EU decision outcome. I proceed as follows. 
First, I start with a brief empirical context and an account of EU sanctions policy 
towards Belarus. Second, I describe Latvia’s intensely held preferences. Third, I trace 
the inner workings of the uploading mechanism. I divide the EU decision-making 
process into three stages: the early stage (2011 - January 2012); the first round of 
negotiations (February 2012); and the second round of negotiations (March 2012). 
5.3.1. Empirical Background 
The Development of EU Sanction Policy Towards Belarus 
At the beginning of the 1990s, EU policy towards Belarus did not differ from its 
broader approach to the Eastern European countries. Until 1994, relations developed 
in a positive trend, including the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement in 1995. These positive developments were interrupted by president 
Lukashenko’s victory in 1994 and the following deterioration of democratic standards 
with Lukashenko gradually gaining unlimited power. 
In response, the EU froze the highest political-level contacts with Belarus. In 
1996, the EU imposed the first sanctions, which were suspended in 1999, but then 
again re-imposed. In 2002 the EU started to offer Belarus a so-called ‘benchmarks 
approach,’ eventually leading to a resumption of the dialogue. However, this did not 
yield any positive results (ENPI, Belarus: Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013). 
During 1996- 2004 there were only mild EU sanctions on Belarus primarily in the 
form of a visa ban and asset-freeze. In 2006, the EU sanctions became more 
comprehensive. The March 2006 Belarusian presidential elections were marked by 
serious violations. The April 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) imposed additional sanctions against Lukashenko and individuals 
responsible for election violations (Council regulation, 18 May 2006). In addition, the 
December 2006 Council withdrew Belarus from access to generalized tariff 
preferences (Council Regulation, 21 December 2006). 
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The situation improved again in 2008, with positive signals from Minsk on its 
willingness to cooperate with the EU. Apparently, Lukashenko’s administration 
sought to manoeuvre between Russia and the EU. He sought contacts with the EU 
after Putin’s threats to increase the gas prices (Liakhovich 2011). In early 2008, the 
Lukashenko’s administration developed an agenda on improvement of relations with 
the West (ibid). In August 2008, it released political prisoners. In response, the EU 
suspended sanctions for six months (Council Conclusions, 13 October, 2008). One 
month later, the head of Lukashenko’s administration Makey held a speech at the 
Minsk Forum devoted to the wish to develop cooperation with the West and political 
liberalization of Belarus, which became a sensation (Liakhovich 2011). Thereby the 
EU moved from a coercive model towards an engagement policy aimed at 
“incremental regime evolution” (Bošs 2012:85). 
The year 2009 followed with a further rapprochement between the EU and 
Minsk. In February 2009, the HR for the CFSP, Solana, met Lukashenko in Minsk, 
with both sides expressing willingness to develop a closer relationship (European 
Council TV Newsroom, 19 February 2009). In May 2009, Belarus officially joined 
the EU Eastern Partnership initiative (Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern 
Partnership Summit, 7 May 2009). In November 2010, the EU Enlargement 
Commissioner Füle visited Minsk. Nonetheless, these positive trends were interrupted 
by the crackdown on the opposition launched soon after the presidential elections in 
December 2010. 
The crackdown that followed the election was unexpected. Prior to the 
elections, the European Council recognized ‘clear and visible progress on the conduct 
of elections.’ However, events took another turn following the violent repression of 
political protests after the elections. There was suspicion that demonstrators may have 
included provocateurs from the Belarusian and Russian secret services (Jarábik et al, 
2011), and that the crackdown was orchestrated by the regime’s ‘siloviki’ with direct 
ties to Moscow, who opposed any attempt to get closer to Brussels and sought to 
undermine Lukashenko’s ‘flirt’ with the EU (Ditrych 2013:2). 
Many in the EU received this development with disappointment, given efforts 
to engage in discussion with Lukashenko. Prior to the elections Germany and Poland 
had offered Belarus 3.5 billion USD aid if the election were considered free and fair 
(The New York Times 19.12.2010). The following reaction of the international 
community was very sharp. The U.S. and the EU common statement strongly 
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condemned the violence, disproportionate use of force, and called for the immediate 
release of the arrested presidential candidates and demonstrators (Joint US-EU 
Statement, 23.12. 2010). 
For Latvia, these developments were very unpleasant, given the latest warmed 
bilateral relations and intensity of economic and political contacts. Latvia joined the 
common line. Therefore Latvian Foreign Minister Kristovskis immediately issued a 
critical statement on the election outcome, while seeking not to slam the door on 
Minsk: “The post-election violence would not facilitate a further dialogue and 
relations between the EU and Belarus,” therefore “Latvia asked for immediate release 
of participants of the protest rally” (MFA, Latvia, Statement, 20.12.2011). 
Meanwhile, the Minsk officials contacted Brussels and the EU capitals to 
convince that the post-election events were not intentional. Still, as recognized by a 
high-level EU representative, “no one from the EU ministers even called to Minsk to 
informally talk to them. Despite Lukashenko, Belarus was still an independent state 
and had to be treated with some respect” (Interview No. 23, 12.07.2013, EEAS).  
The Belarusian Foreign Minister Martynov sought to convince the EU that the 
crackdown was a Russian conspiracy implemented together with a part of the 
opposition (Jarábik et al, 2011). In January 2011, Martynov visited Brussels. After the 
meeting with the HR Ashton, he told the press that Lukashenko was ‘not that stupid’ 
to destroy the relations with the EU; meanwhile Belarusian officials in EU capitals 
sought to explain that “Russia may have had hand in the post-election confrontation in 
a conspiracy form to harm Belarus-EU relations” (EUobserver, 12.01.2011). Despite 
these efforts, HR Ashton made it clear that the EU is “looking into appropriate 
measures” against Minsk (ibid). The reason was that Lukashenko had ignored the 
main demand made by the EU – the release of political prisoners. Lukashenko seemed 
to have angered everyone. Moreover, he did not obey the EU’s pressure. The 
Lukashenko administration did not rush to begin releasing political prisoners. As a 
result, return to the EU sanction policy seemed inevitable. 
As just shown, after 1994 the EU “imposed, suspended, lifted and re-imposed 
variety of sanctions” on the Lukashenko regime (Ditrych 2013), while their efficacy 
has never been evaluated. However, sanctions are an important EU foreign policy 
measure, demonstrating the EU’s ‘actorness.’According to the official EU guidelines 
sanctions have a preventive, not a punishing role: 
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“Sanctions are the EU instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature, which 
seek to bring about a change in activities or policies (...) that do not respect 
the rule of law or democratic principles. They may target governments of third 
countries, non-state entities or individuals.” (European Commission, 2008)  
In preparing EU’s reaction on the post-election crackdown, some member states were 
particularly impatient, among them Poland. For instance, immediately after the 
December elections Poland started to draft its blacklist proposal of 96 people to be 
sanctioned, including Lukashenko and his propagandists (EUobserver, 12.01.2011).  
Latvia, as an EU member State, Vis-à-vis Belarus 
Latvia shares a border with Belarus. The two countries share a common history of 
being under the Soviet regime. Today Belarusian diaspora in Latvia takes an active 
role in promoting closer ties between both countries, including economic cooperation. 
As summarized by a Latvian high-level diplomat, “Latvia perceives Belarus as a 
friendly country. In contrast to its large neighbour Russia, with Belarus, Latvia does 
not have conflicts. In Latvia, we have many influential players, the Belarusian 
‘agents’” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA).  
Looking back at the pre-accession period one can see that Latvia’s main 
foreign policy pre-occupation was joining the EU and NATO. Being eager to reach 
this aim, Latvia strategically followed the U.S. and the EU rhetoric and tried to 
reinforce the EU and NATO policy in Belarus. Since the U.S. did not have any 
security and economic interests in Belarus, the Bush administration’s approach 
towards Lukashenko, ‘the last European dictator,’ focused on only ‘one parameter’ – 
promotion of democracy (Bošs 2012:87). For similar reasons, the EU primarily 
concentrated on democracy and human rights. Most of the member states have no 
strong interests in Belarus, and they seemingly treat Belarus in the context of their 
beneficial contacts with Moscow. 
After joining the EU, Latvia continued promoting EU’s policy towards 
Belarus. Latvia actively insisted on EU’s strong reaction on violations of human 
rights, and opposed the Lukashenko regime. During intra-EU debates, the Latvian 
representatives were vocal and tried to give their input in formulating EU sanction 
policy towards Minsk, when in 2004 and 2006 the EU imposed a visa ban and asset 
freeze on Belarus. At the time, the EU still had some illusions of a post-Lukashenko 
regime. 
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This approach by the Latvian government did not facilitate good neighbourly 
relations. In response to Latvia’s pro-active stance, the Lukashenko’s regime used 
blackmailing. In mid-2006, “Minsk involved with Latvia in diplomatic fracas. Belarus 
state television showed hidden camera footage of the Latvian diplomat’s private 
activities.” (Business Source Premier, 2010:44) In July, Belarusian authorities opened 
a criminal case against this Latvian diplomat with the pretext that he was responsible 
for contacts with Belarus opposition leaders. The Latvian Foreign Ministry reacted by 
accusing Belarus for an ‘unprecedented attack.’ The Foreign Minister Pabriks 
condemned this violation of private space “as breach of the Vienna Convention,” 
showing “what kind of justice system exists in this dictatorship.” Latvia recalled its 
ambassador for three months (ibid). Nonetheless, apart from this bilateral scandal 
with political resonance, relationship developed in a pragmatic way and the two 
countries “enjoyed mostly harmonious relations” (Belarus Digest, 24 May 2012). 
Latvian foreign policy on Belarus gradually shifted towards a more pragmatic 
approach. It coincided with the EU’s rapprochement with Minsk. Increasing business 
contacts between Latvia and Belarus, contributed to Latvia’s rather balanced and 
careful policy instead of focusing only on human rights and democracy. Thereby, 
instead of pushing for the regime change, the Baltic political leaders advocated for 
maintaining the status quo, as they felt that Lukashenko’s further isolation would only 
push Belarus closer towards Russia (Bošs 89-90).  
In recent years economic issues have gained importance in Latvian foreign 
policy, necessitated by the need to recover from the deep economic crisis. Although 
Belarus was not the main economic partner for Latvia, the significant budget income 
from the transit from and through the territory of Belarus was important. Therefore, 
Latvia was expected to resist imposing economic sanctions on Belarus (Bošs, 90). 
5.3.2. Latvia’s Intensely Held Preference: “No Economic Sanctions”  
To assess the intensely held national preferences, I use the following empirical 
indicators: (1) data showing intensity of cross-border trade, (2) interest-based 
statements of the government, (3) foreign policy-makers agreeing on levels of 
salience, (4) media coverage, and (5) national positions. 
First, with regards to economic interdependence, Latvia’s direct border with 
Belarus equals strong business links. For years, Belarus has been one of its main 
economic partners. Transportation service trade plays a crucial role in Latvian-
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Belarusian trade relations. Transportation services account for approximately 50% of 
total service exports, which makes this sector indispensable for the country’s 
economic performance (Jākobsons 2012:22). Latvia’s ports provided some of the 
geographically closest and cheapest hubs for the Belarusian export-oriented 
petrochemical industries. The transport sector accounts for 13% of Latvia’s GDP, and 
goods coming from or through Belarus account for 50% of the freight. Thus, the 
transit of Belarusian goods was one of the main sources of state budget income 
(Kłysiński, 07.01.13). Given this economic interdependence with Belarus, Latvia, 
severely affected by the economic crisis, chose to resist any EU restrictions on 
economic relations with its neighbour (ibid).  
Preserving these links was crucial for the domestic business community, as 
underscored by the Foreign Ministry official: “There are many Belarusian “agents,” 
e.g. the Employers’ Confederation (LDDK), the Chamber of Commerce, the Latvian 
Railway, and individual companies” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). These 
interest groups put enormous pressure on the government. The LDDK asked the 
government “to defend its interests in the EU, considering its geographic location and 
volume of external trade with Belarus” (LDDK, 7.02.2012). The influential 
businessman Lembergs at one point “strongly condemned the EU” and asked that 
“given the place of Belarus in Latvia’s trade, including transit, economic sanctions 
would be irresponsible action, to which Latvia by no means should agree” (Apollo, 
2.03.2012). The government responded to these concerns.  
This leads to the second empirical indicator – the Latvian government’s clear 
interest-based statements. Already at the outset of the EU debate, the Foreign Minister 
Kristovskis made clear that Latvia “is not interested in limiting business opportunities 
for entrepreneurs. When formulating a political stance toward the political governance 
of another state, one should watch out so that business would not suffer” (Diena, 
10.01.2012). Kristovskis added that, while the “EU should promote democracy in 
Belarus, Latvia cannot support economic sanctions as they could affect ordinary 
people in Belarus, and haven't worked before” (ibid). This Latvian government 
position was later replicated in various EU foreign policy formats. 
A third empirical indicator consists of interview respondents confirming the 
salience of the issue. All respondents observed Latvia’s strong interests in Belarus 
sanctions’ case. For instance, one respondent stressed that    
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Latvia´s national interests are related to its direct neighbour. Economic issues 
became increasingly important in foreign policy to overcome economic crisis. 
Understandably, our business community became scared over EU sanctions. 
The foreign policy-makers had to defend business interests. In the EU, it is a 
common practice that member states seek to reach their economic goals 
(Interview No. 2, January 15, 2013, MFA) 
Another respondent confirmed that EU sanctions on Belarus were Latvia’ intensely 
held preference due to economic interests:  
For Latvia, it was a dilemma either to join the EU majority to pressure 
Belarus to respect the democratic standards or defend Latvia’s national 
interests. In the EU, national interests, including economic ones, are 
prevailing. Especially when the CFSP is targeted towards a neighbour, In the 
case of Belarusian sanctions, Latvia could not agree due to strong business 
engagement in Belarus (Interview No.5, 17.01.13, MFA). 
Thus, in relation towards the EU’s sanctions policy, Latvia found itself in a complex 
situation where it had to defend its economic interests at the expense of common 
values.  
A fourth empirical indicator, revealing the intensity of national preferences, is 
the importance the domestic mass media attach to the issue. Apparently, Latvian 
media space played a crucial role in channelling business group pressure on the 
government. Initially used only by business groups, that growing pressure gradually 
engaged politicians, parliamentarians and experts. The public message to foreign 
policy-makers gradually converged on a simple message: “No consent to economic 
sanctions on Belarus.” 
Evidently, for Latvia the EU policy towards Belarus involved economic 
interdependence, one of two key dimensions of ‘first order’ core national interests.  
However, another dimension of the ‘first order’ interests – security – was equally 
important in determining Latvia’s preferences. Russia’s increasing influence in 
Belarus worried the governments of the three Baltic States. They became more and 
more concerned about Moscow buying out the biggest businesses in Belarus, 
politically pressuring Minsk, and arranging joint military exercises and developing 
new military bases near their borders. They were concerned that Belarus would cease 
to be an independent state. Hence, a key interest of the Baltic States was to keep the 
EU engaged in Belarus in order to contain the Russian pressure. Therefore, the EU 
focusing exclusively on democracy protection seemed to be short-sighted for them. 
As underlined earlier, if EU policy for a member state involves both the ‘first’ 
and the ‘second order’ concerns (idealistic values), one may expect that its ‘first 
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order’ interests would not be sacrificed when they clash with the second order, ‘non-
security’ concerns (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008:179). In other words, in the case of EU 
economic sanction towards Minsk, Latvia was expected to object such decisions. 
5.3.3. The EU Policy-making Environment  
According to rational choice institutionalism, EU’s institutional environment 
constrains member state preference projection. EU institutional rules and norms, as 
well as other member states’ preferences, “the actual distribution of power” (Thomson 
2011a), are assumed to constrain Latvia’s pursuit of its preferences.   
Which were the key actors and their preferences in Belarus sanctions policy? 
Apart from its neighbours – the Baltic States and Poland, the member states have no 
strong political and economic interests in Belarus: “Contrary to the other EU sanction 
cases, where big member states were involved, in the Belarus case there were small 
member states next door to Belarus and one big state, Germany. Germany cares about 
Belarus.” (Interview No. 19, 12 July 2013, EEAS Brussels).  
Overall, Germany has geopolitical interests in the Eastern neighbourhood. It 
has supported the EU engagement in Belarus in various ways. Rapprochement 
between the two countries began in 2008. Just before the 2010 December elections, 
Foreign Minister Westerwelle together with his Polish colleague visited Minsk (MFA, 
Germany, March 2013), and offered Belarus 3.5 billion USD aid if elections were 
considered free and fair (The New York Times, 19.12.2010). However, the elections 
interrupted German efforts to engage with Lukashenko’s regime. The German 
government strongly criticized the crackdown on demonstrators protesting against the 
election results and the conditions under the opposition fought the electoral campaign 
(ibid). As commented by the interviewee, one should not expect Berlin to ‘turn a blind 
eye’ on the events in Minsk: “In Germany, there is a real opposition that follows each 
step of the government” (Interview No. 23, 12.07.2013, EEAS). The tough German 
reaction might also have been influenced by personal factors: at that time Chancellor 
Merkel was sharply critical, having some illusion on the possibility to achieve a 
democratic transformation in Eastern Partnership countries. Also, Lukashenko’s 
serious personal attacks on Westerwelle complicated the situation (Spiegel, 
05.03.2012). Germany eventually became an advocate for economic sanctions against 
Minsk.  
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Besides Germany, a crucial role was played by Poland, in particular, by its 
Foreign Minister Sikorski. Poland, a direct neighbour of Belarus with strong historical 
ties, also cares about Belarus. The Polish-Belarusian relations have never been easy 
due to the complicated mutual history. After joining the EU, Poland sought to be the 
‘major voice’ in determining Brussels’ policy towards its neighbour (RFE/RL March 
19, 2006). Warsaw always focused on the post-Lukashenko period (ibid) and 
successfully managed to promote a tougher EU line towards the regime, especially by 
pushing for sanctions in 2006 (Kaminska 2008:4). Seemingly, Lukashenko did not 
want to obey Warsaw’s pressure, and turned his back on Poland, for instance, by 
ignoring the Warsaw Eastern Partnership Summit in September 2011. Considering the 
difficulties faced by the large Polish minority in Belarus, and with the Polish 
parliamentary elections (autumn 2011) approaching, in the weeks and months leading 
up to the summit Polish politicians started to behave ‘hysterically’ (Interview No. 24, 
16.08.2013, PermRep). 
Hence, Lukashenko lost two most important advocates in the EU – Poland and 
Germany. This changed the balance in EU debate with the majority now inclined in 
favour of economic sanctions. What was the role of Lithuania? Same as Latvia, 
Lithuania is a direct neighbour of Belarus and an economic partner. Initially, 
Lithuania was one of the strongest opponents to economic sanctions. It also created 
tensions with Poland over the issue. Sikorski instructed the neighbour in plain 
language: “Lithuania should think twice whether it has the right to vote against 
sanctions against Belarus” (Lashuk, 21.05.2011). In response, the Lithuanian 
President Gribauskaite and Prime Minister Kubilius announced that “the problem of 
the West is simple: having no clue about the Belarussian situation, it based its 
assessments on the expertise of Sikorski, who naively thinks that he has such a clue” 
(Tracevskis, 01.06.2011). 
The Lithuanian governmental representative regretted that “the EU wanted 
‘everything at once,’ and that it did not have patience to make small steps” (EurActiv, 
11.07.2012). In a similar manner, Latvian Foreign Minister Kristovskis urged the HR 
Ashton to maintain strategic patience with Belarus. While both countries had very 
similar national preferences, the key problem was their competitive economic 
positions in Belarus. It appeared to be easy to split Latvia and Lithuania when the EU 
debate turned to sanctioning concrete Belarusian businesses. Indirectly, the EU 
sanctions could help to redistribute the Belarusian transit flows from Latvia to the 
85 
 
Lithuanian Port of Klaipeda, which was seemingly used by Lithuanians, who were 
“more successful in lobbying, and consequently the Belarusian companies doing 
business with Lithuania were not on the blacklist proposal” (Interview No. 13, 
12.07.2013, EEAS). 
Consequently, Latvia could not rely on its traditional like-minded peers, 
especially on Poland, a leader of the East European group. Hence, while the best 
‘recipe’ for Latvia would be “together with Lithuania and Poland [..] to synchronize 
the exiting approaches” and “to speak in one voice” (Kļaviņš 2012:169), in practice it 
was impossible. Poland’s eagerness for economic sanctions was in effect the opposite 
of Latvia’s efforts to put the brakes on such idea. Under these circumstances, how 
could Latvia pursue its intensely held preferences, with steadily increasing domestic 
pressure and while the EU institutional environment hindered it to attain its goals? 
5.3.4. Observed Latvia’s Influence on EU Decision Outcome 
In order to trace the uploading process between the independent variable (national 
preferences) and the dependent variable (influence on EU decision outcome), first, 
there needs to be established knowledge on the correlation between them. 
Empirical findings confirm that Latvia, given its intensely held national 
preference, succeeded to influence the EU decision outcome. All interviewees 
acknowledged a positive outcome. The following Latvia’s influence has been 
observed: “We succeeded in influencing the outcome to a great extett. Not to the 
maximum, but to a great extent” (Interview No. 2, 15.01.13, PermRep); “Despite our 
initial failures, at the end we succeeded in influencing to a great extent (Interview No. 
9, 05.02.13, PermRep); “We succeeded 100% in influencing the outcome – our 
economic interests did not suffer” (Interview No. 7, 18.01.12, MFA). One interlocutor 
noted that, “all Latvia’s concerns were fully taken into account. The final decision 
was acceptable. In fact, EU sanctions proved useless – the Belarusian oligarch Chyzh 
[the key business partner for Latvia, sanctioned by the EU] just renamed his 
companies, including [a sanctioned company] Triple, and continued his business with 
the EU exactly as before” (Interview No. 11, 21.02.2103, MFA). The 22 March FAC 
decision outcome was appreciated by the Latvian business community, generally 
agreeing that “the Latvian diplomats did the maximum to minimize the negative 
influence on Latvia’s economy” (Delfi, 23.03.2012). 
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Latvia’s influence was reported by the Minister Rinkēvičs during the annual 
foreign policy debate in the Saeima in January 2013. He opened his speech by stating 
that “promotion of foreign economic links has never been so high on the Ministry’s 
agenda [..]. Here we are speaking about Belarus. While honouring common EU 
principles, it was vital to prevent the harmful effects that this type of sanctions could 
have had on the economy of Latvia. We succeeded” (MFA, 24.01.2013). 
It is interesting to see with what uploading mechanisms Latvia could influence 
EU foreign policy-making and the decision outcome? How did the EU institutional 
environment help (or constrain) Latvia’s preference projection? Could it be so that 
Latvia succeeded just because its position corresponded to the general EU line? 
5.3.4. The Uploading Mechanisms in Practice   
In tracing the uploading mechanisms, I divide the EU decision-making process into 
three stages: the early stage; the first round; and the second round of negotiations. 
1. The first stage (January 2011 - the 23 January, 2012 FAC) 
January 2011 Beginning of the EU expert level debate on response to the violent 
crackdown of December 2010 Presidential elections in Belarus 
31
 
January 2011  FAC reinstates the visa-ban and asset freeze on 192 persons responsible for 
the crackdown of civil society (Council Decision 31.01.2011) 
20
 
June 2011 FAC includes additional persons and entities in the list of visa-ban and 
asset freeze (Council Decision 20.06.2011) 
10
 
October 2011 FAC includes 16 additional persons on the list of 192 persons targeted by 
visa-ban and asset-freeze (10.10.2011) 
2. The second stage (23 January 2012 FAC - 27 February 2012 FAC) 
23
 
January 2012 FAC broadens the criteria for sanctions to include persons and entities 
benefiting from or supporting the regime (Council Decision 23.01.2012) 
3. The third stage (until the 22 March FAC) 
27
 
February 2012 FAC fails to agree, but promises to take decision in March (Foreign Affairs 
Council, Press release, 27.02.2012) 
28 February 2012 Member states recall their Ambassadors from Minsk  
22
 
March 2012 FAC agrees on limited sanctions (Council Implementing Decision 
23.03.2012) 
Table 4: Chronology of EU decision-making (January 2011 – March 2012) 
For Latvia – a small, new member state – it was exceptional to find itself in isolation 
and with its diplomatic reputation at stake: “if a state wants an exemption from the 
sanctions others tend to interpret it as egoistic behaviour” (Interview No. 17, 
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11.07.2013, PermRep, Brussels). At the same time, Latvians have learned that “the 
EU’s common practice is that states seek to reach their economic goals. For example, 
in China, Germany is deeply economically engaged. Then the values go to the 
secondary place.” (Interview No. 2, 15.01.2013, MFA) Also, “Sweden in 2011 
weakened the EU sanctions on Syria. Sweden always built its reputation as a defender 
of human rights, but then shocked everyone with its double standards. It saved its 
companies STE and MTN from blacklisting” (Interview No. 16, 11.07.2013, EEAS). 
Apparently, “when these sharp EU foreign policy instruments are targeted 
towards its neighbour, a country’s business interests dominate in foreign policy 
action. In the EU’s Belarus sanctions, Latvia could not agree due to its strong business 
engagement” (Interview No. 5, 17.01.13, MFA). In order to defend its interests Latvia 
“needed to invest enormous work.” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA) 
5.3.4.1 The First Stage (January 2011 - January 2012) 
Initially, the EU debate concentrated on political sanctions – visa bans and an asset 
freezes against certain persons. The idea of economic sanctions only arose 
occasionally. Hence, in the first half of 2011, Latvia could easily upload its 
preferences by aligning with general arguments that resonated well with those who 
belonged to the like-minded (sceptical) group, which was rather broad. Meanwhile, 
the most eager advocates of sanctions pushed for stronger measures. The first serious 
test for Latvia was the 20 June 2011 FAC, which dealt with economic sanctions on 
three Belarusian companies. Since presenting arguments proved to be an ineffective 
uploading mechanism on this occasion, as it did not pull others in either direction, 
Latvia for the first time engaged in cooperative bargaining. In line with the 
hypothesis, cooperative bargaining turned out to be more effective because it helped 
to solve Latvia’s specific domestic concerns. Let us trace how Latvia sought to use 
various uploading mechanisms during this stage. 
Presenting Arguments  
In preparing EU reaction to the December 2010 presidential elections in Belarus, in 
January, immediately after the Christmas break, Brussels begun its work. Initially, the 
debate focused only on an extension of the visa ban on individuals. Meanwhile, some 
member states pushed for stronger restrictive measures. Also, the European 
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Parliament in its resolution called the EU “to consider targeted economic sanctions’’ 
(EP Resolution, 20 January 2011). 
On 31 January 2011, the FAC imposed sanctions on Lukashenko and 157 
other officials. The 22 March FAC added 19 names to the blacklist. Latvia fully 
supported these measures. Some member states wanted “other possible punishments, 
such as targeted economic sanctions” (Jozwiak, 21.03.2011, RFE/RL). After the FAC, 
Sikorski promised: “We will consider additional measures. Lukashenko’s relations 
with the EU will suffer. At the 28 March Brussels Forum, Sikorski said that Poland 
had persuaded the EU ministers to apply further measures. He referred to 
Washington’s February sanctions on Belneftekhim (Naviny, 28.03.2011). 
From early on, Latvia argued against economic sanctions. The main arguments 
were, e.g. with reference to the lack of effectiveness of economic sanctions, Belarus’ 
growing dependence on Russia, the negative effect on ordinary Belarusian people and 
on member state’s economic interests. This was a position Latvia later replicated in 
various EU policy-making settings. Given the general nature of the EU debate, there 
was no need for a more explicit justification. As long as the like-minded group was 
large enough, there was no direct pressure upon Latvia. 
Supplementing formal interventions in the EU settings, Latvia made some 
efforts at lobbying. For instance, in March 2011, Foreign Minister Kristovskis sent a 
letter to the HR Ashton expressing Latvia’s concerns. He insisted that such restrictive 
measures require an in-depth impact assessment, examining economic and social 
effect on the Belarusian society, as well as interests of member states. Kristovskis 
argued that the sanctions might not achieve the EU’s desired goal, i.e. positive 
changes in Belarus. A society with state controlled information channels could easily 
start to blame the EU sanctions instead of its own regime for the country’s economic 
crisis. And, as a result, the EU might erode part of its credibility in Belarusian society. 
Kristovskis believed that the EU should be balanced and pragmatic in its demands 
rather than concentrating on a value-based foreign policy (Interview No. 11, 
13.02.2013, MFA). In this way, Latvia raised its concerns. By referring to the 
interests of member states Latvia signalled that it has had intensely held national 
preferences on this issue.  
Besides lobbying, in successful uploading the use of coalitions is of crucial 
importance for smaller states such as Latvia. Evidently, at this early stage the like-
minded group of countries was of great help to Latvia. As observed, “contrary to 
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Sweden and Poland, which pushed for an embargo, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
hoped to keep trading ties. Estonian Foreign Minister Paet stated that the EU should 
not hurt ordinary Belarusians. In Lithuania, President Gribauskaite said that one 
cannot impose economic sanctions on people” (EUbusiness, 28 January 2011).  
Meanwhile, the situation in Minsk continued to deteriorate. Lukashenko 
showed that he does not yield to western pressure. On 14 May, a five-year 
imprisonment sentence was imposed for the presidential candidate Sannikov. This re-
opened an EU debate on more stringent measures. Sikorski and Hillary Clinton jointly 
called for economic sanctions, including on state-owned enterprises, such as 
Belneftekhim, Triple, Beltechexport and Belaruskali (Belarusinfocus, 22.05.2011). 
Other diplomatic sources confirmed that EU sanctions could target these companies, 
as well as Chyzh’s holding Triple and Peftiev’s arms firm Beltechexport (EUobserver, 
16.05.2011). In the 20 May ‘Weimar Triangle’ meeting, the foreign ministers of 
Poland, Germany and France announced that economic sanctions should be applied to 
Belneftekhim, Triple, Belaruskali and Beltechexport (The News Poland, 21.05.2011). 
Soon thereafter, the EEAS invited member states to consider economic 
sanctions, including against influential business people V. Peftijev and J. Chyzh. As a 
consequence, the 23 May FAC broadened the blacklist of travel bans and asset 
freezes, as well as discussed the imposition of economic sanctions. However, as had 
been the case at the previous FAC meetings, the 23 May FAC was split on economic 
sanctions. “Divergent reactions of ministers indicate that it would not be easy to agree 
(Lashuk 21.05.2011). Latvia was among those keeping a sceptical line. It maintained 
the opinion that economic sanctions very rarely produce the expected results: 
“Belarusian business can easily bypass sanctions given its links with third countries; it 
would be the society suffering, the EU would be blamed for economic misfortunes 
instead of Lukashenko And Belarus would become more dependent on Russia” 
(Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). In this way, Latvia presented arguments, 
strategically pursuing its preferences. 
Latvia’s arguing efforts, while well-elaborated, appeared not to persuade the 
influential and eager EU actors. Latvia could easily continue uploading its preferences 
by using the arguing mechanism under conditions if the EU debate would have 
maintained its previous character. However, the situation shifted dramatically when 
the EEAS put forward a concrete proposal suggesting to sanction only one 
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businessman and his three companies, dealing with arms trade, i.e. effectively 
imposing an arms embargo. This tactical approach easily split the like-minded group. 
A Shift Towards Cooperative Bargaining - the 20
 
June 2011 FAC 
For the 20 June FAC, the EEAS came up with a proposal, which was difficult to 
oppose even for the most sceptical member states. Who could resist an arms embargo 
on Peftiev, the head of Belarus’s exporter of weapons, and his Beltech Hoding, arms 
producer, closely linked to Russia’s Dmitry Gurinovich (Ioffe, 2012)? 
However, the preparatory debate turned out to be “so heated” that the EU 
COREPER ambassadors failed to agree, leaving the foreign ministers to find a 
solution; “some countries, led by Italy and Latvia, have been reluctant to be too hard 
on the regime. Latvia has voiced concerns” (RFE/RL, 20. 06.2011). Latvia has 
continuously used the same line of general argument the first time it started to use 
bargaining. While Latvia had no problems with an arms embargo against Peftiev’s 
business group, its concern was that this was only the beginning of economic 
sanctions. Therefore, it made use of the ‘issue-linkage.’ Given the EU’s 
overwhelming majority, Riga’s tactical approach this time was to agree to the 
majority ‘for the sake of EU solidarity,’ while ensuring that there would be no further 
economic sanctions. The Latvian delegation had room for manoeuvring – Peftiev’s 
business did not have any engagement with Latvia, and Latvia by definition was not 
against the arms embargo (Interview No. 24, 16.08.2013, PermRep). The Latvian 
demands were satisfied. After the FAC, the Foreign Ministry announced that although 
Latvia had agreed on sanctions against three companies, “the FAC supported its 
proposal not to automatically extend the scope of the restrictive measures” (MFA of 
Latvia, 20 June 2011). 
The account above provides evidence that a small, new member state can 
modify the existing EU policy proposals by using cooperative bargaining. In line with 
cooperative bargaining, Latvia, first, demonstrated a consensus-oriented behaviour 
and willingness to reach a compromise, and, second, in exchange for its support 
demanded an implicit guarantees that there would be no further economic sanctions. 
Return to Presenting Arguments 
The 20 June FAC was followed by a ‘wait and see’ period from the EU side. The 
hope was that Lukashenko would react to this more forceful EU language and release 
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political prisoners. However, Lukashenko did not rush to oblige. In September, he 
released only eleven prisoners. This was a marginal EU success in terms of achieving 
goals. Another problem was that Peftiev had approached the EU Court of Justice to 
overturn the sanctions and he in that context claimed that the EU had no right to 
sanction a businessperson that had nothing to do with the 2010 December elections. 
Thus, the 10 October FAC only agreed “to regularly monitor the situation.” Poland, at 
the time holding the EU Presidency, kept a low profile on the matter and the same 
was true for most EU institutions. 
Key EU institutions, primarily the EEAS, tried to adopt a pragmatic and 
balanced stance. If the effect of economic sanctions was to be marginal, questions 
might have been raised about the efficacy of EU foreign policy. Thus, instead of 
pushing towards sanctions, the EEAS argued for resuming dialogue if “all political 
prisoners are released and rehabilitated” (Interview No. 24, 16.08.2013, PermRep). In 
a more nuanced position, the EU Enlargement Commissioner Füle indirectly urged 
de-escalation on both sides. First, the commissioner demanded the release and 
rehabilitation of prisoners and, second, he appealed for re-engaging with Belarus: 
“Whatever is taking us away from the most important tasks is unhelpful and 
unproductive” (RFE/RL, 28 February, cited in Socor, 2012:91). 
In this situation, Latvian government officials felt quite comfortable. Their 
national position was close to the EU institutions’ approach, – all vying for ‘de-
escalation’ of the conflict. This gave reason to hope that some EU capitals’ appetite 
for economic sanctions had been satisfied. Yet, the silence did not mean that the 
problem was solved. Instead, it was only postponed. As it later turned out, during its 
EU Presidency Poland was silently ‘doing homework’ (presumably together with its 
allies) in that it was preparing a new, more extensive blacklist of economic sanctions. 
In doing this, Warsaw was careful to exclude all of its own relevant business partners 
in Belarus. It was only a matter of time until the intra-EU debate was reignited 
(Interview No. 24, 16.08.2013, PermRep).  
In January 2012, the EU debate returned to economic sanctions, this time 
aiming at extending sanction criteria as the Peftiev case “highlighted the limits of 
existing sanction criteria” (Rettman, 24.11.11). As a result, the 23 January FAC 
agreed that “freezing of funds and economic resources should be applied to [..] 
persons and entities benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenko regime” (Council 
Decision 23.01.2012). During the FAC debate, Latvia made it clear that it did not 
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object to this proposal exclusively because it was its strategic choice to join partners 
in the EU and the U.S. At the same time, the Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs asked for an 
accurate mechanism of applying [sanction] criteria and the assessment on a case-by-
case basis (MFA of Latvia, 24 January 2012). 
The 23 January FAC found grounds to impose further economic sanctions on 
Belarus. The reaction in Riga was furious; there were rumours that the EU’s next step 
would be to introduce sanctions on an important Latvian business partner in Belarus, 
J. Chyzh. The domestic business community leaders began exerting massive pressure 
against the government, also using mass media. The Employers’ Confederation 
argued that, “Latvia did not follow a politically responsible and strategic approach 
when supporting the use of economic sanctions against Belarus” (LDDK, 
07.02.2012). The business community was consistently backed by the line ministries. 
According to one Latvian official, it was “no secret” that “for the Ministry of 
Economy, human rights were priority number 101” (Interview No.11, 13.02.2013, 
MFA) The pressure for the most part was specifically targeted towards the Foreign 
Ministry, representing Latvia at the Brussels negotiation table. 
5.3.4.2. The Second Stage (February 2012) 
As many expected, immediately after the 23 January FAC the EEAS pushed ahead the 
new economic sanctions with a view to achieve an agreement at the 27 February 
FAC. The urgency under which the debates were held indicated a strong pressure 
from member states (Interview No. 23, 12.07.2013, EEAS). Before the COEST group 
started its own debate, with some preparatory talks taking place in Minsk. 
Hard Bargaining in Minsk 
In forging the EU’s Belarus sanction policy, an important role was played by the 
Heads of Mission (HOMs) in Minsk, consisting of the ambassadors of member states. 
Their task was to prepare the ground for further debates in Brussels. Immediately after 
the 23 January FAC, the HOMs received the task of coming up with a 
recommendation for sanctions under the extended criteria. This task, however, was 
extremely challenging. In practice, the HOMs could not provide a well-elaborated 
recommendation, which could serve as a basis for Brussels (Interview No. 3, 
16.01.13, MFA). Given the broad functions of embassies in third countries and their 
limited staff, it was almost impossible to prepare a high-quality analysis. Since the 
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HOMs group is formally independent from the capitals of its individual members, it 
could not rely on the help from foreign ministries. Finally, the EEAS deadlines for the 
HOMs work were unrealistically tight (ibid). 
Under these circumstances, what could Latvia do? As described earlier, since 
the December 2010 Belarus presidential elections Latvia “put on the brakes on the 
eagerness to impose economic sanctions,” which also included active work in Minsk 
with the view of influencing other ambassadors. However, it became more and more 
complicated to operate in this ‘Minsk-based’ diplomatic process. As suggested by the 
EU representative,  
Instead of pragmatic work, the HOMs approach was biased and influenced by 
individual antipathies against Lukashenko. Instead of being focused on this 
format, Latvia had to lobby in Brussels at the highest possible level. By putting 
all the efforts only on the HOMs, finally Latvia found itself in full isolation 
(Interview No. 23. 12.07.2013, EEAS). 
Hence, Latvia found itself isolated in Minsk. Eventually, the HOMs recommendation 
was sent to Brussels without Latvia’s consent. This suggests that wrong-headed 
uploading mechanisms such as hard bargaining may produce the opposite effect of 
that intended. As one Latvian diplomat concluded on the Belarus debacle, “The 
formal EU decision-making formats were only the surface while the real work 
happened behind the scenes.” (Interview No. 1. 28.12.2012, PermRep).  
Riga Considers a Veto 
After the HOMs’ recommendation reached Brussels, the work was formally taken 
over by the EEAS. “In the initial proposal from HOMs in Minsk there was a long list, 
which was then discussed in the EEAS. Everyone agreed that Chyzh should be listed. 
Then the work moved to the EU working groups” (Interview No. 19, 13.07.2013, 
EEAS, Brussels). As indicated earlier, the main part of recommendations for the 
blacklist might have arrived directly from Warsaw, and “in the EEAS there are many 
‘helpful’ Polish nationals” (Interview No. 24, 16.08.2013, PermRep, Brussels). 
As expected, at the beginning of February 2012, the EEAS put forward the 
proposal of the blacklist to the COEST group. To Latvia’s surprise, it included 
Chyzh’s holding company Triple with businesses in Latvia, with even some formal 
subsidiaries working within its territory. In 2008, Chyzh had acquired majority 
ownership of Latvian companies Mamas D and Latgales Alus in Daugavpils, close to 
the Belarusian border. Another surprise was that the EEAS proposal, contrary to what 
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was said in the previous drafts, excluded big state companies. As told by a high-
ranking civil servant at the Latvian MFA, this was not acceptable for Latvia: 
If the EU would be ready to impose substantial sanctions on whole sectors of 
the economy, including the potash fertilizer production and gas sector – yes, 
this would have been an effective measure. But then those states which have a 
larger trade turnover with Belarus than Latvia started to protest – the 
Netherlands, Germany (Interview No.11, 13.02.2013, MFA). 
It was no surprise that “this time Latvia was against it. It was about interests – trade 
and investments. This is realpolitik.” (Interview No.13, 12.07.2013, EEAS, Brussels) 
For Latvia, the main concern was that sanctions would not hit only Latvia:  
Then everyone in the EU would be satisfied that the necessary political step 
has been made, while “the bill for this, only Latvia would be paying. 
Logically, Latvia was not ready to agree on this – and we were ready to veto 
this (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). 
Thus, Riga considered a veto. Indeed, why should the EU economically punish its 
own member state, which seeks to recover from economic crisis? On the other hand, 
no one prevented Riga from being smarter. Instead of hoping that the EU’s implicit 
promises that Peftiev would be the last in the economic sanction blacklist, 
Riga had to immediately start homework by sorting out which Belarusian 
businessmen and companies under no circumstances could be sanctioned. 
These Latvian ‘red lines’ should have been injected in Brussels. This could 
have prevented surprises (Interview No.24, 16.08.2013, PermRep).  
Cooperative Bargaining  
While initially Riga considered a veto, after the first confusion, it started actively 
seeking ways to avoid unfavourable decisions in the 27 February FAC. First, as 
expected by the hypothesis of cooperative bargaining – Latvia was trying to maintain 
a cooperative interest-mediation mode. This involved an ‘early warning approach’ on 
the issue of salience. This was appreciated by the EEAS, according to an interlocutor: 
“The best way is to signal at the earliest possible stage about your sensitivities. The 
Latvian delegation signalled on its problem.” (Interview No.16, 11.07.2013, EEAS, 
Brussels) In the first COEST debate, the Latvian government came up with clear 
interest-statements by hinting ‘red lines’ in relation to the EEAS proposal, and in 
particular, regarding the potential blacklisting of Chyzh’s Triple and a number of its 
subsidiaries. Clear references were made to the close business cooperation with 
counterparts in Latvia. 
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In cooperative bargaining, the first step is to ensure that policy positions are 
known to others. The next step is to support these interest-based statements with well-
reasoned positions, as well as rational and principled justifications (Lehtonen 
2008:219). Here, one needs ‘good homework’ done in advance (Panke 2010:217-
219). 
Bolstering Domestic Uploading Capacity 
While Latvia strongly opposed sanctioning Chyzh’s business, the biggest problem 
was that it could not provide a non-specific, detailed justification. Simply referring to 
the political backing behind a particular business operation was not credible. EU 
partners noticed this  shortage: “Initially, the Latvian position was confusing. When 
we started to discuss sanctions against Chyzh, it was difficult to get a clear answer. 
Did Latvia seek compromise or did it block progress on any type of sanctions? There 
were no clear signals. Partly we were informed that the confusion stemmed from the 
Prime Minister himself” (Interview No. 20, 12.07.2013, EEAS). 
As one interlocutor put it, “the Latvian diplomats in Brussels had to bear all 
this on their shoulders and to prove to the partners that Latvia had real concerns. This 
was extremely difficult” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). Latvian 
representatives themselves were confused: “if we ourselves were not able to evaluate 
the negative effect of sanctions, then no one in the EU would take us seriously” 
(Interview No. 22, 12.07.2013, PermRep). Another Latvian representative was critical 
that “we were very vocal, but could not clarify the core of the problem” (Interview 
No. 9, 05.2013, PermRep). While the capital demanded that all of its officials in EU 
working parties upheld a tough line, there were no detailed justifications available.  
A lack of detailed justification does not necessarily mean that experts in Riga 
did not work hard. From early on the Foreign Ministry, as coordinator of the CFSP on 
Belarus sanctions and on other matters, had asked the line ministries to provide data 
and expert opinions. It would have been quite useful if the Ministries of Economy and 
Transport had provided impact assessments of various forms of EU sanctions, given 
their specialized competences. Yet, while the urgency increased, they were not in a 
position to help. As recognized by one respondent, 
The Foreign Ministry did not receive any credible or high quality information 
from the line ministries. As a result, we had to work instead of them – the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Transport. 
They only put their demands on the table. The Ministry of Economy openly 
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represented the business interests. It suggested that Latvia should block 
economic sanctions (Interview No. 3, 13.01.13, MFA). 
Paradoxically, while the domestic players increased their pressure, no one could 
explain to what extent Latvia would suffer from the EU’s sanctions on Belarus. There 
seemed to be no credible, comprehensive data on [eventually sanctioned company’s] 
Triple business in Latvia. The Ministry of Economy only repeated: “This is sensitive 
business and therefore we have no data available” (Interview No. 3, 13.01.13, MFA). 
Another paradox was that while there was no official data, Latvian business 
representatives circulated speculative calculations about an “economic embargo” on 
Belarus through media. For instance, the Employers’ Confederation expected losses 
of 3% of the GDP and 8.1% of the budget revenue (BNN, 15.03.12). These 
speculations did not remain unnoticed by the EU embassies in Riga, which reported 
back to capitals and thus undermined the authenticity of Latvian concerns in EU 
working parties. To be effective in Brussels, there was a need for specific calculations 
regarding which sectors of the economy would be impacted and to what extent 
(Pastore 2012:76). Apart from administrative capacity, it is important to have the 
political capacity, i.e. the political consensus. Apparently, in the case of Belarus 
sanctions, there was a strong political consensus in Latvia. Due to the impact of the 
economic crisis, the economic rationale had not been neglected by any of the political 
forces, including traditional ‘pragmatists’ such as the ‘Harmony Centre’ political 
party, as well as ‘normativist’ constellations such as ‘Unity’ and ‘National Alliance’ 
(Pelnēns and Potjomkina 2012:192). 
Limited Use of Informal Uploading Mechanisms 
There is little evidence of Latvia’s additional informal activities during this EU 
policy-making phase. Latvia primarily relied on the formal EU foreign policy settings, 
mainly EU working groups. At one point, it remained without allies. Poland was 
leading the opposing camp, and Estonia and Lithuania, in this pressing situation, 
opted for strategic silence. Also, there is no evidence that Latvia used lobbying. 
According to the respondent from the EEAS, “If a member state has strong domestic 
interests, it is extremely important that it starts lobbying. While it is essential that a 
state demonstrates its interest in the EU working groups, in parallel it should lobby 
the EU institutions directly” (Interview No. 13, 26.06.2013, EEAS). This was not the 
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case with Latvia, according to the same EEAS official, as “the biggest paradox was 
mentality. The Latvian representatives escaped from pro-active lobbying” (ibid). 
In sum, at this decision-making stage Latvia relied on formal EU formats – the HOMs 
in Minsk, the EU working groups and the FAC. Nevertheless, without using 
additional informal means of influence, for a small, new member state it seemed 
virtually impossible to influence EU decisions. 
Being under a considerable pressure in Brussels, Minsk and Riga, and without 
the deployment of the available informal uploading mechanisms such as contacting 
other member states, lobbying the EU institutions, Latvian resistance was therefore 
exhausted. As pointed out by an EEAS representative, “all through February we 
intensively discussed sanctioning the Triple subsidiaries. Finally, we successfully 
isolated Latvia. Everything seemed to be fine until… at the very last minute Slovenia 
came out blocking sanctions of Chyzh. Everyone was annoyed” (Interview No. 20, 
12.07.2012, EEAS). 
Slovenia’s sudden veto, as stated by one interlocutor, “to a certain extent 
helped Latvia. Slovenia’s argumentation was ridiculous, as they just stated: “we do 
not want sanctions against Chyzh,” France asked “Why” – Slovenia replied, “you 
know yourself, why.” Slovenia had no trustable arguments. Nevertheless, it shows 
that even small state may reach a desirable outcome if only it does not care about 
spoiling reputation” (Interview No. 2, 15.01.2013, MFA). 
As a consequence, the 27 February FAC failed to agree. The only public 
message was the HR Ashton’s statement that “further work on restrictive measures [..] 
will be undertaken with a view to the FAC in March” (Foreign Affairs Council, 
27.02.2012). After the FAC, “Poland slammed Slovenia for blocking Belarus oligarch 
sanctions” (TheNews, 28 February 2012). Interestingly, Slovenia was hiding behind 
the Latvian position until the last minute: “one should not behave like this. Slovenia 
was hiding behind us” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). At the same time, 
“Slovenia with its unexpected veto strengthened the Latvian position as well as saved 
Latvia’s reputation” (Interview No. 2, 15.01.2013, MFA). While the FAC outcome 
produced some release for Riga, the main battles were still ahead.  
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5.3.4.3. The Third Stage (March 2012)  
The 27 February FAC decision provided the Latvian foreign policy-makers with 
additional time. However, given the new deadline, which required that an agreement 
on the same list be reached within one month, the domestic pressure only increased, 
involving new sets of supporters on the part of Chyzh.  
The local mass media turned out as the principal forum for the domestic 
debate. Latvian foreign policy-makers explained that while Latvia had done its 
utmost, it “might not have enough influence to block the EU’s decision” (Petrova, 4 
March 2012). Within the business community, there was no understanding of the 
complexity of the Brussels decision-making process. Domestic pressure intensified. 
Besides, business representatives and Latvian parliamentarians became increasingly 
engaged. A petition by a group of the MPs to Prime Minister Dombrovskis stressed: 
“shipment of Belarus goods through Latvia is 21% of the total cargo turnover, and 
Belarus supplies Latvia with 90% of the country’s diesel fuel; facts that speak for 
themselves. For whom is it beneficial?” (Petrova, 16 March 2012). So, the pressure 
became more coherent, as well as more intense. No one, not even noted human rights 
defenders and civil rights NGOs, urged the government to take up the struggle against 
Lukashenko. Instead of blaming his regime, Latvian society criticized the EU for its 
short-sighted policy towards Belarus. 
Through ‘learning by doing’, Riga started to seek for additional uploading 
mechanisms. As recognized by a Latvian high-level diplomat: “We had to invest an 
enormous amount of work in this, but most important was that our national position 
became credible also in the EU debate. As a consequence, others could accept our 
position and support it” (Interview No.11, 13.02.2013, MFA). The EEAS 
representatives agreed that “the Latvian position was much more convincing in the 
second round of debate. Then it was much easier to agree on Czyzh and some 
companies, and Ternavsky” (Interview No. 20, 12.07.2103, EEAS). Also, the Latvian 
representatives in the EU felt that “when a position was supported by precise numbers 
on impact, everything started to go in the right direction” (Interview No. 22, 
13.07.2013, PermRep). What exactly was done by Latvia?  
Bolstering the Domestic Uploading Capacity  
As noted before, while the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Transport took 
an offensive stance on the issue of sanctions, they could not provide any relevant data 
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to underpin the government’s position in Brussels. As a result, the Foreign Ministry 
had to do the ‘homework’ itself. The Ministry found ways to acquire the necessary 
data directly from the State Revenue Service by calculating transit flows of each of 
the potentially affected companies through Latvian territory. On this basis, the MFA 
could produce an impact assessment, distributed prior to the EU working parties as a 
non-paper (Interview No. 24, 16.08.2013, PermRep).  
The Latvian impact assessment was an entirely technical document, expressed 
in percentages and fractions, identifying sectors that would be negatively affected. 
The main emphasis was on the negative impact on Latvia’s transit sector, which at the 
time accounted for 12% of Latvia’s GDP, with one-half coming from and through 
Belarus. Then there were calculations on Triple’s business with Latvia, showing that 
sanctions imposed on the holding would have a highly negative impact on budget 
revenues. The reasoning involved data on the negative social impact – loss of jobs for 
several thousand people employed in ports and the railway sector. Finally, the 
eventual worsening of socio-economic situation in Latgale, Latvia’s economically 
most depressed region, bordering with Belarus, was mentioned, as “many small 
businesses in this region depend on cooperation with Triple and subsidiaries” 
(Interview No. 24, 16.08.2013, PermRep). With this well-elaborated justification, 
Latvia now substantially improved its bargaining position. 
Cooperative Bargaining 
Prior to the 22 March FAC, the EU working groups continued to prepare the FAC 
decision. Still unsolved was the issue on Triple and its subsidiaries. Evidently, in 
these debates, Latvia clearly shifted towards cooperative bargaining. It involved, on 
the one hand, cooperative and consensus-oriented behaviour and signalling the 
readiness to compromise. On the other hand, it involved efforts to use ‘package deals’ 
and ‘issue-linkages.’ The rationale behind it was seeking to broaden the bargaining 
space. Thus, in addition to the distributed non-paper on the impact assessment, Latvia 
came up with its own version of the blacklist, using a member state’s right to 
comment.  
Latvia suggested substantially extending the blacklist by including all the main 
Belarusian business representatives. The proposal was drawn from the ranking of the 
200 most successful Belarusian business people in 2011 (Рейтинг 200 самых 
успешных и влиятельных бизнесменов Беларуси – 2011), which were also singled 
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out by the EP (European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, May 
2012). Also, Latvia suggested blacklisting the earlier mentioned big state-owned 
companies, among them Belneftekhim, Beltechexport and Belaruskali 
(Belarusinfocus, 22.05.2011).  
On the basis of its own version of the blacklist, Latvia operated with a 
‘package deal’ approach. The package included ‘red lines:’  
No sanctions on Chyczh’s Triple, including its three subsidiaries with 
businesses in Latvia.” Latvia signalled that if its demands were satisfied it 
could eventually withdraw its request to sanction the state-owned enterprises 
(Interview No. 24, 16.08.2013, PermRep).  
The most interesting element in this ‘package deal,’ however, was the indication of an 
agreement to extend sanctions to the Triple, but under the condition that the 
Belarusian businessman Ternavsky’s company Univest-M was also included. In 
linking both businesspeople Latvia was ‘playing poker’, but with the knowledge that 
the cards of other governments were at least as bad cards. In other words, Riga was 
well aware that Ternavsky had close economic links with certain big member states, 
and especially Poland. At the same, Latvia was signalling a degree of flexibility – if 
Ternavsky’s Univest-T was included in the blacklist, it would withdraw its demand 
for sanctions to encompass state-owned enterprises (Interview No. 2, 15.01.2013, 
MFA).  
Such a concrete and ostensibly flexible bargaining approach was apparently 
much more effective than attempts at presenting arguments and persuasion. The latter 
assertion resonates well with the general hypothesis, suggesting that, when the stakes 
are high, a member state may opt for bargaining. While the EEAS answer was that 
this proposal should be left for future debate, the more sophisticated Latvian position 
evidently had an influence on the proceedings. With enhanced and improved 
uploading mechanisms, Latvia increased its probabilities of actually uploading its 
preferences.  
Contacting Big Member States 
Finally, Riga seriously started to use additional means of influence in the diplomatic 
toolbox – its bilateral contacts with influential member states, in particular the ‘big 
three.’ These contacts were crucial. While the high-level contacts with Poland caused 
confusion and a feeling that Warsaw did not keep its promises, the decisive support 
came from another big member state – Germany. As recognized by one interviewee,  
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If Latvia has succeeded to achieve its interests in the EU foreign policy, it was 
thanks to the German support. Even if we have been extremely vocal and pro-
active, it did not help. But Germany has always listened when we had real 
problems. Other member states are often an “amorphous mass” (Interview 
No. 10, 06.02,2013, MFA). 
The importance of Germany in the Belarus sanctions case was confirmed by another 
respondent: “The reality is that we need Germany on board. This is not always easy. 
But if Germans lend their support, we are on the safe side. Big member states, despite 
the EEAS, remain in control. Germany is a key” (Interview No. 14, 09.07.2013, 
PermRep). As a result, the situation begun to change and “Latvian concerns were 
supported in the EU – Germany supported us and other countries as well; they 
understood our specific situation.” (Interview No. 2, 15.01.2013, MFA, Riga).  
Return to Presenting Arguments: COREPER II  
Before entering the FAC at the ministerial level, an issue is discussed in the 
COREPER II at the ambassadors’ level. On the foreign policy issues, the debate is 
formal and usually reflects that a de facto agreement has been reached in advance. 
This was the case in Belarus sanctions with a view to the 22 March FAC. Since the 
bargaining deal in principle was a done deal, the COREPER ambassadors could return 
to arguing. 
             In distinction to discussions in working groups, the COREPER debate is 
political. The conventional approach is to start with general value-oriented statements 
and then flesh out with narrower, national or regional concerns (Interview No. 9, 
13.02.2013, PermRep). In the crucial COREPER debate before the 22 March FAC, 
Latvia could operate with a well-elaborated position. “We (1) argued on the basis of 
common EU interest, (2) warned of the negative impact for a member state, i.e. the 
country’s most underdeveloped region Latgale, where unemployment there would 
dramatically increase, and (3) then expressed concerns that Latvia’s domestic socio-
economic situation is going to worsen. We always start with a common picture, 
because ‘the EU is Latvia and vice-versa’” (ibid).  
The EU Council’s Conclusion Reflecting Latvia’s National Preference 
What was the outcome of EU’s policy-making process? The 22 March FAC agreed 
to impose sanctions on 29 Belarus companies, including the Chyzh’s ‘Triple’ and the 
Ternavsky’s ‘Univest-M’ (Council Implementing Decision 23.03.2012). As can be 
seen, this EU decision reflected Latvian ‘package-deal’ elements – Chyzh’s ‘Triple’ 
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only if there are sanctions on Ternavsky’s business (which was not in the EEAS 
initial proposal). Also, the stated ‘red lines.’ namely, no sanctions on ‘Triple’ 
subsidiaries dealing with Latvia, were fully respected. 
Furthermore, the observations show that Latvia not only managed to modify 
the EU policy decisions, but also that its arguments on the EU policy towards Belarus 
withstood the test of time:  
EU sanction policy failed – the political climate in Belarus did not change, 
member states continue economic cooperation with the regime, and the EU 
institutions seek for some kind of cooperation with it. Surprisingly, now the 
member states (and the U.S.) use the same argumentation as Latvia before, 
calling for a strategic approach towards Belarus, not allowing the country to 
fall back under Russian control. It shows that EU policy in Belarus was 
unprofessional and clumsy (Interview No.5, 17.01.13, MFA).  
This leads to the following considerations. First, considering the European Foreign 
Policy Scorecard 2013, one may ask who were actually the real ‘slackers’ and 
‘leaders’ in the EU’s policy towards Belarus , and if European leaders were 
sufficiently far-sighted and smart. Second, an important finding in this study is that 
the Belarus sanctions case demonstrates the limits of arguing and persuading (i.e. 
constructivist arguments) in order to upload national preferences. Even a well-
elaborated and logically coherent approach may fail to persuade the audience due to 
conflicting interests with other member states, especially if influential actors and with 
strong preferences are involved. Instead, cooperative bargaining in combination with 
diplomatic tactics demonstrated its comparative advantage. These appear to be 
important lessons for small, new member states in the EU.  
5.3.5. Conclusions  
This chapter aimed to assess in what ways Latvia projected its intensely held 
preferences in the case of EU economic sanctions against Belarus.  
The findings of this sub-case prove the hypothesis that Latvia – a small new 
member state, can influence the policy outcome through combining various uploading 
mechanisms, even when it modifies its approach at a relatively late stage in the 
process. This proves the second hypothesis (H2) that the higher the intensity of 
national preference, the more various uploading mechanisms a member state (Latvia) 
uses to secure the outcome. Through a combination of a number of strategies, Latvia 
succeeded in turning EU policy-making to its favour. Apart from such uploading 
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endeavours as presenting arguments and bargaining, Latvia made use (though only at 
the late stage) of the additional means of influence – lobbying EU institutions and 
contacting larger member states. Importantly, by improving its domestic uploading 
capacity in the form of developing a well-elaborated reasoning about the economic 
effects to defend the national position, as well as coordination of all its activities, 
Latvia could upload its national preference and influence (modify) the outcome.  
Furthermore, the empirical analysis revealed that during the EU policy-making 
process Latvia decisively shifted from deploying general arguing (presenting 
arguments) towards cooperative bargaining. This allows us to argue that with a higher 
intensity of preference, particularly involving risks of not attaining the strongly 
preferred outcome, a member state (Latvia) shifts towards cooperative bargaining. 
Finally, the case study showed that Latvia could not abort the EU policy, but 
had to settle for modifying existing EU proposals. This confirms that “smaller states 
may not be able to set agendas, but they are able to modify them” (Duke 2001:36). 
This was validated by summarizing the experience of Latvian foreign policy-makers: 
“Of course, the EU could not give up the idea of sanctions as such, but it could find 
some solution and modify, to find a transition period or an exception [for those 
adversely affected].” (Interview No.11, 21.02.2013, MFA) 
5.4. CASE II: EU-Russia Visa-free travel perspective (2010-2014) 
In January 2014, in Riga, the HR Catherine Ashton reassured the Latvian Foreign 
Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs that “all 28 Member states stand together in one team for a 
strong relationship with Russia” (EEAS Remarks, 30.01.2014). In practice, however, 
member states differ widely in their interests and policy towards Russia. This has 
been particularly visible in the case of EU visa-free travel perspective with Russia. 
A visa-free travel seems to be Russia’s single most significant demand from 
the EU (ECFR Scorecard 2012). Although visa issues are technical by their nature, 
due to the high politicisation in Russia it turned out to be the main EU foreign policy 
towards Russia. Moscow pressured the EU announcing through the mass media that 
“Russia and the EU [are] preparing to abolish visas” (Newsland, 12.01.2010). Later, 
the Kremlin became frustrated by the EU’s ‘lack of political will’ and criticized a 
‘slow pace of the process’ (European Parliament, DG External Policies, April 2013). 
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The EU side wanted to develop relations with Russia, one of its main trade 
partners and a pivotal energy supplier, in a full spectrum of issues, while Russia 
preferred a ‘cherry-picking’ approach. Moscow partly succeeded due to the 
enthusiastic support from a number of member states. Consequently, the visa-free 
dialogue overshadowed other significant spheres of the EU-Russia cooperation. The 
May 2003 EU-Russia Summit agreed to examine the conditions for visa-free travel as 
a long-term perspective. Nevertheless, despite all pressure from Moscow during more 
than ten years (at the end of 2013) even the preparations for negotiations on visa-
freedom were not concluded. Russia unilaterally set a target date to the 2014 Winter 
Olympics in Sochi. Yet, the January 2014 EU-Russia Summit did not produce the 
anticipated results. Instead, Putin, who for years pushed “to break visa barriers,” 
reportedly “did not even get a dinner” in Brussels (The NYTimes, 28.01.2014). 
Why did the visa-free travel regime did not proceed as smoothly as expected? 
The major resistance came from a group of member states, including Latvia. Contrary 
to the southern countries, such as Italy, Spain and France, which supported the visa-
freedom perspective with Russia, the new member states: Lithuania, Latvia and 
Visegrad countries stressed that “Moscow should not get a ‘geopolitical discount’ 
compared to Ukraine and Moldova” (ECFR Scorecard 2013:46). Latvia has been 
active in the EU debates on this issue since the very beginning, seeking to give its 
input in the common EU stance. Latvia’s national position became reflected in EU’s 
common position, and it did not change throughout the whole EU decision-making 
process (2011 - January 2014). Thereby this EU dossier is suitable for testing the 
hypothesis on the uploading mechanisms: independent and dependent variables 
display the positive value, i.e. Latvia’s intensely held national preferences and 
observable influence on the EU decision. Also, it allows for testing how the 
conditions – the EU policy-making environment – channelled Latvia’s preference 
projection.   
I proceed in the following way. First, I briefly describe the empirical 
background of the EU-Russia visa dialogue. Second, Latvia’s national preferences are 
described, followed by characterization of EU foreign policy-making environment. 
Third, I trace the inner workings of the hypothesized uploading mechanism. I divide 
the EU decision-making process into three stages: the first stage (middle 2010 -Spring 
2011), the second stage (Spring 2011 - end of 2011), and the third stage (2012 - 
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beginning 2014). Each stage in some degree exhibits a completed negotiation round 
dealing with specific issues of the EU-Russia visa-free travel regime. 
5.4.1. Empirical Background  
Towards Launching the Common Steps to the Visa-freedom with Russia 
Visa liberalization is the main benefit that the EU can offer to the citizens of the third 
countries, which also applies to Russia. Statistics shows that Russia is the “champion” 
in receiving the short-stay visas in the EU (40% of all applications) (EC, DG Home 
Affairs). For instance, in 2012 around 6 million Schengen visas were issued to 
Russian citizens (EU delegation in Russia 13.03.2013).  
The charter below shows that Russia is leader in the number of applications 
for visas and a steady increase of that number can be observed.  
 
Figure 4: Evolution of the number of C visas applied for in Russia and other countries. Source: 
European Commission, DG of Home Affairs, Overview of Schengen Visa Statistics 2009-2012 
 
These numbers explain why the member states, especially the wealthy ones, have 
been extremely cautious about the possible unprecedented immigration in their 
countries. Russia, on the contrary, quoting the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, was 
ready for visa-free regime “today if you like” (RiaNovosti 10.12. 2008). 
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Looking back at how the visa issues emerged in the EU – Russia cooperation 
agenda, the beginning was the 2003 EU-Russia Summit, launching cooperation in 
four Common Spaces, including in the area of freedom, security and justice. The 2005 
EU-Russia Summit agreed to “examine the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-
term perspective” (European Commission, 2005:19). In 2007, the EU-Russia visa 
dialogue was launched within the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Abolition of visas with a third country requires an extensive preparatory work, 
including conclusion of Visa Facilitation and the Readmission agreements, as well as 
implementation of the Visa Liberalization action plan. Despite this, most member 
states on an individual basis promised Russia their highest political support. Italian 
President Berlusconi supported the Russians (RiaNovosti, 09.12.2009), and Finland’s 
President Halonen promised to do “all it can and will continue the introduction the 
visa-free regime” (RiaNovisti, 21.07.2010).  
In the first half of 2010, the Spanish EU Presidency put efforts to speed up the 
process, which gave Lavrov the reason to hope that in the June 2010 EU-Russia 
Summit the “EU leadership would be able to articulate their position on the deal” 
(ibid). He assured: “We are ready to scrap visas tomorrow” (ibid). In order to limit the 
EU’s manoeuvring possibilities, the Russian side suddenly grasped the initiative by 
submitting its draft of the agreement of the EU-Russia visa-free travel regime. 
The June 2010 EU-Russia Summit agreed to “work on preparing a list of 
common steps for a visa-free travel regime” (European Commission, EU-Russia 
Summit, 28.05.2010). Apparently, this was the only EU’s response to Russia’s 
submitted draft agreement, but no document “on [Russia’s] long-awaited lifting of 
visa regime” was signed (Global Times, 19.06.2010). To Russia’s disappointment, the 
“EU turned out not to be ready to discuss it” (Сотрудничество России с Бельгией и 
Евросоюзом, 14.06.2011). The EU suggestion was to start with the expert-level 
work, identifying the operational steps towards visa abolition (RiaNovosti, 
2.06.2010). Russia’s President Medvedev encouraged this work to be “maximally 
intensified” (ibid).  
EU commitments made at the summit followed by several high-level political 
statements. For instance, German Chancellor Merkel assured: “We will certainly 
engage in this” (RiaNovosti, 15.07.2010). Consequently, in September 2010, Prime 
Minister Putin announced: “We should move to a visa-free regime since a majority of 
our partners in Europe support the idea” (RiaNovosti, 13.09.2010). In October 2010, 
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the French, German and Russian leaders in their meeting in Deauville expressed a 
“hope that progress will be made in defining the steps towards moving to a visa-free 
regime at the December 2010 EU-Russia Summit” (Embassy of France, 18.10.2010). 
Following this, on the eve of the 2010 December EU-Russia Summit, Moscow again 
put high expectations. At the summit, President Barroso promised to “start elaborating 
common steps. The implementation of concrete steps will open the way for talks on 
Visa Waiver Agreement” (European Commission, 7.12.2010). Moscow praised the 
eventual Common Steps as a ‘ground-breaking’ document.  
Thereby the 2010 December EU-Russia summit set the stage for the 
subsequent work in various EU working parties with political responsibility to be 
taken by the EU foreign ministers. EU and Russian expert work behind closed doors 
took place in Spring 2011. But then unexpectedly, seemingly without the EU consent, 
Russian officials made public that “Russia and the EU [had] agreed on the common 
steps in order to abolish visas” (Новые Хроники, 25.04.2011). The Russian 
interpretation was that both sides “agreed on common steps. Once the checklist is 
completed, the parties expect to be ready to sign a visa waiver agreement” 
(Kоммерсант, 11.05.2011). Russia’s public statement caused consternation among 
the EU partners.  
Latvia, as an EU member State, Vis-à-vis Russia 
Geographic proximity with Russia inevitably involves Latvia’s ‘first order’ core 
national interests of security and economic welfare. In terms of security, Latvia’s 
historical experience plays a critical role, related to all Baltic States’ worries about 
Russia’s attempts to restore influence in the former Soviet Union space (Baun & 
Marek 2013:210). Also, this geographical proximity to Russia directly engages 
Latvia’s economic interests. Latvia is heavily dependent on Russia’s energy 
resources, importing 100% of the natural gas from its neighbour. In 2012, Russia was 
Latvia’s second largest trade partner taking the second in exports and the third place 
in imports (MFA of Latvia, 30.08.2013). These two ‘first order’ core national interests 
– security and economic welfare – to a great extent are conflicting, representing a 
dilemma for Latvian foreign policy-makers in relations with Moscow. 
Officially, the guiding principle in Latvia’s foreign policy towards Russia, in 
the words of Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs, is “mutual advantage and respect” (MFA of 
Latvia, 26.01.2012). Apparently, it is a difficult task: “With Russia we have 
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continuous conflicts,” as recognized by a Latvian diplomat (Interview No. 11, 
13.02.2013, MFA). The fact that business opportunities offered by Russia are much 
needed it does not detract from the situation that the Eastern neighbour remains a very 
complicated partner. While the Latvian political elite has opted “for de-securitization 
of economic cooperation with Russia” (Sprūds 2009:113-115), and the Foreign 
Minister argued that “we must continue developing our economic links,” yet he was 
adamant that “Latvia cannot and will not accept the interference in its domestic 
affairs” (MFA of Latvia, 7.03.2012). Latvian government has sought to balance its 
‘first order’ core national interests in the sphere of economy against security concerns, 
which, given the high stakes in both directions, has proved to be a challenging task. 
As can be seen, these two ‘first order’ core national interests in one way or another 
have appeared on the EU–Russia agenda, and help explaining the intensity of Latvia’s 
preferences in EU relations with Russia.  
The EU has nevertheless faced a similar challenge with increasing economic 
interdependency with Russia, persuading several member states to take a ‘pragmatic 
approach’ towards Moscow. Reflecting this dominating approach, Latvia adjusted 
further towards the EU’s general line. After joining the EU, Latvia’s relations with 
Russia evolved in a more pragmatic tone (Ozoliņa 2012:146). In EU policy-making 
the Baltic States seemingly wanted to get rid of the impression that they would be 
‘one-issue’ states. Latvia in particular was keen to avoid being branded as a ‘trouble 
maker’ in EU relations with Russia. Therefore, its deliberate behaviour was to take a 
restrained and constructive approach. This was also the case with the EU-Russia visa 
free-travel regime perspective. In this regard, Latvia was officially positive, lending 
its ‘political support,’ contrary to the negative stance of the majority of the new 
member states, which were not in a hurry to abolish visas with Russia (Sprūds, 
31.07.2013). In practice, however, Latvia used the policy process to develop a tailor-
made list of conditionality for Russia in order to find technical excuses for delaying 
the process. 
Below, I further explore what Latvia’s ‘political support’ to the visa-free travel 
with Russia involved in terms of its national preferences and intensity, how Latvia 
eventually projected them to the EU level, and which of the hypothesized uploading 
mechanisms helped it to influence the EU decision making and outcome. 
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5.4.2. Latvia’s National Preference – Politically ‘Yes,’ but With Conditions 
For measuring the intensity of national preference, I use such empirical indicators as 
data showing the intensity of the cross-border trade and people-to-people contacts 
(e.g. the number of visa applications), interest-based statements, foreign policy-
makers agreeing on the preference intensity, media coverage, and national positions.  
Regarding the first empirical indicator, the crucial aspect here is the fact that 
Latvia shares a common border with Russia (~ 250 km with the Pskov region). The 
inhabitants of the border regions have intense cross-border contacts, which is why 
visa freedom could be beneficial for them. Ethnic Russians make up around 26% of 
Latvia’s 2 million population and many of them entertain close links with Russia. 
Also, surveys show that around 64% of Latvia’s economically active residents would 
support a visa-free regime with Russia (BNS, 19.07.2011). Economic 
interdependence can be seen in the following numbers: Russia is Latvia’s second 
biggest trade partner, with a substantial increase in trade volumes in 2012 by 25% 
(MFA of Latvia, 30.08.2013). Lastly, Latvia has been one of the favourite travel 
destinations for Russian tourists. In 2012 and 2013, the most visitors in Latvia were 
from Russia. In 2012, as compared with 2011, a number of Russian tourists in Latvia 
increased by 33% (CSB, 25.02.2013). Also the numbers of visa applications 
increased: in 2011, there were 10 326 visa applications, which was a 27% increase 
compared to 2010, and in 2012 the number increased even further reaching 15 120 
applications (MFA of Latvia, 30.08.2013). The above indicates that substantial part of 
the Latvian society favoured the visa-freedom with Russia. 
Also, geographic proximity involves security-related national concerns for 
Latvia regarding its large neighbour, such as wariness of an increase in uncontrolled 
illegal immigration. Thereby the intensity of the security-related preference was also 
high, while the underlying national interests differed. If business-related interests 
suggested Latvia advancing the visa-free travel with Russia, then security-related 
interests suggested being opposed to it. 
The second empirical indicator is comprised of interest-based statements. Here 
a perfect example is the Latvian President Zatlers’ official statement during his 
historical visit to Russia in December 2010, the first visit in twenty years after Latvia 
regained its independence. Zatlers’ visit was accompanied with breaking news that 
“Latvia supports introduction of a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia as 
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soon as possible” (The Baltic Course, 20.12.2010). This came as a surprise to the 
Latvian society because such option had never been publicly discussed before. Due to 
its historical vulnerabilities towards Russia, Latvian society has been suspicious of 
anything that smacks of backstage political deals with its big neighbour. Foreign 
policy experts later played down Zatlers’ statement by saying it primarily represented 
diplomatic courtesy” (NRA, 26.01.2012). 
Indeed, the subsequent official statements from the Latvian government did 
not follow up on the President’s announcement. The government’s policy documents 
– the Government’s Declarations and Action Plans, as well as the Foreign Minister’s 
Annual Reports – placed the visa-freedom perspective within the general context of 
EU-Russia relations. The Government’s Action Plan for 2012-2014 put forward the 
task to “elaborate the EU-Russia new agreement in line with Latvia’s interests, 
including the facilitation of traveling” (MFA of Latvia, 16.02.2012). The 2012 
Foreign Minister’s Report 2012 did not mention anything on visa-free travel with 
Russia, while prioritizing visa liberalization with the Eastern Partnership countries 
(MFA of Latvia, 24.01.2012). The 2013 Report entailed a nuanced remark, supporting 
“balanced development and progress in all the EU-Russia cooperation agenda, 
including [..] visa dialogue” (MFA of Latvia, 08.01.2013), while the 2014 Report 
reiterated the previous line – support for the prospects of the visa-free travel if Russia 
fulfils all the necessary preconditions” (MFA of Latvia, 07.01.2014). This suggests 
that the official position does not always reveals the actual preference: arguably, these 
positions resonated with Latvia’s official line towards Moscow in terms of sending 
public signals, while the real Latvia’s preferences could have been different if raised 
at the EU’s negotiation table.  
The third empirical indicator is the apparent agreement of foreign policy 
officials regarding the level of preference intensity. According to a senior official of 
the Foreign Ministry, visa-free travel with Russia would have serious internal security 
implications, and should therefore reinforce the preference intensity:  
Latvia is the bordering country, and we will be the first facing border control, 
and therefore we are especially interested about security (Interview No. 11, 
22.02.13, MFA).  
In addition, the government officials referred to promises made at the highest political 
level by President Zatlers in Moscow, which the government could not ignore:  
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Latvia promised Russians at the highest level to support visa-free travel, and 
now we cannot take our promises back, but rather [we need] to work together 
with the EU partners on this issue (Interview No. 25, 10.02.2014, MoI).  
Another reason why the visa-free travel issue with Russia became salient was due to 
the high public interest and media attention after Zatlers’ public statements in 
Moscow. In Latvia, as one interviewee put it, “Everything related to Russia creates 
public resonance” (Interview No. 8, 01.02.2013, MFA). The visa issue was important 
not only for the general public interest but also for certain economic sectors. The 
business community was supportive of visa-free travel with Russia; if introduced with 
a high quality administrative process, it could be beneficial for cross-border trade, and 
especially for “the Latvian regions bordering with Russia are extremely interested in 
visa-free travel” (ibid). 
From another, more idealistic, perspective Latvia’s interest in EU-Russia visa-
free travel perspective was supported by one Latvian MFA representative as a 
possibility for Russians to learn about democracy and become integrated in Europe. 
He argued that Latvia should support it because “today Russians are isolated from 
Europe. If more Russians would freely travel to the EU, they would be able to see the 
difference, gain new experience and compare the benefits of democracy. In this way 
they would gradually become more integrated” (Interview 24, 12.12.2013, MFA). 
The fourth empirical indicator is media coverage devoted to the visa issue. 
Empirical observations clearly indicate that the issue was in the local media spotlight 
only during the December 2010 President Zatlers’ visit to Moscow and his 
unexpected announcement. Later on, when it became clear that the EU-Russia visa 
waiver programme was going to become a long-term perspective rather than being 
introduced in the short-to mid-term, the Latvian media lost its interest. 
The four categories of empirical indicators demonstrate that, while there was a 
general domestic interest towards the issue, in particular from several interest groups, 
there was no strong domestic group pressure, not even from the influential business 
groups, on the Latvian foreign policy-makers to push for a particular EU policy 
outcome. This suggests that the intensity of Latvia’s national preference on the EU-
Russia visa-free travel perspective was moderately strong (of medium intensity).  
Given Latvia’s promises to Moscow at the highest political level, as well as 
the sensitivity of the issue across the Latvian society, the government continued 
keeping a particular focus on it. When in spring of 2011, the EU internal debate 
112 
 
begun, “the government was trying to react as fast as possible in order to preclude an 
outcome that might have had adverse consequences for Latvia” (Interview No. 8, 
01.02.2013, MFA). 
5.4.3. The EU Policy-making Environment  
Formally, the decision-making on visa-free travel with Russia is based on qualified 
majority voting (QMV) by the Council and the European Parliament. Under the 
Lisbon Treaty, all the decisions on freedom, security and justice, including visa 
issues, should be taken by the QMV. While in practice the Council decision-making is 
based on informal consensus without formal voting, there have been rare exceptions 
when the only way forward was voting. With this in mind, the member states, when 
negotiating in EU foreign policy formats on visa-free travel with Russia, were 
influenced by the ‘shadow’ of QMV, counting the theoretical weight of votes. This 
means that for Latvia, given its marginal voting weight of around 1%, the only way to 
influence EU decisions was to act together with a larger group, at least creating a 
blocking minority. 
With regards to important EU institutional actors, on the visa issues the main 
role is played by the European Commission. The Commission is responsible for EU 
external policy in the area of justice and home affairs. Thus, in the EU dialogue with 
Russia on visa-free travel the Commission was the chief negotiator from the EU side. 
The dialogue consisted of screening Russian legislation and administrative practices. 
Once the Commission would consider that Russia fulfils conditions it has the 
initiative right to present a proposal on the visa regime to the Council. Then the 
proposal needs to be voted on by QMV.  
However, the EEAS became the Commission’s competitor on this issue. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS is responsible for the overall EU external action. 
It seems to be challenging to cooperate between both of the institutions, as the 
Commission did not want to give up its previous leading role in this field (Interview 
No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). The Commission continued to keep control over the visa 
dialogue with Russia. Thereby the EEAS, a key institutional actor in EU foreign 
policy in the visa dialogue with Russia played a subordinate role. 
Another important actor in the case of an EU visa-free regime with Russia is 
the European Parliament (EP). Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EP must accept to sign 
EU’s international agreements. The Lisbon Treaty reinforced the human rights 
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framework at the EU level
14
, this is why the EP became active. In June 2013, the EP 
warned that no visa facilitation would be accepted for the Russian officials were 
involved in the notorious Magnitsky case (European Parliament, 04.06.2013). In this 
way, the MPs indicated that they might use their veto power on visa-free travel with 
Russia. 
Apart from the EU’s institutional actors, the member states, including through 
holding the rotating EU Presidency, have been influential on the visa issue. The 
French EU Presidency in 2008, the Spanish Presidency in the first half of 2010, and 
the Polish Presidency in the second half of 2010 made substantial progress towards 
the visa-free travel perspective with Russia. As suggested by the Latvian 
representative in the EU, if there would be some EU Presidency that would be 
“courageous enough to signal to the Commission that it is expected to come up with 
the proposal – then the breakthrough might be achieved” (Interview No. 23, 16.12. 
2013, MoI). If the Presidency would ask the Commission to put a proposal on the 
visa-free regime with Russia to the vote “it remained to be seen whether those 
member states, which behind the closed doors told that they would block, would be 
ready to vote against it” (ibid). 
This leads to the question of member states’ preferences. Did others’ 
preferences and their constellation constrain (or help) Latvia in its uploading 
endeavours? Apparently, at the domestic level the EU-Russia visa-free travel issue 
was highly political (Salminen & Moses 2009:43). It seems that Russia had numerous 
disputes with individual member states on the subject (Interview No. 23, 16.12.2013, 
MoI). However, the main concern among the member states, especially the wealthy 
ones, was the risk of increasing illegal immigration. In particular, the interior 
ministries of these countries worried about illegal immigration and Russian organized 
crime (EFRC Scorecard 2010).  
Publicly, the member states said “yes” to the visa freedom with Russia 
because no one openly wanted to be the one that tells Russia that it intends to block it, 
according to one interviewee. He mentioned Germany as the most visible example:    
Germany publicly says one thing, but afterwards behind the closed doors in 
the Council working groups, when it is possible to put the brakes, it puts the 
brakes” (Interview No. 23, 16.12. 2013, MoI).  
                                                 
14
 In the Lisbon Treaty, there is a legally binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Also, 
the EU acceded to the European Convention of the Human Rights, of which Russia is a member. 
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“France belonged to the Southern group, favouring visa-free travel. For France, the 
Nordic-Baltic arguments are irrelevant,” according to a national representative 
(Interview No. 12, 20.06.13, MFA Sweden). But even France and Spain – the main 
supporters – were not decisive, considering the EU-Russia visa-free regime as a 
distant prospect. Despite their common position, they lacked a ‘strategic vision’ 
(EFRC Scorecard 2010).  
Among the member states, as confirmed by all the interviewees, Germany was 
relevant actor for Latvia. In 2008, at the very beginning of the debate, the Germans 
wanted to proceed with visa-free travel with Russia, primarily due to its business 
interests. This situation changed after 2009 elections, when its Ministry of the Interior 
proceeded to correct Berlin’s position, said one interlocutor: “In difference from its 
Foreign Ministry, which was much more supportive, the Ministry of the Interior was 
strongly opposed” (Interview No. 10, 13.02.2013, PermRep). Furthermore,   
German Ministry of the Interior came up with [a] position, which was 
considerably tougher than Latvia’s position. It seemed that Germans had not 
forgotten the scandal with Ukraine 10 years ago when one million Ukrainians 
entered Germany with false visas. (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA) 
As a result, Germany’s position during the EU policy-making process was 
substantially corrected, demanding that Russia redouble its efforts to meet an 
extensive list of EU technical standards (Interview No. 10, 13.02.2013, PermRep). 
Germany played a critical role for Latvia in terms of its ability to pursue its intensely 
held national preference on the EU-Russia visa-free travel. Under the formal voting 
rule of QMV, Germany, as a big member state, could help Latvia to reach a blocking 
minority. As noted by the interlocutor from the like-minded group, “As long as 
Germany blocks this issue we are safe. Now Germany is a part of a blocking minority. 
But in Germany, there are plenty of different domestic views. Line ministries have 
different positions. Thus, Germany is constantly switching sides” (Interview No. 12, 
20.06.13. MFA Sweden) 
Another crucial actor here was Poland. Seemingly, “Poland was not in strong 
opposition against the visa-free travel perspective” (Interview No. 10, 13.02.2013, 
PermRep). One reason could be that Poland for a long time was seeking to conclude a 
bilateral agreement with Russia on facilitated border crossing procedures for the 
Russia’s Kaliningrad Region and adjacent territories of Poland. During the Polish EU 
Presidency in the second half of 2011, shortly before the 2011 December EU-Russia 
Summit, which was expected to adopt the Common Steps for visa-free travel between 
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the EU and Russia, the Kaliningrad-Poland agreement was reached. The Russian side 
praised this deal as the “first step in creating a visa-free regime with entire EU” (RT, 
14.12.2011). The Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski had regular contacts with his 
counterparts in Moscow. Poland’s official position was positive, yet it clearly 
indicated on the package deal – “support to the visa-free travel with Russia, but under 
the condition that Eastern Partnership countries are treated in the same way,” which 
was regularly reiterated by Sikorski (EUobserver, 13.03.2013). His approach was that 
“all Russians should get EU visa-free travel, so long as Moldovans, Georgians and 
Ukrainians get it too” (ibid). In a similar way, Lithuania insisted on non-
discrimination of the Eastern Partners when taking decisions on visa-free travel with 
Russia. This was a bargaining chip in negotiations with those EU partners who pushed 
for visa freedom with Russia, while keeping reservations towards Ukraine, Moldova 
and Georgia.  
Altogether, while part of the member states openly lobbied for visa-free travel 
with Russia, there was no overwhelming majority. Thereby the Commission “tested 
the ‘temperature’ among the member states before using its initiative rights. Also, it 
checked whether the member states’ messages in the mass media and afterwards in 
the Council were the same” (Interview No. 23, 16.12. 2013, MoI). 
 Thus, EU foreign policy-making environment (constraints) in this case 
involved both the specific decision-making rules (QMV), as well as other actors’ 
preferences. With this in mind, Latvia could pursue its specific preference only with 
help from a coalition with one big member state on the board. On the EU-Russia visa-
free travel, “the only big member state with a similar position is Germany. If 
Germany suddenly would leave the blocking minority, there would be a completely 
new situation” (Interview No. 23, 16.12.2013, MoI). This shows, in line with rational 
choice institutionalism, that the institutional environment indeed plays a crucial role 
in a member state’s chances to project its preferences onto the EU level. 
5.4.4. Observed Latvia’s Influence on EU Decision Outcome 
In order to trace the uploading process between the independent variable (national 
preferences) and the dependent variable (influence on EU decision outcome), first, 
knowledge of the correlation between them needs to be established.  
According to all interviewees, there has been tangible Latvia’s influence on 
EU decisions on visa-free travel with Russia. “We succeeded to influence the 
116 
 
outcome to a great extent,” observed a senior national representative in the EU 
(Interview No. 2, 15.01.13, PermRep). Other respondents agreed that Latvia 
“succeeded to influence the EU position” (Interview No. 3, 16.01.2013, MFA). As 
another respondent observed: “Even if Latvia is a small member state, we were able 
to influence the outcome” (Interview No. 6, 18.01.2013, MFA). Furthermore, 
Latvia’s success was possible due to its “well-elaborated, pragmatic and publicly 
defined position” (Interview No. 11, 22.02.13, MFA). 
Latvia’s influence was also reported by the ECFR Scorecard 2013, which 
recognized that the country had been one of the most active member states, promoting 
visa-free travel with Russia. The Scorecard singled out Latvia as a leader in only this 
specific EU foreign policy dossier – pushing visa liberalization for Russia, together 
with Ukraine and Moldova – while in other important EU foreign policy areas Latvia 
was placed among the slackers (ECFR Scorecard, 2013). 
Not only Latvia’s national position on the Common Steps was reflected in the 
EU ‘line to take’ for negotiations with Russia, but it also remained valid (without 
modifications) from 2011 until the January 2014 EU-Russia Summit (the period in 
focus for the study). This happened because of its well-elaborated position and the 
ability to present arguments to EU partners, but also because of the fact that “the EU 
in general was not enthusiastic” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
It is interesting to see with what specific uploading mechanisms Latvia was in 
a position to influence EU foreign policy. How did the EU policy-making 
environment help (or constrain) Latvia’s preference projection? Could it be that 
Latvia succeeded just because its position corresponded to the general EU line?  
5.4.5. The Uploading Mechanism in Practice   
In tracing the uploading mechanism, I divide the EU policy-making process into three 
stages: the first stage (middle 2010 – spring 2011), the second stage (spring 2011 – 
end 2011), and the third stage (beginning 2012 – beginning 2014). 
The table below shows the chronology of this process.  
1. The first stage (middle 2010 – spring 2011) 
June 2010  At the 26
th
 EU-RU Summit, Russia submitted its draft of 
visa-free travel agreement.  
December 2010 The 27
th
 EU-RU Summit agreed to “explore ways on 
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promoting visa-free travel as a long-term perspective.” It 
agreed to elaborate ‘Common Steps towards visa-free short-
term travel of Russian and EU citizens.’ 
Spring 2011 EU (Commission) presented its draft proposal “Common 
Steps towards visa-free short-term travel of Russian and EU 
citizens.’ Russia, quite unexpectedly, made the proposal 
public. 
2. The second stage (spring 2011 – end 2011) 
During 2011 EU working groups negotiated the EU ‘lines to take’/ official 
position for the December EU-RU Summit. 
December 2011 28
th
 EU-RU Summit in Brussels – adoption of the document 
Common Steps towards visa-free short-term travel for 
Russian and EU citizens at the highest political level. 
2. The third stage (beginning 2012 – beginning 2014) 
June 2012 29
th
 EU-RU Summit in St. Petersburg – with President Putin 
back, stressing Russia’s willingness to cooperate on visa-free 
travel. Van Rompuy “celebrated the best dynamics for 
years.”  
December 2012 30
th
 EU-RU Summit in Brussels. After the Summit Putin 
criticized that, the lack of visa freedom is thwarting the 
development of economic relations between the trading 
partners. 
2012 -2013 Russia puts into force hard bargaining, linking visa-free 
travel with renegotiations of the Visa Facilitation Agreement. 
June 2013 The 31
st
 EU-Russia Summit in Yekaterinburg. 
Russia plays down its demands – at the press conference 
President Putin did not even mention the visa 
(facilitation/liberalization) issue. 
EU position: “Visa-free travel remains an important common 
goal. To achieve this, it is important to fully implement the 
agreed common steps.” 
January 2014 The 32
nd
 EU-Russia Summit in Brussels, without progress. 
Putin did not mention the visa-free travel issue. 
Table 5: Chronology of EU policy on visa-free travel with Russia (middle 2010 – beginning 
2014). 
5.4.5.1. The First Stage (Middle 2010 – Spring 2011) 
Visa-free travel with Russia was in many ways a purely technical issue, but as a 
technical issue, it would never be solved. For this reason, it was transferred to the 
political level with the idea that, when the political situation would be mature, 
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technical criteria would be adjusted. An official from the Latvian Ministry of the 
Interior believed that, “The technical issues could always be solved if only the 
member states had a political will” (Interview No. 23, 16.12.2013, MoI). 
Due to Spanish EU Presidency’s efforts, the idea of visa-free travel with 
Russia appeared on the EU foreign policy agenda in 2010. At the very beginning, 
there was only a general exchange of ideas. The aim was not to reach any particular 
EU decision, but rather to get the initial reactions from the capitals. Already earlier, in 
2008, the French EU Presidency had pushed for this issue – then, as described by a 
Latvian representative, “The atmosphere was positive, and the majority of member 
states politically supported visa-freedom perspective with Russia. Some states 
objected because Russia had ignored implementation of the existing agreements” 
(Interview No. 10, 13.02.2013, PermRep). The same respondent revealed that 
At this very initial stage, Latvia did not have any explicit arguments, and it 
basically maintained a ‘wait and see’ position ibid). 
In the first half of 2010, the Spanish EU Presidency continued to push for this issue. It 
pressured for launching negotiations on visa-free travel, though met resistance from 
such countries as Denmark, Poland and Slovakia. Also, Germany after the 2009 
elections shifted its initial positive stance. Consequently, when Russia in the June 
2010 EU-Russia Summit submitted its draft agreement on visa-free travel, it was first 
of all rejected by Germany. Besides, Germany and France wanted the bargaining deal 
– visa-freedom to be considered “under sui generis process in exchange for Russian 
ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECFC Scorecard 2010). The majority of 
member countries rejected this idea of linking visas to the energy matters as the basis 
for bargaining. 
Latvia’s Proactive and Balanced Position – Matter of Reputation in EU 
In the EU, “there was obvious lack of enthusiasm on visa freedom with Russia,” as 
characterized by a high-level MFA official (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). 
This suited the Latvian general interest, yet the problem that appeared was that “all 
member states wanted good bilateral relationships with Russia and therefore made big 
promises,” but afterwards were hiding behind of what they presented the Baltic 
States’ ‘Russophobia’ (ibid). As a result, as he felt, Russians blamed Latvia:  
Russians told me: “you, Latvians and the Baltic States, are hindering and 
delaying the process.” I explained that this was not true: “If some of our EU 
partners make excuses that the EU has to put brakes on the visa freedom 
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because of the Baltic States, then they simply wanted to hide behind us. We in 
Riga were not just naïve” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). 
Apparently, in the EU circles it was not anything new to blame the Baltic States for 
visa issues, as can be seen from the explanation offered by the President of European 
Economic and Social Committee Malosse: “the visa problem is political. [..] Historic 
reconciliation between the Baltic States and Poland, and Russia interferes with 
achieving an EU-Russia agreement on visa-free travel. [..] Unless you reach an 
agreement on every disputed issue with your neighbours, misunderstandings will 
continue” (Interfax, 27.07.2013). 
In fact, one of the reasons for Latvian foreign policy-makers to take a pro-
active stance in EU debates was the desire to avoid being disproportionately blamed 
for the slow progress on visa liberalization/facilitation. Thus, they already at the initial 
stage understood that early positioning in the EU debates was of crucial importance: 
in this way, Latvia would not allow other member states “to hide behind the Baltic 
States’ supposed Russophobia” (Interview No. 8, 01.02.13, MFA). Being aware that 
“in the EU Latvia would always be treated as the Russophobic country,” policy-
makers needed to project a more balanced national position. According to an 
interlocutor from the Ministry of the Interior:  
Latvia had to learn avoiding be too active in the EU by criticizing Russia. 
Otherwise, no one would listen to us. Not because we really told lies, but 
because they would perceive us as lying. Our arguments should have been 
only few and formulated in a way that everyone understands (Interview No. 
23, 16.12. 2013, MoI). 
Consultations with Other Member States, Collection of Information 
In pursuit of its preferences, from early on Latvian policy-makers adopted a pro-
active approach. They started with informal corridor talks in EU meetings, as well as 
arranged informal bilateral consultations with other member states: “Instead of 
waiting for other member state[s] to formulate our national position, Latvia acted in a 
proactive manner” (Interview No. 8, 01.02.13, MFA). 
After the June 2010 EU-Russia Summit, when Russia had suddenly handed in 
its draft of the EU-Russia visa-free travel agreement, “Immediately the corridor talks 
started in Brussels among the national representatives,” one respondent said. He 
observed a ‘big noise’ around this submitted draft. He explained that   
This was a signal for Latvia as a bordering country to explore the eventual 
impact on its domestic security. The Latvian experts started working already 
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before the proposal landed at the COEST and the Visa groups in 2011. When 
the formal discussions started, Latvia was already prepared (Interview No. 8, 
13.01.2013, MFA). 
In order to prepare the initial national position, as it will be shown later, Latvia used 
such uploading mechanisms as the consultations with other member states, and, 
primarily, bolstering the domestic uploading capacity. This involved collecting and 
analysing the background information. Due to a high publicity in the Russian and in 
the international media, Latvia could easily gain information on the member states’ 
initial reactions, including the specific concerns of their domestic interest groups. The 
advantage was that the key EU actors were transparent and predictable as a 
consequence of Russia’s public pressure. As described by an MFA official, “Russia’s 
behaviour was aggressive; it made a huge public noise around visa-free travel, 
resonating in member states’ mass media. Thus, Latvia could follow the others’ 
domestic debate in details. The rationale behind was that the member states official 
positions had to respect their domestic concerns” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, 
MFA). Hence, it was not difficult to foresee their national preferences and positions. 
Already at this first stage there appeared to be clear groupings of the like-minded 
member states:  
First, there were ‘absolutely uncritical’ states – Spain, Portugal, France, etc. 
The opposite camp was ‘instinctively sceptical’ – Lithuania, Poland 
(Kacinski), Estonia (shortly after the “Bronze Solder” case). The third group 
was ‘pragmatic’ states, including Latvia (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
In the EU working parties, the Latvian experts gauged the initial reactions. To their 
surprise, it appeared that the main obstacle for the Kremlin would not be the concerns 
of Latvia and of the Baltic States, but rather Russia’s main migration target countries 
– Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Especially, their 
Ministries of the Interior were deeply concerned (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
In the second half of 2010, the EU working parties continued the debate on 
how to react to the Russian draft agreement for visa-free travel. After Russia’s 
continuous political pressure and several member states’ efforts, a ‘breakthrough’ was 
reached during the December 2010 EU-Russia Summit. Speaking at the summit, the 
Commission’s President Barroso appealed for real progress on this issue. He pointed 
at the member states’ responsibility, and promised that “we will start elaborating 
common steps, and the implementation of those concrete steps will open the way for 
talks on [a] Visa Waiver Agreement” (European Commission, 07.12. 2010). The EU 
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idea with the Common Steps was to elaborate, with Russia, the list of steps and 
operational measures to be implemented before moving to the real negotiations on a 
visa waiver. 
As already indicated Latvia was not explicitly negative towards the EU-Russia 
visa-freedom, especially in its public statements, in the wake of President Zatlers’ 
support of the Russian position in Moscow (Interview No. 23, 16.12. 2013, MoI). 
5.4.5.2. The Second Stage (Spring 2011 – End 2011) 
This stage can be characterized by the member states’ intensive negotiations in the 
Council working groups, aiming to reach the EU’s unified position on the Common 
Steps. The aim was to prepare the instructions for the Commission, the EU negotiator 
with Russia. In parallel to the Council debate, the Commission already discussed the 
Common Steps with the Russian counterparts. The target was to adopt the Common 
Steps at the highest political level in the December 2011 EU-Russia Summit, at the 
end of the Polish EU Presidency. Being aware that the issue will be high on the Polish 
Presidency’s agenda, Latvia put forward as its priority an active engagement in “the 
EU discussion on the ‘common steps’ on gradual progress towards visa-free travel 
with Russia as a long-term perspective” (MFA of Latvia, 2011). 
Contacting Other Member States 
At the beginning of 2011, the EU internal debate on the Common Steps started in the 
COEST and the Visa groups. In order to find the common elements with other 
member states’ national positions the “Latvian experts held consultations with 
Estonian, Lithuanian, Nordic and Polish experts and officials” (Interview No. 26, 
16.01.2013, MFA). During this consultation process, Latvia continuously exchanged 
information and compared its national preferences with the positions of the like-
minded countries. The informal consultations took place primarily in the Brussels 
formats, as well as during the bilateral consultations in the EU capitals.  
Bolstering the Domestic Uploading Capacity 
Besides Latvia’s initial consultations in Brussels and in the EU capitals, ‘homework’ 
in Riga had to be done to elaborate a high-quality national position. In doing so, the 
administrative and political coordination was of critical importance. 
At the beginning of 2011, the government started the work. Although the main 
national coordinator on the visa issues was the Ministry of the Interior, this time it 
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was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea was to develop Latvia’s national 
position with a “maximum speed and inclusiveness” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, 
MFA). Initially, the Ministry of the Interior was enormously cautious about the 
Foreign Ministry’s idea to undertake the leadership role. However, the argument that 
in Russia the visa policy with the EU was decided at the highest political level in 
Kremlin convinced everyone. Also, in Brussels the policy-making shifted from the 
Visa group to the foreign policy formats (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). In 
elaborating the initial national position all the relevant stakeholders were engaged – 
the MFA, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Border Guard, the Office of 
Migration, the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
and Regional Development (ibid). 
The initial expert discussion indicated that in practical terms visa-free travel 
with Russia could be beneficial for a significant part of the Latvian society. Various 
elements of the national position appeared, supported by concrete technical 
arguments. There were two opposite views – on the one hand, the national 
stakeholders saw a number of benefits from the EU-Russia visa-free travel for the 
Latvian society. On the other hand, there were substantial concerns regarding the 
potential domestic security risks, e.g. related to the illegal migration (Interview No. 8, 
13.01.2013, MFA). This provides the evidence that the ‘first order’ national interests 
indeed turned into Latvia’s intensely held national preference on this issue. 
Gradually, a compromise was achieved between these two ‘first order’ 
conflicting national interests. The national position was elaborated with a strategic 
calculation that the major fight in the EU debate should be carried out among the big 
and wealthy member states. Accordingly, “Latvia’s national position consisted of two 
related elements – generally pro visa-free travel with Russia, but only under 
conditions if/when all the technical requirements are fulfilled.”  
The first argument in support for the EU-Russia visa-free travel was that 
shortly before the EU discussion on the Common Steps in 2011 started, Russia 
unilaterally introduced visa-free travel for Latvia’s non-citizens: now they could 
freely travel from Lisbon to Vladivostok, while the citizens could only move between 
Lisbon to Zilupe (the town at the Latvian-Russian border). The visa-free perspective 
could provide equal opportunities for everyone in Latvia, abolishing existing 
privileges for non-citizens” (Interview No. 26, 16.01.2013, MFA). 
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The second argument in favour of visa-free travel pertained to the anticipated 
growth in workload for the MFA Consular sections in Russia. EU debates on 
Common Steps coincided with Latvia’s economic crisis and considerable cuts to the 
MFA staff. The Ministry was struggling with a lack of personnel: “queues in our 
consular section in Russia were enormous. Visa-free regime could immediately solve 
this workload problem” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). Moreover, the statistics 
showed that flows of travellers to and from Latvia and Russia were almost identical. 
Surprisingly, many Latvians travelled to Russia to their relatives and for tourism 
purposes. Thereby on both sides, Russia and Latvia, there was similar income in the 
state budget through the visa fees, and equally busy consular staff. Therefore in 
practical terms Latvia, by abolishing visas, would not lose anything” (ibid). 
Furthermore, the formulation of the initial national position on Russia helped 
Latvia to also formulate its position towards Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. “The 
Latvian position was based on equal treatment of all the partners: the merit-based 
approach; no support to any political agendas” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
In this way, Latvia effectively linked EU visa-free travel with Russia to the same 
treatment for the Eastern Partnership countries. Visa liberalization was one of the 
main incentives for the Eastern partners. Given the southern member states’ 
reluctance in their support, this became the bargaining chip. Thus, Latvia together 
with a like-minded coalition could proceed by asking for a balanced EU approach 
towards all of its Eastern neighbours (ECFR Scorecard 2012). 
Furthermore, Latvia’s national position had to take into account the security 
risks. For this reason, Latvia in its position included the conditionality element – an 
extensive list of technical conditions Russia had to fulfil. As argued by an interlocutor 
from the MFA, the real problem was the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement and the 
transit of illegal immigrants from the third countries. He believed that the EU could 
grant Russia the visa-free travel perspective to put pressure on Russia to take 
responsibility for the third country nationals legally or illegally staying in its territory: 
Even now, the Moscow-Riga train is called ‘the Congo Express.’ The Latvian 
authorities regularly detain illegal immigrants from Congo, Nigeria, who try 
to use Latvia as a transit to get access, with illegal documents, to Sweden or 
other attractive EU countries. 
If Russia has a 7000 km uncontrolled border with Kazakhstan then it is 
legitimate to ask guarantees from the Russian side with regard to third 
country citizens who work in Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc. and can cross the 
border with the EU (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). 
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The above expressions clearly demonstrate that Latvia by developing general and 
expert-based technical argumentation improved its ability to influence EU policy-
making and the outcome. Importantly, by stressing the problems with illegal 
immigration from Russia, where Latvia serves only as a transit country to other 
member states, Latvia demonstrated responsibility for the EU common interests, and 
thus sought to ‘entrap’ others in its argumentation in pursuit of its own preferences. 
The Latvian national position was aided by the requests of the Latvian 
Ministry of Economy. The Ministry generally supported the visa-free perspective with 
Russia, as it believed that “the main beneficiaries would be the Latvian tourism 
sector, small and medium sized companies, and the real estate sector. Support also 
came from the Russian related ‘big business’ in Latvia, though only as a symbolic 
gesture, because all influential Russian business representatives already benefited 
from long-term Schengen visas” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). Furthermore, 
Latvian companies asked to add to the Latvian initial national position a request to the 
Russian side to abolish their complicated registration procedures for foreigners: 
In Russia, registration of foreigners is a ‘complete mess.’ If you move from 
one oblast to the other you have to register, and to pay again. It creates an 
enormous chaos” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA).   
Thus, Latvia further developed the expertise-based technical argumentation by 
suggesting for the EU’s common position an important request to the Russian side: 
“staying in Russia for the first two weeks without registration,” as described by the 
MFA official, who believed that there would be benefits for everyone on the EU side. 
“From the EU side, we are interested that our tourists and business representatives can 
travel freely in all of the Russian territory. Russia should guarantee this. This message 
we delivered to everyone” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). This Latvian 
proposal was later incorporated into the EU common position and “turned into the 
EU/Austrian-Russian problem: the Russians criticized that a similar system exists in 
Austria (the need to register the passport with the police through a hotel)” (Interview 
No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
In elaborating the national position, “important support came from the State 
Border Guards, assuring that they had capacities to efficiently control persons on the 
border with Russia, as well as that they had the blacklist of persons, whose presence 
in Latvia was not desirable” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). The Office of 
Migration also did not see immediate risks to Latvia’s internal security: Russia 
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created only a marginal risk for illegal immigration in Latvia. Violations of the 
Latvian-Russian visa regime were minimal. “Latvia seemed to be not a target country 
for Russian illegal migrants. Their main target was Germany, France, Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden” (ibid). Also, a large number of Russian citizens could 
easily evade the Latvian border control with their Schengen visas, issued by another 
Schengen country. It was no secret that “many Schengen countries issued visas to 
Russians in a much more flexible, even automatic way. Thus, if the Russian travellers 
to Latvia came from Finland, it was impossible to control them. Latvia as a Schengen 
member could not solve this problem unilaterally, but only together with its partners” 
(Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
The Ministry of the Interior provided excellent technical elements for 
justification of Latvia’s national position, according to the interviewed MFA 
representative, because the Ministry had investigated a practice the Russian 
authorities’ to issue different types of passports: 
Results demonstrated that in Russia there was a functioning system only for 
issuing the diplomatic passports, whereas with other passports were huge 
problems. Each region in Russia has its own passport register, and there is no 
one in Russia dealing with the whole passport register (Interview No. 8, 
13.01.2013, MFA). 
The above expressions show that Latvia’s initial national position was added by 
detailed technical arguments, which were used as a strategic asset in pursuit of its 
national preference. 
The position of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional 
Development was generally positive. It provided assurances that the Latvian regions 
bordering with Russia were very eager to have the visa-free travel. The EU-Russia 
visa-free travel seemed also a good solution because at that time the bilateral 
agreement between Latvia and Russia on facilitating mutual journeys of the border 
residents was still under discussion (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). Thereby all 
the relevant Latvian stakeholders’ contributions were incorporated into the Latvian 
national position for the Common Steps towards EU-Russia visa-free travel regime. 
With a view to the December 2011 EU-Russia Summit, the Latvian national 
position was also discussed in the Saeima, the Latvian Parliament, to gain its 
approval. In November 2011, the Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs presented the national 
position to the Saeima’s Foreign Affairs and the European Affairs Committees. He 
explained that Latvia, in general, supported visa-free regime with Russia, and that this 
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is a long-term perspective. According to an MFA official, in these discussions 
“everything went well, despite the fact that influential political parties in the Saeima 
had sensitivities towards Russia;” “but since our national position was well elaborated 
and based on detailed technical justifications, the parliamentarians’ resistance was not 
impassable” (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
Thus, critical inputs for Latvia’s national position for the Common Steps were 
collected, with the main signal: politically “yes” to visa-free travel with Russia, but 
under strong conditionality. Detailed technical arguments provided that the national 
position was of high-quality, which later “was supported greatly by the like-minded 
member states, and consequently taken into account in defining the EU common 
position on the Common Steps’ (Interview No. 8., 13.01.2013, MFA). With a well-
elaborated position it was much easier to effectively participate in EU policy-making. 
This shows the benefits of doing a proper ‘homework:’ 
Of course, the preparation of a high-quality national position demanded 
resources and energy, as well as the ability to survive through different 
attacks and complaints from the line ministries. Gradually everything went in 
the right direction (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
Hence, the Latvian position was formulated in a timely, high-quality and well-argued 
manner, which during the EU debate did not require any substantial adaptation: 
In EU expert discussions, Latvia could proceed in a comfortable way. Thus, 
being pro-active already before the formal decision-making started, Latvia 
could foresee others’ preferences (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
This provides empirical evidence that bolstering the domestic uploading capacity may 
be a highly relevant uploading mechanism (or condition for uploading), which 
indirectly helps a member state to exert influence in the EU. This uploading 
mechanism, as shown by an MFA representative, responsible for elaboration of this 
particular national position, “the key was ensuring smooth administrative 
coordination. Here it was important to involve all the relevant national stakeholders. 
For such a small country as Latvia a privilege was its small and flexible bureaucracy” 
(Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). Furthermore, for the national coordinating 
institution to be efficient, the “initiative needed be taken from the very start to turn the 
other stakeholders’ thinking onto the ‘right track’” (ibid). The same interlocutor 
recognized that “this resulted in Latvia’s position being politically well-argued and 
supported by detailed technical justifications:  
“With a high quality product Latvia could be in the leading positions in EU 
decision-making since the very beginning (Interview No.8, 01.02.13, MFA).  
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Consequently, Latvia’s position had numerous advantages: “in difference from the 
Polish and the Lithuanian positions, which were much more radical at the beginning, 
Latvia came up with a balanced position at the very beginning” (Interview No. 8, 
13.01.2013, MFA). From the German position, “one could feel that its Ministry of the 
Interior joined the preparation of the national position – it ‘tightened the screws’ and 
held the Foreign Ministry back. Estonia maintained reservation for a long time” (ibid). 
Given the broad diversity of the national positions “Latvia’s position was ‘pragmatic’ 
since the very beginning” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). 
The main ‘lesson learned’ was that Latvia has better chances of influencing 
EU foreign policy-making if it reacts in a speedy and timely manner. Another 
important factor was that in the EU debate the Latvian national position was in the 
middle. In this way, the Latvian foreign policy-makers in the public space could go 
along with the EU common position, demonstrating a constructive attitude towards 
visa-free travel with Russia. For Latvia, transparency and publicity of its position 
were crucial to avoid a situation that some big member states could blame it for 
supposed “Russophobia.” In 2011, the Foreign Minister Kristovskis made it clear to 
the public that Latvia supports “visa-free regime with Russia as much as the whole of 
the European Union” (Delfi, 14.01.2011). 
While Latvia’s strategic approach was to be publicly supportive, in fact, there 
were reasons to be reserved due to “domestic security matters and [an] unwillingness 
to open the border to potential immigrants” (Bukovskis 2012:83). However, Latvia 
decided to take a ‘pragmatic’ approach, with the preliminary knowledge that some big 
and wealthy member states would be much more eager to hinder the process towards 
visa-freedom with Russia.  
Presenting Arguments 
“To be vocal in the EU’s working group discussions – it is really important,” 
suggested a national representative of one of the member states, which belonged to 
the same coalition on the EU visa policy towards Russia (Interview No.12, 
20.06.2013 MFA of Sweden). The same interlocutor observed that  
Latvia has always been vocal and has spoken out in the EU working parties. 
Latvia can be considered as a leader of the like-minded group, because it 
usually had a well-elaborated position with detailed technical reasoning 
(ibid).  
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In order to pursue its national preference, Latvia actively utilized one of the 
hypothesized uploading mechanisms – ‘presenting arguments.’ Apparently, Latvia’s 
tactical approach was to minimize its image of a troublemaker vis-à-vis Russia. This 
uploading mechanism was suitable as Latvia’s arguments resonated well with others’ 
national positions and helped in developing the EU common position. An MFA 
representative felt that it was the right approach:  
I can assure that our constructive approach was recognised long before the 
formal discussions in the FAC, COEST and the Visa working group formats 
(Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
In its formal interventions during EU discussions, Latvia presented arguments “with 
the aim of putting forward its arguments to its partners at the earliest possible stage” 
(Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA). Evidence shows that Latvia used primarily 
expertise-based and technical argumentation. An MFA official described that Latvia’s 
arguments were “supported by detailed technical details, calculations and background 
information. The idea was to explain ‘how and why.’ Latvia realized that its specific 
expertise on Russia, which was of benefit for the whole Union, was also useful in 
strategic pursuit of its own national preference. This provided with additional 
possibilities to inject Latvia’s ideas in EU common position. With its expertise, Latvia 
was in a privileged situation, according to an official of the Ministry of Interior:  
The EU partners listen to our position because we are geographically close 
and thus we have much deeper knowledge. We can assure that (Interview No. 
23, 16.12. 2013. MoI). 
I therefore conclude that a member state can indeed use arguments as a strategic asset. 
This is even more so when a member state has specific expertise and knowledge, as 
Latvia did in this specific situation. This helps a member state in pursuit of its 
preferences. In particular, it seems to be very likely in situations when other member 
states have “incomplete or imperfect information or absence of such knowledge,” then 
‘presenting arguments’ or ‘functional persuasion,’ as Grobbe (2010:10) calls it, 
“converges with [others’] bargaining approaches.” 
The representative of the Ministry of the Interior described using arguments in 
a form of very detailed and reasonable questions to other member states: 
In the COEST Group we never were against. When we delivered our positions, 
we rather posed questions to our EU partners – what is the target date and 
what would the quality of the process be? We never wanted to make the 
impression that we would stop the process. We argued with our partners that 
visa-free travel should be a long-term process, and the most important here is 
the quality” (Interview No. 23, 16.12.2013, MoI). 
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The main elements of Latvia’s argument position were the following: first, a reference 
to its geographical location on the EU external border with Russia; also why Latvia 
felt it could benefit from visa-free travel with Russia. At the same time, being located 
on the border, Latvia expressed the need to ensure proper technical quality of the visa-
free regime. Therefore, Latvia politically supported visa-free travel, but only under 
conditions that the EU technical requirements would be met (Interview No. 8, 
13.01.2013, MFA). 
Later on, in EU discussions at various levels the Latvian national 
representatives felt comfortable: “There is no politician among the member states who 
can object to its own Ministry of the Interior” (Interview No. 8, 01.02.13, MFA). This 
Latvian approach was seen by a representative from the EEAS as the right one: 
“Latvia’s position was correct – no objection, but instead asking to meet technical 
standards” (Interview No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). 
In the COEST debate, Latvia realized that the member states had very 
divergent preferences. Furthermore, they diverged not only among member states, but 
also at the national level, where the business community was much more interested, 
while the Ministries of the Interior put the brakes. The most visible example was 
Germany, switching its position dramatically. Since Germany had a similar position, 
Latvia’s main concern was that Germany as a crucial EU player could leave the 
blocking minority. Then Latvia would immediately need to modify its national 
position. Latvia alone in EU policy-making on visa issues based on the QMV would 
be unable to proceed with the same old arguments and technical justification. 
Lobbying 
There is no evidence that Latvia used lobbying as an uploading mechanism in the case 
of EU-Russia visa-free perspective. As the Latvian representative to the Visa group 
recognized, Latvia from time to time used lobbying on visa issues, but it worked only 
if there were close personal contacts: “In the EU institutions, they have such lobbyists 
every day. If there is no personal contact, then lobbying is effective only if all the 
national representatives put in common efforts” (Interview No. 23, 16.12. 2013, MoI). 
He also believed that lobbying should involve the political level: 
 If [the] minister and experts convey the same to EU institutions, then lobbying 
is effective. The Commission and the EEAS always check the situation. If there 
is only the expert level involved, they do not pay any attention and ‘cross you 
over.’ When the EU institutions feel that there is no political backing, they 
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ignore you, especially, if they receive such instructions from their bosses 
(Interview No. 23, 16.12. 2013, MoI).  
The same interlocutor recognized that some member states are extremely active in 
lobbying the Commission. They meet the Commission on a regular basis, deliver their 
positions and technical solutions as help. Also, member states send their seconded 
experts to the Commission, which pro-actively lobby their national interests” (ibid). 
Thereby, lobbying indeed is a strong mechanism of influence (Interview No. 
23, 16.12. 2013, MoI). But in the case of the EU-Russia visa-free travel Latvia did not 
need to put particular efforts in lobbying. First, while for Latvia this was a strong 
national preference, there was no immediate domestic pressure on the Latvian foreign 
policy-makers. Second, in terms of institutional constraints, EU foreign policy-
making environment in this case helped Latvia to project this preference. Latvia 
belonged to the group of like-minded member states with one big member state – 
Germany, securing its position and the status quo. As a consequence, as observed by 
the MFA official,  
There was no need for extra efforts in lobbying: with Latvia’s speedy reaction 
and well-elaborated position, which matched with and complemented the like-
minded group’s stance, Latvia could be in EU’s ‘forefront’ and even influence 
others’ initial positions (Interview No. 8, 01.02.13, MFA).  
Consequently, it did not need to use the informal uploading mechanisms such as 
lobbying EU institutions. It could rely on EU’s formal proceedings. This shows that a 
member state may not necessarily use all the available mechanisms if the conditions 
allow relying on only a few. 
Joining Coalitions 
Given the formal QMV voting procedure on visa-free travel with Russia, in practice 
Latvia could upload its national preferences only if the group of like-minded countries 
was large enough to create a blocking minority. This specific EU institutional 
constraint was highlighted by a representative of one of the like-minded countries: 
When we as a group– the Baltic States and Sweden – act together, we can do 
much more” (Interview No.12, 20.06.2013, MFA of Sweden).  
This means that it was of utmost importance to employ another of the hypothesized 
uploading mechanism as ‘building or joining coalitions.” Speaking about how Latvia 
used the coalitions, the same national representative from the like-minded country 
praised Latvia’s active behaviour and cooperation with the partners. He described that  
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In the EU debate Latvia was very vocal. Although it did not have fully similar 
positions with the coalition countries (Sweden), “together we were stronger.”  
Latvia had been generous with information sharing with like-minded countries 
before the EU working group meetings. 
Among the like-minded countries, Latvia definitely is in the forefront in the 
EU. It takes the lead. Its main qualities are willingness to cooperate and 
readiness to accommodate” (Interview No.12, 20.06.2013, MFA Sweden). 
This shows that Latvia with its well-developed national position could be pro-active 
in the EU to influence others’ positions, as well as to be a valuable coalition partner to 
other like-minded member states. 
Developments Under the Polish Presidency (Second Half 2011) 
During the second half of 2011, Poland as a Presidency actively pushed forward the 
visa issue with Russia, and there was an intensive on-going debate in the COEST 
group. The aim was to elaborate the EU position for the Common Steps to be 
approved in the December 2011 EU-Russia Summit. On the eve of the summit, it 
appeared that there was a disagreement between the EU and Russia in understanding 
of what the Common Steps actually mean. Moscow insisted that “full approval of the 
document must automatically” mean abolishing visas, and complained that “Brussels 
says this is not yet guaranteed,” (Telegraph, 01.12.2011) as well as criticized that 
“some member states try [..] to include the questions such as combating corruption” 
(ibid). 
Apparently, Poland played an active role, including using its Presidency for its 
own benefits: its diplomatic efforts seemingly linked the Kaliningrad-Poland 
agreement on visa regime for the border regions as a bargaining chip with the 
Russians, which Moscow “anticipated to be the first step in creating a visa-free 
regime” (RT, 15.12.2011). Thereby, on the eve of the December 2011 EU-Russia 
Summit, Poland took a strategic approach towards the EU-Russia visa-free travel. 
Also, the German and the French Foreign Ministers in EU Foreign Ministers’ meeting 
prior to the Summit encouraged the opening of negotiations with Russia on a visa-free 
agreement as soon as possible (Latvijas Radio, 15.11.2011). 
As a result, the December 2011 EU-Russia Summit agreed to “take concrete 
steps to facilitate the mobility of citizens.” Different from the EU visa liberalization 
action plans with the Eastern Partnership countries, which were the EU unilateral 
documents, setting the conditions for the partners, the Common Steps highlighted 
equality and reciprocity between the EU and Russia (Scorecard 2012). 
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5.4.5.3. The Third Stage (Beginning 2012 – Beginning 2014) 
After the December 2011 EU-Russia Summit reached apolitical agreement to proceed 
with the Common Steps, the main responsibility shifted to the Commission, which 
had a mandate to work directly with Russia in implementing the Common Steps.
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The EU and Russia agreed on regular meetings at the expert and senior official level. 
Thus, in practice, the Commission took control over the visa issues with Russia 
(Interview No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). 
Consequently, member states’ debate in the Council working parties on visa-
free travel with Russia was limited. The progress of implementation of the Common 
Steps was discussed occasionally in the COEST group, mainly consisting of the 
Commission’s briefings on the status of the implementation, followed by member 
states’ short comments and questions.  
Given this shift in responsibilities among EU institutions, with member states 
lacking direct access to EU policy-making, Latvia had to seek informal ways to 
influence the process. The hypothesized uploading mechanism here could be 
lobbying. However, as noted earlier, in the case of EU-Russia visa-free travel Latvia 
did not need to put particular efforts in lobbying. There was no strong domestic 
pressure on the Latvian foreign policy-makers, and in the EU policy-making Latvia 
could rely on an influential country – Germany, which secured Latvia’s preferences as 
long as it belonged to the same group of like-minded member states. 
‘Bolstering Domestic Uploading Capacity’ and ‘Presenting Arguments’ 
Apart from informal uploading mechanisms, there was the possibility to use formal 
intervention in the COEST-level debates. It could involve either presenting arguments 
or bargaining. To sustain the previously strong position among the like-minded 
countries and to effectively engage in EU policy-making, Latvia had to put in extra 
efforts. Given that the Commission now had full control over the implementation of 
the Common Steps together with Russia, Latvia felt the need to closer monitor the 
Commission’s work on the ground. 
                                                 
15
 The Common Steps for a long time were not available to the public. Only in March 2013, the 
Commission published the document (European Commission, DG Home, 11.03.2013). The technical 
process on implementation of the Common Steps took place in four blocks: 1) Technical security of the 
borders; 2) Borders and migration; 3) Public security and data protection; 4) External relations and 
human rights (ibid). 
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The Commission’s task was to regularly inform the member states on 
implementation of the Common Steps. According to the interviewees, during 2012 in 
the COEST group there were only short briefings from the Commission without 
substantial debates. Among like-minded member states, this was perceived with 
mixed feelings: “The Commission is trying to be the honest broker. However, it does 
not promote the aggregate interests of member states. Instead, it is pushing for 
reaching the agreement. The Commission has a mandate to negotiate, but it tries to 
sacrifice member states’ interests” (Interview No.12, 20.06.2013 MFA of Sweden). 
Member states perceived the Commission’s work on the Common Steps with 
suspicion. Not only the EEAS, but also member states became irritated, as there was a 
feeling that the Commission was chiefly pushing its own interests: “The Commission 
is pushing for finalising the work. It seems to be desparaely willing to reach the deal, 
trying to sacrifice member state interests. But we are not in a rush. We can wait until 
the next EU-Russia summit, and we can wait for another five more summits. We 
cannot support artificial deadlines” (Interview No. 25, 10.02.2014. MFA). 
For this reason member states demanded close monitoring of the 
Commission’s work. Again, Latvia returned to the mechanism of bolstering the 
domestic uploading capacity. This time it involved another type of specific activities. 
Member states could participate in the so-called EU ‘field missions’ in Russia 
together with the Commission, which were a part of the implementation of the 
Common Steps. The Latvian government decided to send its own national experts to 
these joint EU ‘field missions’ to Russia to crosscheck the Commission’s work. 
Despite all of the EU political commitments and promises to Russia, in 2012 
there was only one field mission to Russia. This was a marginal achievement, 
considering the ambitious goals set in the December 2011 EU-Russia Summit. In 
spite of the Russian pressure, the experts stalled on the ground. For instance, it 
became clear that “Russia’s eastern border was not properly guarded and controlled. 
The problem was that its third country citizens staying illegally in Russia could easily 
cross the EU border without visas” (Interview No. 11, 13.02.2013, MFA). The 
Latvian representatives warned EU partners that there was no any functioning 
passport system in Russia, by using such expertize-based arguments as:   
The results of the ‘field missions’ demonstrated that in Russia there was a 
functioning system only for issuing the diplomatic passports, whereas with 
other passports there were huge problems, primarily due to the lack of unified 
national system for accounting issued passports. Each region in Russia has its 
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own passport register, and there is no one in Russia dealing with the whole 
passport register (Interview No. 8, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
This shows that Latvia employed again bolstering of the domestic uploading capacity 
to update its expertise-based argumentation, which was needed in pursuit of its 
preferences in EU policy-making due to the risk of unfavourable developments on 
EU-Russia visa talks. 
Despite the ill-conditioned situation the EU experts faced on the ground, the 
June 2012 EU-Russia Summit in St. Petersburg was perceived as a new beginning. 
The summit was special because it was the first summit since Putin returned to the 
presidency. Putin back in Kremlin rammed home the message that at the summit he 
regarded visa-free travel with the EU as an essential precondition for opening the 
Russian market. He stressed Russia’s willingness to cooperate on visa-free travel, 
while Van Rompuy “celebrated the best dynamics for years” (MailOnline, 4 June 
2012). However, Putin’s statements signalled on a new uncompromising approach: 
“Russians are piling pressure on visas but there is no way we can allow open entry. If 
it would happen tomorrow we would imagine an influx of people arriving to 
immediately claim asylum from Putin’s regime” (ibid). 
The joint technical work of the Commission and Russia with the Common 
Steps did not succeed. At the same time the December 2012 EU-Russia Summit was 
approaching, and Russia demanded deliverables. Yet, the October 2012 EU-Russia 
Partnership Council on Freedom, Security and Justice only “welcomed the on-going 
implementation of ‘common steps’ and reconfirmed its willingness to progress,” 
while at the same time stressing the need to combat transnational crime and 
corruption (Joint Conclusions, EU-Russia PPC, 03.10.2012), thereby broadening visa 
issues to other politically sensitive areas. 
The outcome of implementation of the Common Steps was supposed to be the 
Commission’s recommendation to the Council to start the formal negotiations with 
Russia on visa-free travel regime. The Commission was expected to produce a sort of 
progress report on implementation with a view to the December 2012 EU-Russia 
Summit (Sagrera & Potemkina 2013). Seemingly, there were high expectations in 
Moscow that the EU would give the ‘green light’ to start the real negotiations on visa-
freedom. However, despite all the Russian pressure such report did not materialize.  
To agree on the EU ‘line to take’ in the December EU-Russia Summit, the 
Council again discussed the visa issue at the COEST and the COREPER groups. 
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These debates generally reflected member states’ previous positions as no practical 
progress with the Common Steps was reached. On the eve of the summit, the Latvian 
MFA issued its official position, generally reiterating its previous line, adopted a year 
earlier. The Ministry referred to the State President Zatlers’ visit to Moscow in 
December 2010, where he expressed Latvia’s support to the EU-Russia visa-free 
travel if the Common Steps were fulfilled. The Foreign Ministry referred to the 
Commission, which had the main responsibility for implementation of the Common 
Steps, assured that work on their implementation would continue, including exchange 
of written reports and the expert missions. The MFA referred to the EU common 
stance that implementation of this document would determine the progress of the EU-
Russia visa dialogue (MFA of Latvia, 20.12.2012).  
The December 2012 EU-Russia Summit in Brussels was a disappointment for 
Russia. After the Summit Putin criticized the EU – that it was “thwarting the 
development of economic relations between the trading partners” (RT, 21 December 
2012). Barroso’s main message was that the EU and Russia were “indeed strategic 
partners of a special kind,” and that “the good progress [has been] made on the 
implementation of the Commons Steps towards visa-free travel, and our goal is to 
open negotiations on visa waiver agreement in the future. We believe substance over 
speed should guide our common endeavours. [..] Meanwhile we believe it is 
important to conclude the Visa Facilitation Agreement” (European Commission, 
21.12.2012). Thereby one more obstacle appeared – the Visa Facilitation Agreement.  
The EU Faces Russia’s Hard Bargaining 
Apparently, the Russian side became angered by the EU’s ‘lack of political will.’ 
Consequently, Russia put hard bargaining into use. It linked the visa-free travel issue 
with renegotiating the already concluded Visa Facilitation Agreement, and suddenly 
brought forward unexpected additional demands. 
The Common Steps indeed included the task of amending the Visa Facilitation 
Agreement “to further simplify visa requirements” (Common Steps, 11.03.2013). 
Visa facilitation was a provisional solution until visa-free travel regime entered into 
force. While the Visa Facilitation Agreement functioned already since 2007, the idea 
was to update it by providing multi-entry visas to more categories of travellers (EU 
Delegation in Moscow, Visas and Readmission). However, renegotiation became a 
136 
 
‘battlefield’ between the EU and Russia, and a “real litmus test of how united is the 
EU on the visa-free regime” (Interview No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). 
The real problems started after the December 2012 EU-Russia Summit. Russia 
suddenly put forward the demand to include a new category for visa facilitation – the 
service passport holders. This was a shock in the EU: in practice, it would mean that 
the Russian militaries and security service personnel would get free access to the 
Schengen area. Everyone in the EU, including Latvia, was against the idea. But then 
Russia unexpectedly put forward additional demands to the EU side – to provide data 
on every EU pilot scheduled for Trans-Siberian flights, implying that their airplane 
pilots would not get the Russian visas. Some believed that “the EU needs to make 
visa-freedom as a bargaining chip to ask for Russian concessions in other areas. 
Bargaining appeared to be the only way in negotiations with Russia. But there was no 
legal basis for this according to one interlocutor in the respective EU working group 
(Interview No. 12, 20.06.13, Sweden). 
In January 2013, Russia announced it was leaving the visa facilitation 
negotiations. Thus, as the EEAS representative felt, Russia played bargaining games, 
which the EU could not play in a similar manner: “The renegotiation of visa 
facilitation constituted a serious warning signal that Russia was not predictable 
partner. Presumably, it was Russia’s bargaining tactics, given the EU’s unwillingness 
to proceed with visa-free travel” (Interview No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). 
But then suddenly Germany shifted its negative position. In spring 2013, 
Germany’s Foreign and Interior Ministers sent a letter to Brussels, supporting visa 
facilitation for service passports “if the security guarantees from the Russian side 
were provided.” German Foreign Minister Westerwelle explained that Russia “is our 
strategic partner. [..] If visa liberalization for service passports happens, it would be 
nice and welcomed progress. Putin brings it up all the time, so it is important for us 
too." (Euobserver 13.03.2013) There was a strong German business lobby and 
pressure on Merkel (Interview No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). This was also a warning 
signal to Latvia and a clear indication that Germany could in the same way suddenly 
change its position on the visa-free travel with Russia (ibid). 
Latvia Presenting Arguments 
As a consequence, in the first half of 2013 visa-free traveling and visa facilitation 
issues again appeared on the COEST and the Visa group working agendas. In parallel 
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to the negotiations on visa facilitation, Russia started pressuring to get visa-free 
regime until the 2014 Sochi Olympics. 
On the Visa Facilitation Agreement, in the EU debates there were again the 
same two opposite camps. According to a Latvian representative: “In the first camp 
there were the Baltic States, Sweden, Denmark and Austria, as well as Germany 
(which publicly had made the impression of supporting Russia’s demands regarding 
the service passport holders), while in the second camp – the Southern member states. 
Overall, the majority did not support the inclusion of the service passport holders” 
(Interview No. 26, 16.01.2013, MFA). Latvia underlined that it would not be rational 
to include the service passport holders by presenting the following arguments:   
If Russia would be really interested in its citizens instead of certain privileged 
categories then it would have been agreed already a long time ago. Also we 
are not ready to discuss visa-free travel before Russia signs the Visa 
Facilitation Agreement (Interview No. 26, 16.01.2013, MFA).  
However, as recognized by the same representative, it was obvious that “Latvia’s 
strong position was valid only until Germany had the same position” (Interview No. 
26. 16.01.2013, MFA). 
The EU made some effort to comfort Moscow’s feelings. In March 2013 in 
Moscow, it organized a high-level conference on visa liberalization, attended by the 
Commission President Barroso. Despite these efforts, this event “left more questions 
than answers to the future trajectory of EU-Russia visa dialogue;” accompanied by 
Russia’s demand for the crews of some European airlines, e.g. Latvia’s AirBaltic, 
asking for business visas (Kogut, 29.03.2013). 
Bolstering the Domestic Uploading Capacity and Presenting Arguments 
In 2013, in parallel to the discussions on what to do with the Russian demands on the 
Visa Facilitation Agreement, the implementation work of the Common Steps towards 
the visa-free travel continued. This was primarily a technical process in the four 
blocks within the framework of the Common Steps under the Commission’s 
leadership. In this situation, Latvia returned to domestic capacity building with an 
idea that when the issue on visa-free travel again arrives in EU foreign policy-making 
the country needed to be ready for uploading. Given that it was a Commission-driven 
process, it meant that Latvia had to build its position on strong technical arguments. 
For this purpose, Latvia, first, took an active part in EU field missions to Russia to 
collect the first-hand information. Second, under the Foreign Ministry’s leadership the 
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national coordination group on visa-free regime with Russia renewed its work. The 
aim was to elaborate the national position for it to be ready to respond to the 
Commission’s forthcoming Progress Report on implementation of the Common 
Steps, which was expected to be released prior to the annual EU-Russia Summit in 
December 2013 and was already delayed for one year. 
Until October 2013, all the necessary EU field missions to Russia and the way 
around were concluded. Four EU expert field missions to Russia were organized, 
where the Latvian experts also took part, whereas Russia undertook four expert 
missions to the EU member states, including Latvia. This theoretically would mean 
that the Common Steps could be implemented if the Commission came to a 
conclusion and gave its recommendation to launch the formal negotiations on visa-
free travel with Russia. However, none of the experts’ had any doubt that Russia was 
far from being ready for this. In this situation, however, the EU side was worrying 
that Moscow would exert enormous political pressure on EU member states: 
Russia would press again to launch the negotiations on visa freedom. The 
feeling was that Russia would continue its pressure until the EU side gives up 
(Interview No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). 
In this situation, Latvia actively participated in all the EU’s expert field missions to 
Russia. These missions were very practical, and looked at the concrete cases when the 
EU citizen had been deported, and other cases. The Russian side organized the return 
mission (Interview No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS). The situation seemed to be tricky, as 
the Commission apparently had its own interests and agenda, which did not 
necessarily serve member state preferences. The worrying signals were also coming 
from the Commission’s reports from the field missions. These reports, as 
characterized by the national expert in the EU, were extremely superficial and without 
the necessary evaluation and conclusions: 
In the COEST group, I asked the Commission to provide an evaluation. 
Regrettably, in the reports from the field missions, we cannot see any 
evaluation. There is a description of which places in Russia had been visited. 
We cannot proceed without an evaluation. (Interview No. 21, 11.07.2013, 
PermRep)  
The reason for member states’ worry was that the Commission’s reports from the 
‘field-missions’ later should have been incorporated in the Progress Report on 
implementing the Common Steps. The Progress Report was important because it 
“would indicate the gaps” on the Russian side (Interview No. 21, 11.07.2013, 
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PermRep). In the middle of 2013, Latvia and the group of like-minded countries was 
rather pessimistic on the Commission’s work. 
Given this delicate situation, for Latvia to continuously proceed with its 
national preferences it was important that the status quo among the member states’ 
votes remained the same. Hence, one interviewee felt that uploading was possible 
through common coalition activities: “Luckily the like-minded coalition was rather 
large – the Benelux States, Germany, the Baltic States and Sweden” (Interview No. 
21, 11.07.2013, PermRep). He also felt that the Russian position was very strong, 
based on the belief that “visa-free regime is imminent.” He recalled that the Latvian 
position is “not against the visa-free regime with Russia, but that it has a common 
approach towards all the third countries – the process should be merit-based. 
Unfortunately, the EU’s approach towards Russia is different” (ibid).   
In this situation, while Latvian position demanding Russia to fulfil the 
technical requirements was evaluated as correct by the EEAS, it was also mentioned 
that one needed to put more pressure on the Commission:  
The like-minded states should put more pressure on the Commission – the 
main EU negotiator – to provide information about the negotiation process. 
The small member states should join forces, to approach the Commission 
together to request the explanatory briefings, ask concrete questions to the 
Commission. Then it would be pressured to finally provide answers (Interview 
No. 18, 13.07.2013, EEAS).  
The Commission: No Conditions for Launching Negotiation On The Visa-Freedom 
Latvia and other like-minded countries worried that the Commission’s Progress 
Report on implementation the Common Steps ahead of the EU-Russia Summit in 
January 2014 could be considered as a green light to open negotiations on visa-free 
travel. Shortly before the EU Report was published on 18 December 2013, the 
Russian side came up with its own report. The Russian report was four pages long and 
very formal with the main message being: “Let’s finish this move to the real 
negotiations on visa-free travel” (Interview No. 25, 10.02.2014, MFA). Lavrov 
signalled that the Russian report was positive, and hoped for a similar report from the 
EU side. Ahead of the summit, he hoped “for the soonest decision of the EU to start 
the elaboration of a visa-free travel agreement” (Russia Beyond the Headlines, 
18.12.2013). 
On 18 December 2013, the Commission published the long-awaited Progress 
Report (Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 18 
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December 2013). Contrary to Russia’s expectations, as well as worries of Latvia and 
the like-minded member states, the Report was very detailed, (53 pages in length) and 
included a long list of gaps in implementation of the Common Steps. 
The initial Latvian reaction to the Commission’s Report was generally 
positive, and it could in principle agree to the Commission’s evaluation. At the same 
time, Latvia asked for another opportunity to analyse the Report in detail. Being 
aware that Russia would continue pressuring at the political level, Riga decided to 
resume the work of inter-ministerial working group. As the MFA official informed, in 
order “to deal with the EU-Russia visa-free regime, the special inter-ministerial 
working group was again established under the leadership of the MFA. One of its 
tasks was to make detailed technical analysis on the Commission’s Report on the 
Common Steps. The aim was to crosscheck the Commission’s findings to be able to 
engage in the EU further debate with well-established arguments” (Interview No. 25, 
10.02.2014. MFA). 
The visa-free travel agreement was included in the agenda of the January 2014 
EU-Russia Summit. However, the atmosphere of the Summit was frosty due to 
Russia’s increasing pressure on Ukraine, aimed at stopping Ukraine’s European 
aspirations. While many in the EU still wanted to keep the business going with 
Russia, the general attitude begun to change. Thus, on the visa-free travel perspective 
the Commission’s statement was short-spoken: it stated that implementation of the 
Common Steps towards visa-free travel was underway. Once the Common Steps 
would be fully implemented, a decision on the launch of negotiations on a visa waiver 
agreement could be taken (European Commission, 24.01.2014). This shows that visa-
free travel perspective with Russia had become frozen not because of some individual 
member state’s uploading efforts on this particular issue, but that it became part of a 
broader game with the EU using visa-free travel as a bargaining element in response 
to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014. 
EU visa dialogue with Russia was halted in spring 2014 due to Russia’s 
aggression towards Ukraine. On 6 March 2014, the European Council adopted a 
statement on Ukraine, strongly condemning Russia’s “unprovoked violation of 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and deciding to “suspend bilateral 
talks with Russia on visa matters” (Statement of the Heads of State of Government on 
Ukraine, 6 March 2014). Thereby the external factors contributed to freezing the visa-
free talks with Russia, which was the first EU response to the Kremlin’s aggression in 
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Ukraine, followed by a tougher measure from the EU – imposition of economic 
sanctions on its recent strategic partner. 
5.4.6. Conclusions  
This chapter explored in what ways Latvia sought to project its national preferences in 
the case of EU-Russia visa-free travel regime. The analysis revealed that during the 
EU policy-making-process Latvia utilized a number of hypothesized uploading 
mechanisms. Firstly, it involved bolstering of the domestic uploading capacity, which 
helped the preference projection. This meant political support and consensus, as well 
as smooth administrative coordination. As a result, Latvia already at an early stage of 
EU policy-making was equipped with well-elaborated national position. Further, 
Latvia pro-actively used uploading mechanisms, such as informal consultations with 
other member states, making most of coalitions, as well as using formal interventions 
in EU working parties, in particular presenting arguments. Arguing included mainly 
the expertise-based and technical arguments, which were used as a strategic asset in 
pursuit of its preferences. Latvia’s arguments were beneficial for the formulation of 
the EU common position and resonated well with the positions of other like-minded 
countries, and consequently these arguments became reflected in the EU decision 
outcome. In this way, Latvia was able influence EU policy outcome.  
Thus, the case study corroborates the first hypothesis (H1) that Latvia could 
influence the EU foreign policy-making process and the outcome by combining 
various uploading mechanisms. In terms of preference intensity, this sub-case shows 
that, in difference from the first sub-case on EU sanctions on Belarus, in this case 
Latvia was not challenged by the “two level game” (Putnam 1988), where national 
representatives are squeezed between domestic and EU pressures, and interest groups. 
That is why it was relatively easy for the country to proceed with such uploading 
mechanism as presenting arguments (general and expert-based arguing). Without 
strong domestic pressure, Latvia could rely on arguing. In a situation when there was 
no strong domestic pressure, the national representatives did not need to employ a 
bargaining mechanism. Furthermore, given the favourable EU foreign policy-making 
environment, i.e. Germany being in a similar position, there were no serious risks 
associated with losing in the outcome of the negotiations. The conditions under which 
Latvia was able to exert its influence can be summarized in one quote from a 
respondent: “Our position is valid until Germany has the same position” (Interview 
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No. 26. 16.01.2013, MFA). However, there is the question of whether Latvia 
uploaded its preferences or experienced a stroke of good luck. 
5.5. Case III: the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (2011-2013) 
In answering the research question, the third sub-case “The EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement 2011-2013” was used for empirical analysis. I look at the period 
beginning from autumn 2011 when the EU suspended signature of the Association 
Agreement (AA) with Ukraine due to the imprisonment of the former Prime Minister 
Tymoshenko until autumn of 2013, when, prior to the Vilnius Eastern Partnership 
Summit, the EU came up with unified support for signing the AA.  
The signature of the AA was expected to be a highlight of the Vilnius Summit, 
yet the agreement failed to materialize. Despite the tremendous preparatory work on 
both sides, at the last minute the Ukrainian President Yanukovych withdrew from the 
AA and turned to the Russian-led Customs Union instead. This sub-case does not seek 
to explain the failure of signing the AA, but looks at how the EU finally reached a 
unified position prior to the Vilnius Summit despite conflicting interests and 
resistance from the majority of influential member states. In particular, it explores 
how Latvia together with other like-minded countries contributed to the shaping EU 
common position, which largely reflected the official position defined by the Latvian 
government. The study seeks to answer what uploading mechanisms Latvia used in 
this particular case. 
The EU policy on Ukraine has been characterized as ‘divided,’ and 
’ultimatum-based’ This divide reflected member states’ interests, extending beyond 
the EU relations with Ukraine: “Many member states were reluctant to support the 
AA due to their beneficial contracts with Russia” (Interview No. 28, 30.03.2014, 
EM). The EU debates on the AA reaffirmed this divide, as observed by an EEAS 
representative:    
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is a very visible example of how new 
and old, big and small member states try to inject their interests in EU foreign 
policy. In this case, the new member states were especially active. Lithuania 
as the rotating EU Presidency was very vocal. Latvia was less visible 
(Interview No. 15, 12.07.2013, EEAS). 
The EU-Ukraine negotiations on the AA were launched in 2007. In 2011, they were 
finalized. Poland as the EU Presidency of the second half of 2011 wanted to announce 
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the conclusion of the AA negotiations during the September 2011 Warsaw Eastern 
Partnership Summit, but due to Ukraine’s backsliding democracy it became 
impossible. Ukraine’s track record under the President Yanukovych had dramatically 
declined. Yanukovych ignored the EU warning signals. The EU patience was 
exhausted when in October 2011 the former Prime Minister Tymoshenko was 
imprisoned for seven years. The EU reacted by freezing the whole process towards 
the AA.  
After almost a year of silence, in late autumn 2012, the EU signalled on its 
readiness to unfreeze the process. On December 2012, the EU came up with the time 
perspective for the AA signature in the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit in 
November 2013, if Ukraine were to meet its determined criteria, in particular the 
release of Tymoshenko. Yanukovych promised to fulfil the EU criteria. This pledge 
followed by intense preparatory work in Brussels and Kyiv. While a number of 
member states continuously objected, the EU consensus gradually emerged. Prior to 
the Vilnius Summit the EU came up with a unified position on the AA signature. 
Notwithstanding that such EU unity was motivated by external factors such as 
increasing Russia’s pressure on Ukraine, and this to a great extent happened due to 
the efforts of Ukraine’s supporters in EU, among them also Latvia. 
This EU dossier is suitable for testing the hypothesis because the independent 
and dependent variables display a positive value, i.e. the Latvian national preference 
in supporting the AA, and its reflection in the outcome – the EU’s common position 
in support of signing the AA. Also, it allows for testing how the conditions – EU 
foreign policy-making environment – constrained (or facilitated) Latvia’s ability to 
influence the outcome. 
I proceed as follows. First, I start with a brief description of the empirical 
context of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Second, Latvia’s approach 
towards the EU-Ukraine relations is described by identifying the intensity of Latvia’s 
national preferences regarding the AA. Third, I characterize the EU’s institutional 
environment. Fourth, the hypothesized uploading mechanisms are traced. I divide the 
EU decision-making process into two stages: the first stage – from the end of 2011 
until the December 2012 FAC (Council Conclusions), and the second stage – from the 
beginning of 2013 until the September 2013 Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. 
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5.5.1. Empirical Background  
EU policy towards Ukraine has been related to the broader geopolitical context and 
the fact that Ukraine has been the “object of a geopolitical contest between the 
Kremlin and the West” (FT, 23.02.2014). For Russia, keeping the influence over 
Ukraine had almost been an existential imperative, whereas within the EU Ukraine 
was awarded a lower priority. The Russian factor was important: the majority of big 
old member states treated Ukraine in the context of their beneficial relations with 
Russia. This led to reluctance on the part of the EU to actively engage with Ukraine, 
in order not to damage relations with Russia. The new post-Soviet member states, on 
the contrary, pushed for a pro-active EU role in Ukraine, so as to pull it out of the 
orbit of Russia’s immediate influence. These two competing, or at least partly 
contradictory, objectives resulted in a deep inconsistency in the EU’s approach 
towards Ukraine.  
In general, Ukraine was given more attention by the EU after the 2004 Orange 
Revolution, when it begun to strive for EU membership. As this was considered as an 
unrealistic perspective, the EU established a replacement for the former enlargement 
policy aimed at the ex-Soviet countries in the east – the so-called Eastern Partnership. 
Given its large size, Ukraine was perceived as crucial country for the whole Eastern 
Partnership. Ukraine became the first country with which the EU begun talks on the 
AA, the core mechanism of the Partnership. 
According to the EU officials, the AA with Ukraine was the ‘most ambitious 
and complex agreement the EU has ever negotiated with a third country’ (Füle, 
Speech, June 2012). Within this framework, the EU and Ukraine also negotiated on 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) – a core element of the AA 
(COM (2013) 289). In 2011, the AA was close to finalization. There were 
expectations that the September 2011 Warsaw Summit would conclude the AA. Yet, 
this was interrupted due to domestic problems in Ukraine under Yanukovych. 
The EU was facing a dilemma. On the one hand, it was very difficult for the 
EU to compromise on its values. On the other hand, the EU needed a more strategic 
approach. Without Ukraine, the whole Partnership would be under a threat. With the 
Warsaw Eastern Partnership Summit approaching, the EU needed a ‘success story’ of 
seriously engaging with Ukraine. From his side, Yanukovych never gave up his 
contacts with the EU despite his pro-Russian course, as he sought to manoeuver 
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between both sides. Ahead of the Warsaw Summit, Yanukovych promised to ask the 
EU to include Ukraine’s EU membership perspective in the AA. Meanwhile, the 
French Foreign Minister Juppé made it clear that the Eastern partners “should be told 
that there is no chance for them to join the club,” and that “we should not let them 
imagine” (Forum, 05.09.2011). Some member states were reluctant to even refer to 
Ukraine as a European country. 
Besides Ukraine’s own domestic problems as a major obstacle turned out to be 
Russia’s attempt to prevent Ukraine from signing the AA. After Yanukovych became 
President in 2010, Moscow exerted extra pressure on Ukraine to force it to join the 
Customs Union. In April 2011, Putin in his capacity as the Prime Minister made it 
clear that if Ukraine would sign the AA, Russia would have to “reinforce its borders;” 
It was indeed, a clear message that Russia was ready to take far-reaching measures to 
prevent Ukraine from the European choice (Solodky, 22.04.2011, EaP Community).  
While Russia’s pressure on Ukraine was increasing, there were no signs that 
the EU would become more flexible with its tough conditionality on Ukraine. Many 
member states had the illusions that Ukraine would agree on everything that the EU 
would offer. Still, the 2011 Warsaw Summit Declaration stressed that EU leaders 
were looking forward to the possible finalizing of the AA by the end of 2011 (Joint 
Declaration, the Warsaw Summit, 29-30.09.2011). The Commission’s President 
Barroso expressed himself optimistically on Ukraine’s chances to become the first 
Eastern Partnership country to finalize the AA. 
However, the whole process towards the signing of the AA was interrupted by 
the decision of Yanukovych to imprison Tymoshenko shortly after the Warsaw 
Summit, in October 2011. “There were rumours that in Tymoshenko’s imprisonment 
a major role was played by Russia, and also the former German President Schroeder” 
(Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). Germany’s patience had been exhausted: 
“The public opinion was crucial before the elections in Germany. Chancellor Merkel 
also had good relations with Tymoshenko. Her tough line against Yanukovych 
influenced the EU position” (ibid). Consequently, the Tymoshenko case appeared as 
the main obstacle for signing the AA. EU-Ukraine relations dropped to a new low 
point, which resulted in suspending the process towards the AA and avoiding contact 
with Yanukovych. These developments were a disappointment for Ukraine supporters 
in the EU, especially the new former Soviet member states. They were concerned by 
the increasing Russian influence in their neighbourhood. Without the AA, a practical 
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mechanism for integrating Ukraine with the EU, Russian dominance over Ukraine 
would become much more likely” (Visegrad Fund, 2013). 
Latvia, as the EU Member State, Vis-à-vis Ukraine 
Latvia’s approach to the EU policy on Ukraine involves the ‘first order’ security 
concerns related to its geographic proximity primarily with Russia and its interests in 
the whole of the post-Soviet space, where Ukraine was perceived as a pivotal 
component. Already before joining the EU, Latvia stated that one of its foreign policy 
priorities for the neighbourhood was Ukraine approaching the EU. As a member state, 
Latvia became one of Ukraine’s advocates in the EU. In the EU working parties, 
Latvia together with like-minded countries always supported Ukraine’s deeper 
relations with the EU. It even supported granting Ukraine the EU membership 
perspective, which received major resistance in the EU.  
With Ukraine’s deteriorating development under Yanukovych, its advocacy 
became complicated. The dominating views of the EU were demands for a tougher 
attitude and strict conditionality towards Ukraine in order to safeguard the respect for 
common values. Latvia wanted a more strategic and pragmatic approach, seeking 
cooperation regardless of the political leadership in Ukraine, including Yanukovych 
(Interview No. 28, 05.04.2014, MFA). In the EU formats, Latvia was among those 
that reiterated the need for EU’s pragmatic and strategic behaviour towards Ukraine. 
Yet, over time, it became almost impossible to persuade the sceptics. Also, Latvian 
foreign policy-makers became increasingly pessimistic, and the “Feeling was that the 
Ukrainian political leadership made promises, but failed to follow up with practical 
action (Interview No. 5, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
Another aspect was that Ukraine perceived itself as a big country, while 
“Latvia as its lobbyist within the EU meant little to Kyiv, given its small size and very 
limited ability to influence EU decisions” (Interview No. 27, 20.03.2014, MFA). 
After the Yanukovych’s election, for a prolonged period there were no high-level 
bilateral contacts, despite Latvia’s efforts to establish them. Ukraine begun actively 
approaching Latvia only at the end of 2011, when it faced isolation from the main EU 
players after Tymoshenko’s imprisonment. Latvia used these contacts strategically by 
“supporting Ukraine’s European course, while encouraging it to implement EU 
reforms” (ibid). 
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5.5.2. Latvia’s Preference: Political Support to the Association Agreement 
Ukraine represents Latvia’s ‘first order’ concerns, related to its geographical 
proximity within the post-Soviet space. In order to assess the intensity of Latvia’s 
national preferences, I use empirical indicators of data on cross-border trade, 
government’s statements, policy-makers agreeing on the level of salience, and media 
coverage.  
An important consideration for the first empirical indicator, i.e. data showing 
intensity of cross-border trade, is that Ukraine is not a direct neighbour of Latvia. 
There is no strong economic interdependence between both countries. Ukraine 
occupies the 19
th
 place among Latvia’s trade partners (2013), with a negative trade 
balance and decreasing trade volumes of exports and imports (MFA of Latvia, 
Relations between Latvia and Ukraine). At the same time, experts believe that for 
Latvia as a small country the Eastern market it is important, and that “such sectors as 
fishery and pharmacy have found profitable niches in Ukraine, which could benefit 
from the AA especially with regards to the trade part of the DCFTA, as simplification 
of customs procedures” (Interview 28, 30.03.2014, EM). Latvian business community 
saw the potential in Ukraine, given its market size, and has been supportive of the AA 
(EM, 10.02.2014). Yet overall, in the view of the respondents,  
Latvian business community has not been interested in such a broad issue as 
the AA, because there are no any immediate risks involved (Interview No. 3, 
15.01.13, PermRep.). 
The Latvian policy-makers did not face direct pressure from the domestic economic 
interest groups to push for the signing of the AA. This was confirmed by an MFA 
representative:     
Neither directly nor indirectly (through the line ministries) we felt that there 
were any specific Latvian business interests expressed in relation to Ukraine. 
There is a big difference compared to the case of Poland, which has vast 
economic cooperation with Ukraine and thus an interest in the AA (Interview 
No. 5, 15.01.2013, MFA). 
In my assessment, therefore, the first empirical indicator shows low intensity of 
Latvia’s national preference on the EU-Ukraine AA, including the DCFTA part. 
Despite the fact that “promotion of economic interests became a central part of 
Latvian foreign policy in order to recover from the country’s economic crisis,” 
(Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA), there were no specific domestic interests and 
pressure on the foreign policy-makers. 
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The second empirical indicator is the interest-based statement. Different from 
the moderate business interests, the Latvian government’s official positions 
continuously highlighted Ukraine and signing of the AA as its top priority in the 
entire Eastern Partnership. These statements were continuously replicated in the 
annual Foreign Policy Reports. The 2011 Report stated that Latvia would continue to 
support the signing of the AA with Ukraine (MFA of Latvia, 08.01.2011). In the 
2012, Report Latvia regretted that member states’ different evaluation of the 
democratic character of the October 2012 elections prevented the EU from signing the 
AA. Its position was that Ukraine’s European orientation is important for the security 
and economy of Latvia and of the Euro-Atlantic community. The conclusion of the 
AA would be an effective means for forging closer ties with the EU (MFA Latvia, 
08.01.2012).  
 Also, when defining the foreign policy priorities for each upcoming EU 
Presidency, Latvia especially singled out the signature of the AA with Ukraine as the 
most important issue. For the 2011 Polish Presidency, Latvia put forward the 
finalization of the AA negotiations as its priority. For the 2012 Danish Presidency, it 
reemphasized the conclusion of the AA negotiations, while cautioning that it would 
depend on Ukraine’s democratic progress (MFA of Latvia, 20.01.2012). For the 
second half of 2012 Cyprus Presidency, it emphasized that depending on Ukraine’s 
progress it is necessary to proceed with signature and ratification of the AA. For the 
Irish Presidency of the first half of 2013, it reiterated that depending on Ukraine’s 
progress in addressing the rule of law issues, it is necessary to move towards the 
signature and ratification of the Agreement. For the Lithuanian Presidency of the 
second half of 2013, Latvia highlighted the necessity “to pay attention to the signing 
the AA with Ukraine” (MFA of Latvia). This demonstrates that Latvia officially 
continued to prioritize Ukraine’s AA, yet it gradually became less and less ambitious 
in helping it to come about. Thereby the second empirical indicator shows that, while 
Latvia politically highlighted the EU-Ukraine AA as a national interest, in reality it 
followed the EU medium position. 
Further, Latvia’s bilateral development assistance apparently did not follow its 
politically defined priority. Latvia’s target countries in the Eastern neighbourhood 
were Moldova and Georgia, whereas Ukraine was perceived as too large for small 
Latvia. Eventually, Latvia did not spend much effort in either practically helping 
Ukraine to adjust to the EU demands or working directly with Kyiv to promote 
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Ukraine’s European integration. As observed by a Latvian official, the Polish 
delegations visited Kyiv every week to talk about the EU-Ukraine relations, while 
contacts between the Ukrainian and the Latvian governmental representatives were 
marginal (Interview No. 27, 20.03.2014, MFA). This serves as an additional evidence 
that Ukraine was in fact an intensely held preference for Latvia only on a political 
level, i.e. political preference.  
 The third empirical indicator is the agreement of foreign policy officials on 
the level of salience. Respondents interviewed by me agreed that Latvia’s interest in 
signing the AA has been related to the broader security concerns and Russia’s factor. 
One interviewee noted that in EU foreign policy formats “it is well known that 
Latvia’s interests focus on the Eastern neighbours in the former Soviet Union” 
(Interview No. 1, 28.12.12, PermRep). Another respondent agreed that, “all member 
states have their priorities in their direct neighbourhood – instability in the 
neighbourhood may affect them in a very negative way. States usually explain their 
geographic interests by referring to deeper expertise about the respective region, 
security, historical and economic ties” (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA). The fact 
that the AA was related primarily to Latvia’s security-based interests was further 
confirmed: 
Latvia considered that although Ukraine moves in the wrong direction in 
terms of democracy, the EU should not ‘lose’ Ukraine. We should be aware 
that there is a bigger strategic game concerning the influence of the EU and 
Russia in Ukraine (Interview No. 1, 22.12.2012, PermRep). 
The fourth empirical indicator is media coverage. The observations show that the EU-
Ukraine AA was in the local media spotlight only shortly before the Vilnius Eastern 
Partnership Summit in November 2013. Before that, the Latvian media did not have a 
particular interest in this issue. This was in contrast to the issue of EU economic 
sanctions against Belarus in 2012, when domestic economic interest groups actively 
used Latvian media to transmit their message. 
The fifth indicator is Latvia’s national positions. Generally, the state position 
was that the EU should not leave Ukraine in the Russian orbit of influence. The EU 
needs Ukraine – the most important Eastern Partnership country. The best way to 
practically integrate Ukraine into the EU is through the AA. This again confirms that 
the AA was Latvia’s national preference due to broader security-related concerns.  
The above empirical indicators show that while Latvia had a general interest in 
signing the AA, without strong domestic pressure the intensity of Latvia’s national 
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preference in this regard was low. This was mainly Latvia’s political priority, 
indirectly representing the country’s ‘first order’ security concerns. Latvia’s security-
based interests became clearly visible in spring 2014, when Russia launched its 
aggression towards Ukraine. The military intervention in Ukraine, a former territory 
of the Soviet Union, raised enormous concerns for Latvia: “If the Kremlin decides to 
carry out its plan in Ukraine, the Baltic States are next” – several Baltic diplomats told 
journalists (Euractiv, 03.03.2014). Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs stressed: “We should 
not remain passive!” He asked for a strong response from the EU, including an arms 
embargo and sanctions against Russia. 
However, the empirical evidence shows that in practice Latvia’s domestic 
economic interests mattered more for the intensity of its national preferences in the 
EU. As an example is the expression of an MFA representative: “Ukraine [the AA] 
was not that high among Latvia’s foreign policy priorities, which is the opposite from 
Belarus [EU sanction case] with strong domestic transit business interests involved” 
(Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA). This is in a sharp difference from what is said in 
the official statements, where Ukraine was placed at the centre of the country’s policy 
in the Eastern neighbourhood. Thereby, my assessment is that the EU-Ukraine AA 
represents a low intensity preference for Latvia, given the lack of domestic business 
pressure, even if it was ranked high among the government’s priority list for the EU 
foreign policy. 
5.5.3. EU Policy-making Environment 
EU foreign policy-making environment is assumed to consist of the formal and 
informal rules, as well as of actors and their preferences. Formally, the EU Council 
decision-making on the AA was based on the unanimity rule, with member states 
being the key players. At the technical level, the main EU institution was the 
Commission, which had a mandate to negotiate the AA with Ukraine. Technical 
negotiations were massive, involving trade, transport, energy, the environment, the 
CFSP and justice, freedom and security issues, as well as political aspects. Various 
Commission directorates were involved in negotiating the AA. Also, the 
Commission’s Legal Service was involved in legal scrutinizing of the AA text, 
consisting of 486 articles. Besides, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy Füle played an active role, providing recommendations for the 
EU action in Ukraine. 
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In addition, the HR and the EEAS were influential EU actors, preparing the 
agenda, drafting documents and chairing the EU Council meetings, which made 
decisions on the AA. Also, the EEAS represented the EU in the political dialogue 
with Ukraine and therefore it had the most updated information. A Latvian 
representative in the EU felt that the role of the EEAS was positive: “The EEAS had a 
clear understanding that the EU needs a more strategic approach towards Ukraine, and 
therefore the EEAS asked the member states to behave responsibly and not to delay 
the AA” (Interview No. 3, 15.01.2013, MFA). This shows that the EU institutions 
actively stimulated reaching unified position within the EU, “Presumably with the 
support from some influential member states” (ibid). 
The fact that the EU institutions were not politically neutral became apparent 
by looking at their inter-institutional battles. This was especially visible with the 
Commission’s DG Trade, which was reluctant to proceed with the AA, using the need 
for a “legal scraping” of the AA as an excuse, while the EEAS was substantially more 
supportive. No doubt that the technical “nitty-gritty” details consumes a lot of time, 
but the “the Commission still treated the EEAS as a very young institution and tried to 
overturn it” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2013, PermRep). There is also evidence that the 
European Parliament, in particular its President Martin Schulz, played a ‘self-
established’ role which jeopardized the conclusion of the AA in Vilnius. Also, an 
“ambiguous role was played by the EP rapporteurs, the so-called Cox-Kwasniewski 
mission, at the end suspending the whole AA procedure” (ibid).  
Apart from EU institutions which “sag under the weight of their bureaucracy 
and technocratic culture,” the ‘lion’s share’ of blame for the delayed AA belongs to 
the member states (Rettman, 25.11.2013). One should recall that the most influential 
members – France and Germany – in their position on Ukraine have always been 
concerned with their relations with Russia (Youngs 2011:32). Altogether, member 
state preferences on Ukraine were more or less related to their relations with Russia, 
by placing them in two opposite groups – the ‘minimalists’ (sceptics) versus the 
‘maximalists.’  
On the minimalist side were France, the Benelux countries, Spain, Italy and 
other southern countries, traditionally not supportive of the EU’s Eastern neighbours 
(Youngs 2011:32). Although Germany generally supported the EU’s Eastern 
neighbours, at the same time it desperately wanted to avoid confrontation with Russia 
(Reuters, 03.03.2014). On the opposite side were the new ex-Soviet member states. 
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These so called ‘maximalists’ – the ten new member states – Poland, the Baltic 
countries, supported to some extent by the Nordic countries – pushed for an EU pro-
active engagement with Ukraine (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA). They 
advocated that the EU should not isolate Ukraine. Altogether, these opposite 
preferences were reflected in EU common policy towards Ukraine, often expressed as 
the lowest common denominator (Youngs 2011). 
Among the ‘maximalists’ the most prominent role was adopted by Poland. 
Poland’s eagerness to integrate Ukraine into the EU was based on its ‘first order’ core 
national interests. Economically, Poland could be the main beneficiary of the AA, as 
its goods would be able to gain substantial market share in Ukraine. As a Latvian 
MFA representative noted, “Poland has huge economic cooperation with Ukraine, 
which explains its high interest about Ukraine’s integration with the EU” (Interview 
No. 5, 15.01.2013, MFA). In addition, Poland’s strong interest in Ukraine was related 
to history, as Western Ukraine had previously belonged to Poland. The new member 
states were partly supported by Sweden, Ireland and EU institutions, primarily the 
EEAS (Interview No. 1, 28.12.2012, MFA). 
However, Germany’s position was critical for the whole process towards the 
signature of the AA. In Germany, the main player was Chancellor Merkel. Initially, 
she had a very tough line towards Yanukovych, but later turned to a more strategic 
approach. Germany seemingly influenced the process behind the scenes, and also it 
was extremely cautious in the formal EU debates: “For a long time Germany 
remained sceptical, then it was neutral, and only finally joined the ‘maximalist’ group 
(Interview No. 1, 28.12.2012, MFA). In the official meetings, Germany sympathised 
with France, but behind the scenes, it supported the signing of the AA. Most probably, 
it finally reached some backstage deal with France, which resulted in French consent. 
Germany later became the main ally to the EEAS and the 2013 Lithuanian EU 
Presidency, pushing for signing the AA in Vilnius” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2013, 
PermRep). Moreover, Germany took over the initiative from Poland (ibid).  
German activities were seemingly accompanied by some jealousy on the 
Poland’s side. As observed by an EEAS official, “Poland was the main advocate of 
Ukraine. But when, after all its efforts, the Ukrainian political leaders, feeling 
Germany’s support, began to lobby Berlin instead of Warsaw, Poland was 
disappointed. Unlike Poland, Germany is much more pragmatic. This is a kind of 
‘culture.’ However, Poland later became more pragmatic in EU working parties by 
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waiting while the big states fought through. But then the main obstacle came out to be 
the UK” (Interview No. 15, 12.07.2013, EEAS).  
Unexpectedly, the UK turned out to be the most serious obstructer – “It was a 
big disappointment, because the UK had always been an ally of the new member 
states,” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2013, PermRep). The UK blocked the proceedings 
due to its domestic excuses, which they avoided explaining. It resulted in the 
situations that prior to the Vilnius Summit, “all but one” agreed on the signature of the 
AA. “The worst rumours were that there was some on-going deal of the British 
Petroleum” (ibid). Only at the very late stage, the UK joined to the support for the AA 
signature. 
To sum up, EU foreign policy-making environment was helpful for Latvia’s 
uploading in the sense that it could rely on its traditional like-minded partners, 
especially on Poland, a leader of the Eastern European group, and Lithuania, a 
rotating EU Presidency. This was to Latvia’s advantage, according to an MFA 
official: “Poland was the strongest and toughest player. This was a positive exception, 
as not always our interests in EU policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood coincide” 
(Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA). However, the crucial condition for Latvian (and 
‘maximalist’) successful uploading was Germany’s support. Germany as an 
influential EU actor made the difference in the entire policy-making process. On the 
contrary, Latvia’s (and ‘maximalist’) uploading efforts were constrained by the 
‘minimalist’ group’s conflicting preferences.  
5.5.4. Observed Latvia’s Influence 
In order to trace the uploading process, I draw on the observations from the 
interviewees, and examine whether the EU’s common position and official statements 
prior to the Vilnius Summit reflected Latvia’s national preference on the AA. 
First, the interviewees generally agreed that there was observable Latvia’s 
influence on the EU’s common position. In their view, the main achievement was the 
compromise agreement of member states at the December 2012 FAC to unfreeze the 
process towards finalizing the AA at the Vilnius Summit, as well as the EU’s unified 
position in the autumn 2013, supporting the AA signature prior to the Vilnius 
Summit. As described by a national representative in the EU,  
The EU-Ukraine AA is a concrete case where Latvia succeeded together with 
a like-minded group to get others’ support for signing the AA. Of course, we 
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could not expect 100% fulfilment of our interests, because it is a compromise, 
but our ‘red lines’ were not crossed (Interview No. 1, 28.12.2012, PermRep). 
Another Latvian representative in the EU felt that the AA with Ukraine was not so 
critically important for Latvia, and that it influenced the outcome to a medium extent: 
It is a paradox that in the case of [EU sanctions on] Belarus, Latvia alone 
reached much more than in the case of Ukraine as a like-minded group. It was 
because the importance of the issue was not so high for us. The higher the 
importance, the more energy we invest. In the case of Ukraine, we invested 
much less energy to reach the goal (Interview No. 2, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
Some Latvian influence was further confirmed by the fact that “Latvia’s ‘red lines,’ 
i.e. signature of the AA until the Vilnius Summit, were respected despite the heavy 
preconditions to be fulfilled” (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013). 
            Evidence on the correlation between Latvia’s national preferences and the EU 
decision outcome is further confirmed in EU statements and public positions prior to 
the Vilnius Summit, thereby they reflected Latvia’s defined national preference. For 
instance, despite that the Vilnius Summit later failed to sign the AA due to 
Yanukovych’s ‘U-turn,’ the Commission’s President Barroso stated: “The EU offer to 
Ukraine in terms of signing the Association Agreement remains on the table” 
(Interfax, 29.11.2013). This also shows that Latvia’s national preference has been 
reflected in EU foreign policy decision outcome. I further explore how and with what 
uploading mechanisms Latvia sought to influence the outcome. 
5.5.5. The Uploading Mechanism in Practice 
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that member state’s influence on the 
outcome is related to the preference intensity and the institutional constrains. In my 
assessment, the intensity of Latvia’s preference on the EU-Ukraine AA was low: 
while it was the government’s defined high political priority, there was no direct 
domestic pressure on the government. The EU environment was favourable for 
Latvia’s uploading in a way that the like-minded coalition was large enough, 
supported by one big member state. Given these circumstances, what uploading 
mechanisms did Latvia use?  
In order to trace the uploading process, I divide EU foreign policy-making into 
two stages: the first stage (October 2011 – December 2012 FAC), and the second 
stage (January 2012 FAC – the November 2013 the Vilnius Summit). The table below 
shows the chronology of the EU policy-making process. 
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1. The first stage (October 2011 – December 2012 FAC) 
29 - 30 September 2011 The Warsaw Eastern Partnership Summit – the EU’s promising 
signals on signing the AA until the end of 2011. 
11 October, 2011 Tymoshenko sentenced to seven years in prison – EU’s threatens to 
postpone the AA. 
December, 2011 The EU-Ukraine Summit – no expected initialling of the AA; EU 
conditionality – the release of Tymoshenko and general reforms. 
25 March, 2012 The AA initialled, but no indications on when it could be signed. 
May, 2012 The FAC reiterates conditions for the AA – release of Tymoshenko 
and free and fair parliamentary elections on 28 October 2012. 
October, 2012  Parliamentary elections in Ukraine – divergent member states’ 
evaluation on the election outcome. 
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December, 2012 FAC Conclusion on Ukraine sets the Vilnius Summit as the 
potential time of the AA signature. 
2. The second stage (beginning 2013 – November 2013) 
25 February 2013 The EU-Ukraine Summit – commitment by both sides towards the 
Vilnius timetable. 
The first half of 2013 Intense technical and political preparation in the EU and Ukraine 
for singing the AA. 
Autumn 2013 
 
The EU political consensus emerges – support for the signature and 
provisional application of the AA. 
21 November 2013 Yanukovych’s withdrawal from the signing of the AA. The Vilnius 
Eastern Partnership Summit – no signature of the AA. 
Table 6: Chronology of the EU decision-making (October 2011 – November 2013). 
5.5.5.1. The First Stage (October 2011 – December 2012)  
While formally placing the signature of the AA among its top national foreign policy 
priorities in the EU neighbourhood, empirical evidence shows that Latvia did not plan 
any particular uploading activities. In practice, it followed the agenda set by other EU 
actors, arguably, above all by the influential member states. As described by an MFA 
official, 
In the case of the AA, there was no strict and purposeful planning, but rather 
ad hoc responses and subsequent movements from our side (Interview No. 1. 
28.12.2012, PermRep). 
At this stage, Latvia apparently used only a few of the hypothesized uploading 
mechanisms – joining the coalition’s uploading activities, as well as presenting 
arguments during its formal interventions in EU working parties. Latvia did not use 
additional informal uploading mechanisms such as lobbying EU institutions, or 
contacting other member states in order to gain their political or issue-specific support 
related to the AA. Also, it did not make much effort to use the domestic uploading 
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capacity despite the detailed technical and expertise-based discussions in EU working 
parties on the substance of the AA/DCFTA. 
Since the very beginning of the AA negotiations in 2007, Latvia was among 
Ukraine’s advocates in the EU, lending it political support. Even after Yanukovych 
became President in February 2010, Latvia strategically supported Ukraine’s 
European integration course. In 2011, it still seemed realistic to sign the AA in the 
near future. In May 2011, for instance, the Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian and German 
Foreign Ministers assured that they would “seek to have the AA signed already in 
2011” (Eurodialogue, Foreign Ministers). In the EU, debate prior to the Warsaw 
Eastern Partnership Summit, Latvia was in the like-minded coalition, pushing for 
more positive signals for Ukraine. 
The situation dramatically changed in October 2011, when Yanukovych 
imprisoned Tymoshenko. Reacting to this, the EU considered that the December 2011 
EU-Ukraine Summit was not a proper time for signing the AA. The Agreement had to 
be ratified in all the member states, but several of them signalled a strict “No.” A 
crucial aspect here was that Germany was negative. France also believed that the AA 
could be signed only if the Tymoshenko case was resolved. Sweden said that without 
changes in Kyiv it would be a “suicide mission” trying to get the AA through the 
Parliament (Kyivpost, 28.02.2012). 
Presenting Arguments  
These negative domestic developments in Ukraine left the ‘maximalist’ group in the 
EU without any credible arguments. Latvia joined other ‘maximalists,’ seeking to 
persuade sceptics that the AA represented a cure for Ukraine. They argued that the 
AA is a way to create leverage over Ukraine. Nonetheless, as one interlocutor 
recognized,  
Among the Western European colleagues there were illusions regarding the 
strength of EU’s soft power in the third countries and a belief that Ukraine 
would agree on everything the EU offers. At that time, Germany had a very 
tough line towards Yanukovych, [partly] based on the illusion that the AA is a 
‘gift’ to Ukraine. Its position was [in fact] based on two elements – [the latter] 
illusion and [German] business interests in Russia (Interview No. 30, 
23.05.2014, PermRep). 
In this situation, Latvia evidently took the middle position. While supporting 
signature of the AA, it joined the dominating views. Partly it was because it wanted to 
avoid being branded as a supporter of authoritarian regimes at a time when Latvia also 
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experienced trouble with Belarus, being one of the few countries objecting to the EU 
economic sanctions against Minsk. Joining the criticism on Ukraine was part of the 
game to fix its reputation. But primarily Latvia’s moderate position on the AA can be 
explained by its low intensity of national preference with no domestic pressure.  
Shortly before the December 2011 EU-Ukraine Summit, the EU leaders made 
it clear that signing the AA depended on resolution of Tymoshenko’s case. 
Subsequently, the Summit reflected the member states’ concerns, stating that both 
parties had a common understanding that Ukraine’s respect for common values and 
the rule of law would determine the speed of its political association and economic 
integration within the EU (Council of the EU, 19.12.2011). Apparently, Yanukovych 
agreed on such wording. He expressed hope that the AA would be signed soon.  
Latvia continuously supported the signature of the AA by presenting 
arguments, but in line with the EU’s general position, it also began to put a stronger 
emphasis on the EU conditionality criteria. Latvia communicated its position during 
the bilateral meetings with Ukraine. At this stage, there were active high-level 
contacts between Riga and Kyiv, initiated by the Ukrainian side. While Ukraine 
usually did not perceive Latvia as an important player in the EU, facing a chilly 
attitude in Brussels and Berlin, according to the MFA representative,  
Ukraine used high-level contacts with Latvia for transmitting its signals to the 
EU side and for testing the atmosphere within the EU (Interview No. 27, 
20.03.2014, MFA).  
From its standpoint, Latvia used these occasions by strategically supporting Ukraine, 
reassuring its support to Ukraine’s European integration, while reminding it of the 
need to do ‘homework’ (ibid).  
When in December 2011 the Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs met his Ukrainian 
colleague Gryschenko in Bonn, he assured that the EU “should sustain a continued 
dialogue with Ukraine,” but Ukraine should show its “readiness to follow the course 
of democracy, the rule of law and economic reforms” (MFA of Latvia, 05.12.2011). 
When in January 2012 Gryschenko visited Latvia, both ministers “welcomed 
finalization of the AA negotiations, which opened the way to the signature of the 
AA”; however, they also “recalled that the AA envisages shared commitment to the 
common values [..], which will be of importance for speed of Ukraine’s political 
association and economic integration in the EU (MFA of Latvia, 16.01.2012). In 
February 2012, there was again a high-level incoming visit. Soon after the Ukrainian 
Prime Minister Azarov arrived in Latvia to push for support for the AA. “The AA 
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could be initialled in the coming months,” he said, "Initialling of the agreement can be 
achieved within the next few months [..]. Then the question will arise about 
ratification” (Ukraine Business online, 12.02.2012). These meetings confirmed 
Latvia’s previous concerns that “Ukraine’s leadership continuously made big 
promises, but that very little action followed” (Interview No. 27, 20.03.2014, MFA). 
This complicated Latvia’s advocacy efforts in the EU for the signature of the AA.  
Using the Domestic Uploading Capacity 
Evidence shows that at this stage there were no specific efforts in Riga with a view 
towards developing a high-quality national position to advance finalization of the EU-
Ukraine AA. As there was no necessity to defend any domestic (business) interests, 
its national representatives felt safe in Brussels. Poland, the leader of like-minded 
coalition, assumed the initiative while no domestic pressure could be discerned in 
Riga.  
Contacting Other Member States 
There is no evidence that Latvia pro-actively contacted other member states to push 
for political support for the AA. Most likely, Latvia rather took a ‘wait and see’ 
position until the big member states, in particular Germany, were expected to make 
decisive movements in one direction or another. The issue of Tymoshenko 
imprisonment was highly politicized. At the same time, Latvia engaged in 
consultations on the status quo in Ukraine within the existing informal networks 
entertained with other member states.  
During the first half of 2012, Latvia met the like-minded countries in various 
existing informal formats at different levels, e.g. ‘3+1’ (the Baltic States and 
Germany), ‘4+1’ (the Visegrad and the Baltic States), 5+3 (the Nordic countries and 
the Baltic States), where they exchanged their information and positions. For instance, 
in March 2012 the Baltic and Visegrad group foreign ministers during their meeting 
“noted with satisfaction” the finalization of the AA negotiations and “expressed 
support for its early initialling and subsequent signing and ratification in due course” 
(Joint Statement, 05.03.2012). Such common public statements of the ‘maximalist’ 
group helped Latvia to further clarify and consolidate its position. Also, consultations 
with the Benelux countries allowed Riga to “narrow the gap and to move sceptics 
closer to optimists on [the] EU-Ukraine agenda” (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
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In the meantime, the EU and the Ukrainian experts had finalized the technical 
work with the AA text, which was initialled in March 2012, at the expert level.
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However, at the political level, there was a silence on when it could be signed. Some 
influential member states, mainly Germany, leading an overwhelming majority of 
member states supported a pause in relations with Yanukovych’s regime. In the EU 
debate, critical voices dominated, despite some awareness that “swift signing of the 
AA would allow to avoid giving Putin the time and opportunity in which to exploit 
Ukraine’s vulnerabilities to get Yanukovich to agree to join the Russian-led Customs 
Union, which would overturn the AA” (CEPS, March 2012).  
Using the Coalition 
To advance the signing of the AA, Latvia continuously used the same like-minded 
coalition led by Poland. This included lending its general political support to the AA 
process, as Latvia did not have any specific domestic priorities or concerns to be 
uploaded. Its position was rather flexible in support of Poland. Also, given Ukraine’s 
weight and significance for the EU, with big member states’ specific preferences 
involved, the best uploading mechanism for Latvia as a small country was acting 
together within a larger group. This resonated well with what was said by an MFA 
official,  
Together as a like-minded group, we did more. We coordinated our 
interventions in the EU debate. Especially if the big member states became 
interested, we could better reach the preferred outcome. In the case of 
Ukraine, the like-minded coalition consisted of the new member states with 
Poland as the leader (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
This shows that the like-minded coalition should be large enough, and some big 
member state participation in it is of crucial importance. Given Poland’s much greater 
bargaining power, Latvia could project its national preference by simply supporting 
Poland’s uploading activities. As described by the same interlocutor,  
This like-minded coalition was rather loose, and it coordinated activities on 
an ad hoc basis, mainly when Poland came up with some initiative to push for 
a stronger wording on Ukraine in the EU Council Conclusions (Interview No. 
3, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
The same ad hoc coalition, consisting of the new member states from the Central and 
Eastern Europe, operated within various EU Council working groups – the COEST, 
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 The AA was initialled without its DCFTA part, which was initialled a few months later, in July 2012 
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the PSC, the COREPER, the Trade Policy Committee, and the FAC. For instance, in 
the Trade Policy Committee,  
Latvia worked closely with the like-minded group of the ten new member 
states. This was different from the traditional like-minded group, where Latvia 
took part in the Trade Policy Committee – the Nordic-Baltic, the UK and 
Germany. In the case of DCFTA with Ukraine, it was a different coalition, 
consisting only of the new member states (Interview No. 28, 30.03.2014, EM). 
 
The presence of the same like-minded coalitions, irrespective of a wide range of 
specific issues covered by the AA, shows that the AA negotiation process indeed was 
highly politicized in the EU capitals. Even discussing the most technical parts of the 
AA, member states followed their respective political agendas. Thus, in pursuit of its 
preferences in the EU Trade Policy Committee, Latvia coordinated its positions with 
the same coalition partners. According to a Latvian senior official in this Committee, 
Cooperation in the like-minded coalition was informal and based on good 
personal contacts. In addition, there was another ad hoc like-minded group, 
consisting of Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Latvia. Especially, 
contacts with Lithuania were important during its rotating EU Presidency. It 
helped Latvia to elaborate its positions (Interview No. 28, 30.03.2014, EM). 
Thereby, Latvia widely relied on the uploading mechanism such as joining the 
coalitions in various EU Council formats. The coalition was the same in the COEST, 
which discussed the political elements of the AA, and the Trade Policy Committee, 
focusing on its DCFTA part. I assess this as evidence that in EU foreign policy-
making, the most typical are the issue-based coalitions rather than the geographical 
ones. 
Presenting Arguments (Strategic Use of Arguments) 
At this stage in various EU foreign policy formats Latvia continued to use general 
arguing. Especially, in the COEST group, according to a Latvian representative in the 
EU, “in advocating their interests, member states referred to ‘the EU common values 
and norms,’ never using such primitive language as ‘our domestic sensitivities.” 
Sometimes I referred to ‘my capital believes,’ but it did not work at all” (Interview 
No. 1, 28.12.12, PermRep). The same informant revealed that  
Very effective argumentation is reference to the previously adopted EU 
decisions and documents. I also followed this pattern in the Ukrainian case – 
otherwise Latvia would lose its credibility and reputation among partners 
(Interview No. 1, 28.12.12, PermRep). 
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This provides evidence that uploading through ‘presenting arguments’ in EU foreign 
policy-making is not only the dominating uploading mechanism, but also that it 
follows the ‘logic of consequences’ rather than ‘logic of appropriateness.’ 
Furthermore, the reference to the previously adopted the CFSP decisions and 
documents indicates the presence of ‘entrapment,’ resonating with the findings 
provided by Thomas (2011) that member states often use the previous EU 
commitments as in this way everyone becomes “constrained in their further actions.” 
In parallel to the COEST group considering the political aspects of the AA, the 
Council’s Trade Policy Committee discussed the DCFTA – an economic part of the 
AA. The main EU negotiator with Ukraine was the Commission’s Directorate General 
(DG) Trade, while member states through the Council’s Trade Policy Committee 
adopted the EU negotiation position on the DCFTA prior to each negotiation round 
with Ukraine. According to a Latvian representative in this Committee, the DCFTA 
negotiations were technically complicated and involved market access, reduction of 
the technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs and trade 
facilitation, competition and energy. From the Latvian perspective, the negotiations 
on the DCFTA part proceeded smoothly, and there were no problematic issues from 
its side. Therefore, the main uploading mechanism for Latvia also in the Trade Policy 
Committee was presenting arguments, notably, technical and expertise-based 
arguments, as can be interpreted from the evidence provided by a Latvian 
representative in this EU working group: 
In general, member states used technical arguments to influence or delay the 
process. For all countries, including Latvia, the main concern was protection 
of their domestic agriculture sector (Interview No. 28, 30.03.2014, EM). 
The DCFTA as an integral part of the AA was initialled in July 2012, at the level of 
the EU and Ukraine chief trade negotiators. Nevertheless, to Latvia’s disappointment, 
while the heavy technical negotiation process was over, “it became clear that the 
AA/DCFTA could not be signed. The DG Trade used such excuses as the need for 
translation and scrutinizing the text” (Interview 28, 30.03.2014, EM). The 
Commission also referred to the complicated technical preparation. Nonetheless, as 
recognized by the same interviewee – “the EU can technically prepare some 
agreements for two years, but if there is a real interest, it can be very fast. We have 
seen such precedents. The decision on signalling the AA was pending at the political 
level” (ibid). This shows that EU institutions may use technical arguments 
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strategically to delay the unfavourable developments. The completion of the AA was 
pending at the political level. 
Lobbying 
Lobbying seemed necessary for Latvia and other like-minded countries in a situation 
when it was not possible to apply any formal uploading mechanisms. At this stage, 
there were no any formal EU foreign policy debates on Ukraine until May 2012. The 
Union’s response to Tymoshenko imprisonment was silence from the EU side on the 
AA. The EEAS, using its mandate to set the CFSP agenda, avoided putting forward 
Ukraine at the COEST debate. This shows that agenda setting can indeed be a very 
effective mechanism used by EU institutions, in particular the non-decision making. 
Consequently, without the possibility to engage in the formal procedures Ukraine’s 
supporters in the EU had to find other, informal ways to push for the signature of the 
AA. They felt the urgency to find some exit strategy from the stalemate, and here one 
needed to win the EEAS as an ally. This leads to the question whether Latvia used the 
hypothesized uploading mechanism such as lobbying. 
The Latvian policy-makers were aware that the best way to influence EU 
policy-making, according to one national representative is  
Member states’ intense and timely work behind the scenes, primarily, by 
systematically lobbying the EEAS, which sets [the] agenda, prepares the draft 
decisions and knows all 27 member states’ national interests” (Interview No. 
1, 28.12.2012, PermRep). 
Yet, at this stage, there is no evidence that Latvia would have used this uploading 
mechanism. Instead, it relied on Poland’s lobbying efforts, which “negotiated with EU 
institutions on behalf of the like-minded group, Poland was the main lobbyist – it 
talked to the EEAS” (Interview No. 3, 15.01.13, PermRep). 
After the AA was initialled in spring 2012, as described by one interview 
respondent, Poland and Lithuania started lobby on the need to sign the AA together 
with the provisional application. “The Polish and Lithuanian colleagues pushed 
strongly to apply the AA, arguing that the EU should use this window of opportunity 
before Putin returns to the Kremlin. But the DG Trade was against provisional 
application. Both countries lobbied the EEAS and the Commission hard on behalf of 
the like-minded coalition. This was a time consuming exercise. The fear was that 
some old member states lobbied against” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
Evidently, Latvia was not actively involved in these lobbying efforts. As a result, the 
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dominating views, presumably, with Germany in the leadership, won. The feeling was 
that EU institutions could not have any flexibility to give up its condition regarding 
the release of Tymoshenko. 
‘Wait and See’ Period Until Autumn 2012 
As already mentioned, in 2012, the EEAS purposefully avoided putting Ukraine on 
the EU foreign policy agenda, and therefore there were no formal ways for Latvia and 
the ‘maximalist’ coalition to project their national preferences favouring the signature 
of the AA. In EU circles the dominating viewpoint was that the EU should wait until 
Ukraine’s parliamentary elections in October 2012, which would be a new ‘litmus 
test.’ The thinking was that the EU needed to put pressure on Yanukovych to provide 
free and fair elections, and to release Tymoshenko.  
 Some member states were particularly eager. In March 2012, the Swedish, the 
UK, Czech, Polish and German Foreign Ministers in an open letter stated that the 
October elections would be a ‘litmus test for democracy.’ They drew a symbolic 
parallel with Tymoshenko’s imprisonment: ‘It is fair to say that the Agreement has 
been imprisoned, and the Ukrainian leadership is holding the key’ (The New York 
Times, 04.03.2012). Also, the May FAC put further pressure on Ukraine, stressing 
that the October elections would be a test. 
Apparently, the key member states – Germany, France, and the UK – 
determined the EU relations with Yanukovych. However, Yanukovych openly 
ignored the EU demands. Also, his intention to sign the AA was questionable, 
according to my informant from the Latvian government: 
Officially, the Ukrainians told Latvia that they wanted to sign the AA/DCFTA, 
but in the tête-à-tête meetings, they said something completely different. They 
wanted to keep good cooperation with Russia, [a] very important trade 
partner for Ukraine. The main problem was Ukraine’s dependency on the 
Russian gas (Interview 28, 30.03.2014, EM). 
In September 2012, the EU foreign policy debate returned to Ukraine, with the main 
focus on the forthcoming Ukraine’s parliamentarian elections on 27 October. Prior to 
the elections, the EU institutions disseminated promising signals that the AA could 
eventually be signed until the end of 2012, depending on Ukraine’s “homework.” The 
Head of EU Delegation in Ukraine Tombinski expressed hope to finish this work by 
the end of 2012, possibly by the end of November (Kyivpost, 16.10.2013). 
Latvia’s Vague Position After the October 2012 Ukraine’s Elections 
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As will be shown, the EU debate on the election outcome reveals how the member 
states used arguing for their strategic purposes in pursuit of the national preferences. 
The 28 October 2012 parliamentary elections were expected to be the test for Ukraine 
as their outcome was supposed to determine whether the EU would return to the 
dialogue with Ukraine. Given Ukraine’s domestic developments, no one had illusions 
that the elections would be a ‘breakthrough.’  
The 28 October elections did not bring any positive results. International 
monitors, the Vienna-based OSCE, concluded that the elections were a step 
backwards. The HR Catherine Ashton agreed – “the elections represented a 
deterioration” (EEAS, 12.11.2012). Also, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
came up with strong criticism (Novostimira, 23.11.2012). Contrary to this, the Polish 
President Komorowski spoke appreciatively about the election results. He urged the 
EU to open the way towards the signing of the AA. Latvia’s initial reaction sought a 
middle ground, as well as it “sought to single out some positive elements, for 
instance, that a broad spectrum of political forces were elected and would be 
represented in the Verhovna Rada [Ukraine’s parliament]” (Interview No. 1, 
28.12.2012, PermRep). 
Poland yet again took the leading role in pushing for the AA. Latvia supported 
these efforts. When the Polish President Komorowski visited in Latvia in November 
2012, he specifically addressed the issue of Ukraine (Novostimira, 23.11.2012). Both 
the Polish and the Latvian Presidents issued a common statement, “Agreeing on the 
need to support the conclusion of the Association Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine, helping Ukraine to draw closer to the EU” (Latvijas Valsts Prezidents, 
23.11.2012). This shows how the like-minded states used contacts at the highest 
political level to reinforce their individual positions and to send common signals, thus 
seeking to influence the EU decisions.   
The Ukrainian ambassador in EU Yelisieiev believed that Ukraine has passed 
the test with the elections and urged: “Let’s continue with our EU agenda” (EurActiv, 
19.11.2012). Interestingly, without expressly mentioning Germany, he criticized that 
the largest EU country represented the biggest obstacle by being dependent on its 
business interests: “Why is gas for certain EU countries much cheaper?” implying that 
Germany was rewarded by Russia for its tough line on Ukraine (ibid). 
Immediately after the October elections, the EEAS put Ukraine on the EU 
foreign policy agenda to prepare for the November FAC, when the EU foreign 
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ministers were expected to discuss further policy on Ukraine in light of the election 
results. In the EU initial debate in the COEST group, Latvia’s position seemed to be 
generally supportive, but at the same time rather vague, continuing its previous ‘wait 
and see’ approach. Latvia presented arguments, stressing the need not to isolate 
Ukraine but rather to bring it closer to the EU. It argued that the AA was the most 
effective leverage to carry out reforms in Ukraine, and the EU therefore should 
gradually move closer to signing the AA. Latvia also referred to the conditionality, 
but the EU conditions should be very clear (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
Unlike Latvia, a number of other ‘maximalist’ member states such as Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, were more ambitious. Lithuania argued on the need 
not only to sign but also to provisionally apply the AA before the Vilnius Eastern 
Partnership Summit. Their main concern was not to await the long ratification process 
of the AA in all the 28 EU national parliaments (ibid). 
In the EU working formats, Latvia continuously used general argumentation. 
However, with the December 2012 FAC approaching, which was supposed to make 
the formal Council Conclusions on Ukraine, member states increasingly begun to 
apply bargaining, with the ‘maximalist’ and ‘minimalist’ groups raising opposite 
demands. 
Arguing and Bargaining for Unfreezing the AA Process (Autumn 2012) 
The EU internal debate gradually gained intensity. The aim, as defined by the EEAS, 
was to agree on the EU’s approach towards Ukraine after its October elections and to 
adopt formal Conclusions. In the EU circles meanwhile the new possible date for 
accomplishing the AA begun to circulate – the Vilnius Summit in November 2013.  
The EU initial debate again revealed “opposite interests and various tactics. 
The division was the same as before: the ‘maximalists’ – the new member states and 
the EEAS versus the Benelux and France” (Interview No. 1, 28.12.2012, PermRep). 
This debate showed that member states used various general and expert-based 
arguments to pursue their preferences. As described by the MFA representative,  
In the November COEST, member states, using a reference to human rights, 
evaluated the outcome of 28
th
 October elections very differently. Poland tried 
to find positive elements, while the Netherlands and Sweden came up with very 
tough critical arguments. Latvia argued that the elections were not a surprise, 
including the high number of violations, but [added that] they were pluralistic, 
and [that] the opposition is widely represented in the [new] Verhovna Rada 
(Interview No. 5, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
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The ‘minimalists’ insisted that the October elections were worse than expected, that 
Ukraine needed to fulfil conditionality, and only then it would be possible to think 
about the dates of the AA signature. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands 
said that the AA should be delayed until Yanukovych releases political opponents. 
The Nordic-Dutch group put forward strict criteria for the AA – freedom for 
Tymoshenko and reform of the judiciary. France and the UK kept a low profile, while 
Germany seemed to be undecided (Rettman, 05.11.2012). At that point, an interesting 
approach was applied by Germany. Officially, it was critical of the election outcome, 
saying that there were no conditions for the signing of the AA (Novostimira, 
23.11.2012), but in “EU debate it said the picture was ‘mixed.’ asking to 
operationalize conditionality to make it achievable” (Interview No. 5, 13.01.2013, 
MFA). I assess this as the evidence that these opposite camps created arguments to 
support their specific national preferences.  
With the December FAC approaching but no compromise emerging, an 
important role was undertaken by the EEAS, advocating for unfreezing relations with 
Ukraine and proceeding with the AA. Arguably, it could not happen without the 
informal consent of some influential member states, in particular Germany. The 
EEAS cautiously started to prepare the ground for the member states’ support of the 
Vilnius timetable. In the EU discussion, Latvia again joined the ‘maximalist’ 
coalition. 
The proportion between the opposing coalitions, as described by one 
interlocutor, was “50:50, where the ‘sceptics’ – the Benelux countries, France, Spain, 
Portugal, now supported also by Sweden and Denmark – insisted that they could not 
return to the issue of signing the AA. The main clash was between Poland and the 
Benelux. Both sides mobilised their resources” (Interview No. 1, 28.12.2012, 
PermRep). Latvia, in its bilateral informal contacts with the Netherlands, tried to 
persuade it on the unfreezing of relations with Ukraine. Riga argued that the AA 
should be signed until the Vilnius Summit, but the “Dutch colleagues explained that 
their position was so strong because of their Parliament’s objection” (Interview No. 5, 
13.01.2013, MFA).  
With the EU debate gaining certain shape, Latvia’s position also became more 
explicit and concrete, asking for an ‘exit strategy’ from the stalemate and urging the 
EU to adopt a more strategic approach towards Ukraine. The main arguments that 
Latvia presented, as described by one interviewee, were as follows:  
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We stressed that Ukraine the main country to the Eastern Partnership and 
therefore the EU should continue its engagement, instead of isolating the 
country. The EU should move towards signing the AA under the condition that 
Ukraine fulfil the EU conditionality criteria (Interview No. 3, 15.01.13, MFA). 
Evidently, at this stage Latvia was not among the primary advocates of a European 
perspective for Ukraine. It used very general arguments. Latvia neither called for a 
specific time perspective for signing the AA in Vilnius, nor asked for its provisional 
application of the AA. When a new possible date for finalizing the AA begun to 
circulate, only a few member states supported this idea. Latvia was not among them. 
Brussels-based think tanks urged the EU “to think creatively, not simply wait, but 
apply the AA, and put the pressure on Ukraine in other areas” (see, e.g. Wilson, 
November 2012).  
In the November 2012 FAC, the EU foreign ministers assessed Ukraine’s 
October elections and the perspectives for signing the AA. The FAC debate revealed 
again the same previous divide. Only some member states were ready to consider a 
Ukrainian AA. The ‘maximalists’ called for a more strategic EU approach, insisting 
that the AA should be signed to avoid pushing Ukraine into Belarus-type isolation 
(Rettman, 05.11.2012). Latvia called on not rejecting Ukraine and asked to support 
Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations (MFA of Latvia, 21.11.2012). This indicates that 
while Latvia’s position at that time was rather general, nonetheless it involved the 
crucial demand on the need to unfreeze the process towards signing the AA.   
The Use of Various Mechanisms Prior to the December 2012 FAC  
Based on the November 2012 FAC informal agreement, the EEAS elaborated the 
draft Council Conclusions for the next FAC in December. Yet, when the EEAS first 
draft Conclusions was received in Riga, it was a sort of surprise. While the positive 
side was that in the document the EEAS had included a possible time of the AA 
signature during the Vilnius Summit next November To the dissatisfaction of the 
‘maximalists’ with the Vilnius timetable was linked to conditionality that was too 
extensive. One national representative in Brussels believed that this was too much:   
There were 35 different conditions to be met by Ukraine. The rationale behind 
the EEAS thinking was to ask more with the hope that Ukraine would meet at 
least a part of them. We were concerned f such unrealistic conditionality 
(Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
This demonstrates that the EEAS in its draft Council Conclusions included important 
bargaining elements of the eventual package deal, reflecting the preferences of both 
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opposing coalitions. Thereby the EEAS allowed member states to reach a 
compromise. The EEAS thus combined the aggregate interests. It was clear that the 
‘maximalists’ wanted the EU to offer a generous time perspective for signing the AA, 
while the ‘minimalists’ insisted on strict conditionality, using this as an excuse for 
putting the brakes on with regards to Ukraine. What followed was described by an 
EEAS official as “tough battles: France was against, Lithuania in response said that it 
would block everything. Latvia did not have strictly fixed instructions from the 
capital, so it was flexible” (Interview No. 15, 12.07.2013, EEAS).     
                Within the COEST debate at the beginning of December 2012 the 
‘maximalist’ coalition, including Latvia, tried to improve the wording of the Council 
Conclusions, asking for a ‘more balanced approach’ – conditionality together with the 
AA signature and its provisional application. The rationale behind this was that the 
signature of the AA was important, but a provisional application was even more 
important: the risk was that slow ratification in the national parliaments would delay 
the process. A speedy application of the AA “was not only [in] Ukraine’s, but also 
[in] its EU neighbours’ national security interest” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, 
PermRep). 
                 When the COEST group started discussions on the Council Conclusions in 
early December, the departure point again was the evaluation of the October 
parliamentarian elections in Ukraine. Yet again the member states viewed the 
outcome of the elections differently, and Latvia sought to minimize the EU criticism” 
(Interview No. 3, 15.01.13, MFA). Thereby Latvia’s, as well as the other member 
states’ opposite evaluation of the same event proves that argumentation was used as a 
strategic asset. This resonates with what Schimmelfennig (2001) calls the ‘rhetoric 
action’ that assumes that arguments are used strategically to persuade opponents. 
In order to achieve  positive wording in the Council, the ‘maximalists’ also put the 
lobbying mechanism into use. Here they apparently worked in a coordinated manner. 
Lithuania, as the forthcoming EU Presidency, and Poland were the main lobbyists on 
behalf of the like-minded coalition. They talked to the EEAS, which was overall 
supportive of signing the AA. However, the EEAS was under substantial constraints: 
apart from the need to cope with the member states’ divergent preferences, there were 
also tough inter-institutional battles going on. As described by one interlocutor from 
the Brussels’ formats, “The problem was that the AA was already put aside for one 
year, and we needed to update it. In this situation, the EU institutions’ contradictory 
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interests did not help. The DG Trade was reluctant, saying, as an excuse, that it would 
take a long time to have  ‘legal scraping’ of the AA” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, 
PermRep). 
At this crucial stage, Latvia together with the like-minded coalition used 
arguing and bargaining to gain support from the ‘minimalists’ on the need to come up 
with the timetable for the AA signature. As described by a Latvian representative,  
Our ‘red line’ was the signing the Association Agreement until the Vilnius 
Summit. It was included in the 10 December 2012 Council Conclusions, 
despite the fact that there were too many EU conditions to be fulfilled to reach 
this aim (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA).  
This provides evidence that at this late EU foreign policy-making stage, with pressing 
deadlines ahead, bargaining produced a deal between opposite groupings. 
Importantly, the dominant role was adopted by Germany, who joined in supporting 
the Vilnius timetable. Some sources reported that Chancellor Merkel – who promised 
to get Tymoshenko out of prison – was less happy to support this than her Foreign 
Minister Westerwelle. But Germany’s decisive step improved chances for getting a 
new target date for the AA. Indeed, Germany was a key player for the favourable 
outcome of the December 2012 FAC Conclusions, as indicated by a Latvian 
representative,  
Germany joined the like-minded coalition at a very late stage. But it did join 
it, and thus helped us to reach the favourable outcome (Interview No. 3, 
13.01.2013, MFA). 
Behind such a shift on the part of Germany seemed to be an important deal with 
France. One of the interviewees observed that, “At the official meetings, Germany 
sympathised with France, but behind the scenes its representatives indicated to their 
support for the ‘maximalists.’ Germany quite obviously gained consent from France – 
at the very last minute before the December FAC, as it offered some minor changes in 
the draft Council Conclusions, which were acceptable to France. Germany still 
demanded an unambiguous text on conditionality, but this became acceptable for the 
‘maximalists.’ This was a big shock for the French allies, first, for the Benelux group 
(Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). For this reason, at the very last minute the 
“Benelux group unexpectedly broke the silence procedure. The COEST had to return 
to the discussion” (Interview No. 5, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
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Throughout the intense bargaining process on the December Council Conclusions, 
Latvia only pursued its ‘red line’ regarding the signing of the AA in Vilnius. 
According to a Latvian representative:  
We were not in an extreme position, and we had only a “red line” in the 6th 
Paragraph of the Conclusions [“The Council reaffirms its commitment to the 
signing of the already initialled AA, as soon as the Ukrainian authorities 
demonstrate determined action and tangible progress in the three areas, 
possibly by the time of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius”] (Interview 
No. 5, 13.01.2013, MFA). 
Thereby Latvia supported the coalition and its frontrunner Poland: “Poland was in a 
fighting position. But together we all contributed as a group – we achieved what we 
asked in the December 2012 Conclusions” (Interview No. 5, 13.01.2013, MFA). After 
the tough debate, Latvia compromised along with the rest of the coalition. This is a 
visible example of the cooperative bargaining in EU foreign policy-making:  
Latvia similarly to others had to be flexible and adjust. We compromised. We 
agreed that our preferred language/‘red line’ on signing the AA until the 
Vilnius Summit in November is added to the Benelux request on conditionality 
– even if conditions were too many and difficult for Ukraine to fulfil (Interview 
No. 3. 13.01.2013). 
Because of the intense cooperative bargaining process, the December 2012 FAC 
adopted the formal Council Conclusions on Ukraine. The agreed text represented a 
‘package-deal’ between the ‘maximalist’ and ‘minimalist’ groups. Altogether, the 
Conclusions were a compromise, yet they seemed to be ambiguous: on the one hand, 
the document declared that the October elections ‘constituted deterioration,’ but on 
the other hand, it offered a new target date for the AA process.  
This provides evidence that at the late stage a very concrete bargaining deal 
facilitated the member states’ compromise. The ‘maximalists’ agreed to tough 
conditionality for Ukraine, and the ‘minimalists’ regarding the Vilnius timetable. 
Furthermore, this provides evidence that bargaining in its cooperative form is an 
important uploading mechanism in EU foreign policy-making. Apparently, no one 
was fully satisfied. The ‘maximalists’ were not happy about the conditionality, “But at 
least it was some way out of the stalemate” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
Furthermore, the EU compromise reached was possible due to the German decision to 
support the Vilnius timetable. Without its support, the Council Conclusions would not 
have been possible (Interview No. 1, 28.12.2012, PermRep). This is evidence that in 
such a conflicting bargaining situation, a big member state’s support is crucial.  
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By providing the time perspective for signing the AA, the EU sent a strong 
signal to Ukraine on its readiness to unfreeze relations. Ukrainians welcomed this EU 
step. At the same time, EU leaders hesitated to arrange the annual EU-Ukraine 
Summit to unfreeze contacts with Yanukovych. A turning point here seemed to be 
Yanukovych’s decision to cancel, at the very last minute, his visit to Moscow, where 
he was due to talk with Putin on Ukraine joining the Customs Union. In light of this 
Yanukovych’s choice, the EU responded by inviting him to Brussels. The proposed 
date of the Summit was 25 February 2013. This became a new target for the 
‘maximalists’ to push further for the AA signature.  
5.5.5.2. The Second Stage (January 2013 – November 2013)  
New Dynamics in the EU – Ukraine-Russia ‘Triangle’ 
In 2013, in the words of the Ukrainian ambassador to the EU Yelisieiev, “Ukraine 
entered the year, which will decide the fate of the Association Agreement. This has 
been debated in kitchens and at the highest political level” (Yelisieiev, Ukraine’s 
Mission to the EU, 07.01.2013). He contrasted the AA with the Russian-led Customs 
Union that may “grant Ukraine only short-term dividends in exchange for the loss of 
sovereignty” (ibid).  
Among the EU partners, there was an increasing awareness of Ukraine’s tough 
choice. Putin’s bargaining offer to Yanukovych was the lowering of gas prices for 
Ukraine in exchange of it joining the Customs Union. The EU made it clear that the 
Customs Union was incompatible with the AA. In January 2013, the EU leaders tried 
to put more efforts to find a more flexible position towards Ukraine, while 
acknowledging the risks involved. Some countries were especially concerned about 
the Russian pressure, and that Kyiv eventually would sign the agreement with Russia 
instead (Varfolomeyeva, 16.01.2013). Among them, the most concerned were the ex-
Soviet republics. 
In this increasingly complex situation, Ukraine’s supporters in the EU pushed 
further for their preferences. Equipped with the Council Conclusions commitment on 
the Vilnius timetable, they sought using arguing as a ‘rhetoric entrapment.’ Here 
‘rhetoric entrapment’ involved demands to other member states to stick to the already 
agreed EU ‘language.’ At the same time, given the agreed language on a strong 
conditionality to Ukraine, it was essential to push Ukrainians to complete their 
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‘homework.’ An important mechanism here was the use of elite mediation, sending 
common messages to the Ukrainian political elite. 
Important support came from the EU Commission and the EEAS, with both 
becoming more and more engaged. After the political agreement was reached to 
prepare for the Vilnius Summit everyone started working (Interview 28, 30.03.2014, 
EM). The EU Commission signalled that 2013 would be a turning point and 
encouraged Ukraine to address its shortcomings. Important support came from the 
forthcoming Lithuanian EU Presidency: “The Irish EU Presidency (first half of 2013) 
was not interested in the Eastern Partnership – it allowed Lithuania as the next 
Presidency to take responsibility for the Ukrainian dossier. Lithuania worked closely 
with the EEAS. They elaborated a precise timetable before the Vilnius Summit to 
ensure that the process is smooth” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
Presenting Arguments Prior to the February 2013 European Council 
As the next step, the ‘maximalists,’ including Latvia, pushed for even more ambitious 
EU commitments at the top level, the European Council, which were adopted in 
February 2013. Prior to this there were some attempts to persuade ‘minimalists’ to 
have a more strategic EU approach on Ukraine. For instance, in early 2013 the AA 
was discussed during the informal consultations of the Nordic and Baltic (NB8) and 
the Visegrad group (V4). This consultation format involved both ‘maximalists’ and 
‘minimalists’ with different perceptions on the preferable EU approach on Ukraine. 
Latvia, together with Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, tried to persuade the opposite 
side that, “if the EU would lose Ukraine, it would lose the Eastern Partnership. The 
EU should be very precise with conditionality for Ukraine,” whereas Denmark from 
the opposite side insisted that the EU should avoid setting artificial timetables for the 
signature of the AA (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA). Obviously, the previous 
divide among the member states had not diminished, despite the achieved 
compromise in the December 2012 FAC. This can be interpreted as evidence that the 
EU policy-making on the AA was not a ‘genuine truth seeking exercise’ where states 
act according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ but rather as a strategic action, driven 
by the ‘logic of consequences.’  
Prior to the February 2013 European Council meeting Ukraine again appeared 
on the EU working parties’ agenda. The ‘maximalists’ wanted to use this opportunity 
to send stronger and more ambitious signals to Ukraine. Poland proposed the draft 
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formulation on Ukraine, supported by other like-minded states, including Latvia. The 
‘maximalists’ wanted to go a step further than the December 2012 FAC. In the 
preparatory EU debates for the European Council meeting, Poland and Lithuania 
asked the European Council to assure not only signing, but also provisional 
application of the AA. Hungary, Romania, Slovakia supported this. Latvia was less 
ambitious: while it asked to proceed with the AA signature, it did not push for its 
provisional application. Germany kept silence this time. Without Germany’s support, 
it was not possible to upload their preferences. The Commission rejected suggestions 
of the ‘maximalists,’ because “provisional application of the AA would be possible 
only after it is signed, but this should be decided separately by member states” 
(Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). Apparently, there was strong resistance 
from some big member states. Therefore, the European Council Conclusions only 
reiterated the FAC commitment of December 2012. This reaffirms that the big 
member states’ support was crucial not only for Latvia, but for the like-minded 
coalition as a whole. Without strong backing from Germany the ‘maximalists’ could 
not successfully upload their preferences. 
Presenting Arguments in the EU Debate for the February 2013 EU-Ukraine Summit 
The next time when member states discussed the AA was prior to the EU-Ukraine 
Summit on 25 February 2013. The COREPER ambassadors’ discussion again 
revealed that member states were far from ‘genuine truth seeking’ as it would have 
been expected from the sociological institutionalism perspective. The divide over 
preferences remained the same. Latvia asked the EU negotiators in the Summit to 
reassure the Ukrainian side of the EU’s readiness to sign the AA, if it showed a 
tangible progress. Latvia argued that the AA was necessary “for consolidating 
Ukraine’s geopolitical choice in favour of Europe and because of Russia’s increasing 
pressure on Ukraine” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). Latvia’s reference to 
pressure from Russia, at least in my interpretation, indicates that its national 
preferences in support for the AA signature were indeed based on the ‘first order’ 
security concerns related to its geographical proximity to Russia.  
The EU–Ukraine Summit produced an important breakthrough. It marked the 
unfreezing of the process towards completing the AA. Both parties at the highest 
political level reaffirmed their commitment to the AA “as soon as Ukraine’s tangible 
progress is demonstrated in the three areas emphasized by the EU, possibly by the 
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time of the Vilnius Summit” (EU-Ukraine Summit, 25.02.2013). Both sides also set 
the most urgent deadlines – “progress by early May 2013” (ibid). From the Ukrainian 
side, President Yanukovych declared that the AA was a priority for Ukraine. He 
promised that soon Ukraine would show some progress. May 2013 was crucial 
because then the Commission had to formally approve the AA to be able to pass 
through the bureaucratic process until November. Then the member states would give 
the Commission a mandate to sign the AA in the Vilnius Summit in November. 
Mediation Efforts in Kyiv in Spring 2013 
Despite the re-established mutual confidence among the EU and Ukrainian leaders, 
Yanukovych immediately returned to Moscow. On 4 March, he met Putin in Moscow. 
The main topic was the Customs Union. Putin promised that: ‘if Ukraine joins the 
Customs Union its GDP will increase between 1.5 to 6.5%.’ Yanukovych resisted, 
offering to join the Union as an observer instead (RiaNovosti, 05.03.2013). 
In light of Russia’s increasing pressure, the ‘maximalists’ put further efforts 
into achieving their preferable outcome at the Vilnius Summit. This involved working 
with Kyiv. Given the tough conditionality, the idea was to put pressure on Ukraine for 
it to meet the EU conditions and in this way seeking ways to win the battle with the 
sceptical member states. Here the ‘maximalists’ put the ‘elite mediation’ into use, 
which was crucial because all the decisions in Ukraine were in the hands of 
Yanukovych. This type of mediation involved an intensive exchange of visits between 
Kyiv and the EU capitals, preparing the ground for signing of the AA. In March, the 
Polish ex-president Kwasnievski met Yanukovych, emphasizing that Vilnius could 
become a breakthrough. Yanukovych assured that systemic reforms were under way.  
Likewise, Latvia used the visit of the President Bērziņš to Kyiv for mediation. 
On 14 March 2013, Bērziņš visited Kyiv where he "fully supported Ukraine's 
aspirations for [European] integration.” At the same time, Bērziņš expressed Latvia’s 
concerns about Ukraine’s selective justice and offered its “counsel and assistance in 
bringing Ukraine’s laws into line with European standards.” Yanukovych praised 
Latvia as a “partner of Ukraine that supports it on the path to European integration 
(Interfax-Ukraine, 14.03.2013). He expressed his hope that the AA would be signed in 
Vilnius (ibid). In this way, Latvia sough to mediate the EU commitments and 
conditionality with the Ukrainian political decision takers. 
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As somewhat of a relief, Ukrainian political leaders made some political steps 
that allowed its supporters in the EU to advocate further for the AA. In March 2013, 
the EU institutions could inform about some positive developments in Kyiv, i.e. 
Yanukovych’s decision of 12 March 2013 ‘On Urgent Measures on European 
Integration of Ukraine.’ Also, debates in the European Parliament on Ukraine were 
surprisingly positive. The EP promised that it would do everything to support the 
signing of the AA in Vilnius. In spring, Latvia together with other like-minded 
countries pushed for a more flexible EU approach. Especially given the worrying 
signals on increasing Russia’s pressure towards Ukraine, it was important to use this 
window of opportunity when the Vilnius timetable seemed feasible.  
Latvia’s Low Profile in the EU Debate on Provisional Application of the AA 
Given Ukraine’s commitments at the highest political level regarding conditionality, 
the EU working parties begun to discuss the provisional application of the AA in the 
spring of 2013. This was a notable achievement of the ‘maximalists,’ who had long 
pushed for the AA provisional application. Finally, the EEAS and the Commission 
put forward the long awaited proposal for the member states’ “unanimous agreement” 
(COM (2013) 289). This was discussed in the COEST group. 
From the outset, the provisional application of the AA seemed to be a purely 
technical debate. However, the COEST discussion revealed the same old split among 
‘maximalists’ and ‘minimalists,’ this time demonstrating that member states can use 
various technical and expertise-based arguments to influence the speed of the EU 
policy-making process. The main battle was about which parts of the AA could be 
applied immediately, without ratification in national parliaments. As described by a 
Latvian representative in the EU, “a number of ‘minimalist’ states became more and 
more vocal, using this opportunity to hinder the process at the Vilnius Summit. France 
behaved in a ‘marvellous way’ – it was very quick and worked really hard. Germany 
asked for a balanced provisional application of the AA. It asked to apply not only the 
trade (DCFTA), but also the political part, related to the common values. Poland, 
Lithuania and other ‘maximalist’ countries favoured the trade part only. The UK was 
especially reluctant and asked for extra time for domestic procedures. Also, Sweden 
said it wanted to include human rights in the provisional application of the AA 
(Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
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This debate became yet another headache for the ‘maximalists.’ They 
apparently were not ready for such refined methods as the use of legal and technical 
justifications to delay the process. The ‘maximalists,’ including Latvia, did not have 
detailed arguments to justify their support for swift signature of the AA. They utilized 
mainly general arguing, but in this type of technical discussion, it was inefficient. 
Poland stressed that time is an important factor otherwise it would not be possible to 
finalize the AA until Vilnius. Lithuania also called for hurrying up. Support came 
from the EEAS, which urged member states to behave rationally and not to delay the 
process (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). Yet, in April 2013, there were no 
signs of a possible compromise. The Latvian representative was extremely 
pessimistic:  
At least at the COEST level, consensus on the provisional application of the 
AA seemed to be too far away, and there was a feeling of deadlock ((Interview 
No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
From the EU side, the main negotiator with Ukraine was the Commission, while the 
member states discussed only politically sensitive issues. For instance, the COEST 
group focused on the AA preamble, including a reference to Ukraine’s EU 
membership perspective. In these discussions, a common problem was the lack of 
proper homework done in the capitals, not only in Latvia, as noticed by an EEAS 
official, who described this situation as confusing:  
It is a paradox that although we now intensively discuss the AA, many experts 
in the capitals have not read these 1150 pages of the AA text. There seems to 
be a lot of weakness at home. Often the national representatives simply send 
the report from the COEST meeting to the capital, written too vaguely, and 
then ask for guidance (Interview No. 15, 12.07.2013, EEAS). 
Evidently, Latvia took a rather relaxed approach regarding the substance of the AA, 
relying on the work of EU institutions. In difference from the previous two sub-case 
studies, in EU policy-making on the AA Latvia relied on the expertise of the 
Commission and the EEAS, without double-checking the EU institutions’ activities in 
Kyiv, despite having its own diplomatic representation there (Interview No. 27, 
20.03.2014, MFA). Without specific domestic concerns on the AA, Latvia did not 
invest its resources in extra uploading activities. 
At that time, important support came from the Commission. Despite the lack 
of member states’ full support, on 15 May 2013 the Commission adopted its proposal 
for the Council Decision on the signing and provisional application of the AA. This 
was a substantial precondition in order to technically move ahead with the preparatory 
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arrangements. The Commission issued assurances that the AA would represent a 
“historic breakthrough in EU-Ukraine relations,” while reminding that signing it 
remained conditional on Ukraine’s progress (European Commission, Press Release, 
15.05.2013).  
Despite such backing from the Commission, the COEST group continued the 
previous intense debates, which took place every week. At one point, the battle with 
the sceptical member states was taken over by EU institutions – the EEAS and the 
Commission, especially its Legal Service. Also Lithuania as the incoming EU 
Presidency pro-actively engaged in the process. It made additional efforts to reach a 
consensus on the AA signature and provisional application. Lithuanians contacted 
“sensitive countries to make them feel comfortable with the AA.” In the end, these 
efforts started to yield positive results: “In summer, all the member states apart from 
the UK had agreed. The UK was a real problem; there were rumours about on-going 
negotiations of the British Petroleum deals, and why its government was ‘arrested’ in 
these deals” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). 
Despite objections from some member states, gradually the EU moved closer 
to finishing preparations to enable the signing of the AA. Evidently, at this stage 
Latvia did not use specific uploading efforts through its formal interventions in the 
EU debate. Latvia lacked legal expertise at home, and there was no truly pressing 
demand from Riga. It was crucial that the EU institutions now engaged in the process 
begun to play the central role in facilitating the ‘maximalists’ uploading efforts.  
Russia’s Increasing Pressure and Germany’s Pro-active Engagement 
Overall, in spring 2013 in Brussels and Kyiv there was an on-going active technical 
preparatory work accompanied by Ukraine’s demonstrated political willingness to 
meet the EU commitments. This increased the certainty that the AA could be signed 
in Vilnius. In this situation, Moscow’s pressure on Yanukovych only increased. On 27 
May, Yanukovych urgently travelled to Sochi after Putin’s invitation. Russia had 
recently intensified its pressure, threatening trade restrictions, if Ukraine were to sign 
the AA (KievUkraineNewsBlog, 27.05.2013). Subsequently, after some 
communication between Yanukovych and Putin, on 31 May Ukraine finally signed 
the memorandum on deepening cooperation with the Russia-led Customs Union. This 
secret move by Yanukovych triggered disappointment in Brussels and increased 
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worries about Ukraine’s rapprochement with Russia, despite that it had a real chance 
to sign the AA in the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. 
With these unfavourable developments, the ‘maximalists’ increased the efforts 
to reach a positive outcome at the Vilnius Summit. At this point, crucial support came 
again from Germany, led by the Foreign Minister Westerwelle, who played an active 
role in mediating EU conditionality with Ukraine. Germany had seemingly changed 
its initial position. This indicated Germany’s increasingly strategic and flexible EU 
approach towards making the AA a success, while at the same time satisfying the 
‘conditionality criteria’ – the release of Tymoshenko. Prior to the June 2013 FAC, 
Westerwelle visited Kyiv, where he praised Ukraine for making progress, and in July, 
he welcomed Ukraine’s foreign minister Kozhara in Berlin. A month later, the Vice-
prime minister Arbuzov visited Berlin, calling Germany to say its ‘weighty word’ in 
favour of the AA. Westerwelle made assurances that Germany had a strategic interest 
in Ukraine's EU development, and said it appreciated the efforts of Ukraine towards 
meeting the conditions (Federal Foreign Office, 30.07.2013). 
Thereby for the first time the leading role among the western countries 
supporting Ukraine was not the US or Poland, but Germany, which “acted as the 
principal supporter of the AA,” with its actions “fitting into the overall trend towards 
cooling Russian-German relations” (The Voice of Russia, 21.02.2014). Thereby the 
AA signature and Ukraine as such became a part of a bigger game not only among 
member states, but also between Germany and Russia. 
Latvia Presenting Arguments: June 2013 FAC 
At the June 2013 FAC, the EU ministers again discussed Ukraine. As described by the 
national representative in the EU, in overall everyone reiterated the well-known 
positions. Germany informed that Westerwelle was in Kyiv and expressed his 
readiness to help with Tymoshenko’s treatment. Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK 
continuously asked for a comprehensive evaluation of Ukraine’s performance on all 
EU conditions, not only the release of Tymoshenko. France said that the performance 
of the whole system in Ukraine is important. The UK repeated the same question – 
does the EU have a plan B? The impression was that the UK was preparing for the 
negative case scenario – non-signing of the AA (Interview No. 15, 13.07.2013, 
PermRep). Latvia only reiterated its previous position, stressing that it would be 
important to sign the AA in Vilnius, provided that Ukraine meets conditions (MFA of 
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Latvia, 24.06.2013). After the FAC Poland came out with a tough warning: the 
process was ‘clearly at risk,’ according to its Foreign Minister Sikorski, urging 
Ukraine to speed up meeting the EU’s conditions by the end of the summer and not to 
wait until the very last moment (EurActiv, 26.06.2013). 
The question was about the EU conditionality and opening up for a more 
flexible approach. The conditionality issue involved the possibility for a broader 
interpretation, allowing for specific preferences. Some member states argued in 
favour of signing the AA, despite the unresolved Tymoshenko’s case. Support also 
came from the European Parliament President Schulz, who argued that “the EU 
should not drop a dialogue with Ukraine due to the case of Tymoshenko” (KyivPost, 
28.06.2013). The conditionality principle compelled member states to make a political 
decision on whether Ukraine had satisfied the conditions for signing the AA (Sherr, 
July 2013). 
Russia’s “Trade War” and the EU Reaction 
It became quite possible that the AA might be the ‘success story’ of the Vilnius 
Summit. This motivated Russia to tighten the pressure on Ukraine. On July 27, Putin 
went to Ukraine to join a celebration of the christening of the Kievan Rus. However, 
not receiving any positive signals from Yanukovych on Ukraine joining the Customs 
Union, Putin then launched a full-fledged trade war, blocking Ukrainian imports of 
agricultural products; in this situation, neither the International Monetary Fund nor 
the EU was ready to help Ukraine financially (Åslund, 21.08.2013). The EU reacted 
only with its political support for Ukraine.  
Commissioner Füle criticized Russia and said that any pressure on Ukraine 
related to the AA was not acceptable. On 12 September, the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution regarding Russia’s trade war against Ukraine’s exports. The EP 
called on the Commission to take action in defence of EU partners (The European 
Parliament Resolution, 2013/2826 (RSP)). Also, in September, the EU foreign 
ministers warned Russia not to pressure neighbours seeking closer ties with the EU. 
Yanukovych assured the EU that Ukraine’s course to European integration was 
beyond doubt despite Russia’s pressure. On September 5, the Verhovna Rada passed 
the first package of the EU demanded reforms. On 18 September, the Ukrainian 
government officially approved the AA draft, which its Prime Minister Azarov called 
a historic step (RFE/RL, 18.09.2013). Soon thereafter Westerwelle was in Kyiv, 
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assuring Yanukovych that Germany “is working to eliminate the last barriers on the 
road to summit in Vilnius,” while Yanukovych confirmed that Verhovna Rada is 
working on the adoption of the necessary legislative proposals (Ukrinfo, 10.11.2013).  
In parallel, Ukraine’s supporters in the EU put additional efforts to achieve the 
signature of the AA in Vilnius. Latvia, being concerned about Russia’s pressure on 
Ukraine, came up with public statements that praised Ukraine’s progress in meeting 
EU conditions and condemning Russia’s extraordinary pressure. Yet, there were signs 
that Yanukovych began to surrender. When the Latvian representatives met 
Ukrainians in summer 2013, they indicated that despite Ukraine’s EU choice Kyiv 
begun working on favourable conditions in cooperation with Russia. This was a clear 
sign that for Ukraine, in its poor economic situation, it was difficult to resist 
Moscow’s pressure (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep).  
Given the tricky issue of EU conditionality and its various interpretations, 
Latvia continued to use positive public rhetoric to support Ukraine, praising its reform 
progress. On 2 October 2013, during Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kozhara visit in 
Riga, Rinkēvičs appreciated Ukraine’s “good progress towards the benchmarks 
formulated by the EU, which brings Ukraine closer to signing the AA.” Kozhara 
expressed certainty that Ukraine would make every effort to enable the signing of AA 
in Vilnius (MFA of Latvia, 03.10.2013). For his part, Kozhara called on the EU to 
look beyond the Tymoshenko case: "It is even more important that the relationship 
between 46 million Ukrainian nationals and 500 million European nationals should 
not depend on a single criminal case." (EUbusiness, 02.10.2013). Another issue 
stressed by Rinkēvičs was that any pressure from a third party threatening with the 
trade sanctions was not acceptable (Puaro, 02.11.2013). 
October 2013 FAC – No Consensus on the Council Conclusions on the AA 
As mentioned above, conditionality for signature of the AA was the trickiest issue and 
involved a risk of political manipulation. This split even Ukraine’s supporters. The 
EU foreign ministers had to adopt the formal Council Conclusions, giving the 
Commission a mandate to sign the AA in Vilnius. The draft Conclusions were already 
prepared for the October FAC, as informed by the interviewee. Nonetheless, the 
European Parliament reporters Cox-Kwasniewski mission made a great mistake, 
“spoiling everything:” they had to report before the FAC, but they unexpectedly gave 
a very negative evaluation, which prevented the FAC from agreeing already in 
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October (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). The problem was that EU 
conditionality was operationalized into six bills to be adopted by the Verhovna Rada. 
In October, the Cox-Kwasniewski mission returned to Kyiv and came back with an 
extremely negative report. The suspicion was that they were jealous of Westerwelle, 
who did a parallel job. Initially, Cox-Kwasniewski mission asked Ukrainians the same 
conditions as Westerwelle – the six legislative proposals adopted by the Verhovna 
Rada (partial release and pardon of Tymoshenko), but later it asked for more. Thus, 
the mission became a part of the problem. One interlocutor speculated that, “Poland 
wanted that Vilnius is no more than the Warsaw Eastern Partnership summit in terms 
of the progress with the AA with Ukraine” (ibid). 
As a result, the opportunity of reaching an agreement in the October 2013 
FAC was missed. The EU agreement on the signing and provisional application of the 
AA was postponed until November. The Latvian Foreign Minister remained upbeat, 
expressed satisfaction with Ukraine’s progress, while stressing that real progress at 
the Vilnius Summit was anticipated (NRA, 21.10.2013). This shows that Latvia, 
together with the like-minded countries, made additional efforts regarding the highly 
politicized EU conditionality criteria. However, in Ukraine all the six necessary 
legislative proposals were still waiting for approval.   
Yanykovych’s U-Turn 
With Moscow’s pressure on Ukraine increasing, while the EU was demanding the 
release of Tymoshenko, Yanukovych manoeuvred back and forth. Several 
developments began to indicate that he might take a U-turn. Shortly before the EU’s 
expected legislative proposals in the Verhovna Rada were to be passed, Yanukovych 
visited Putin. On 27
 
October, they discussed ‘urgent topics.’ On 9 November, 
Yanukovych again met Putin. After these meetings, the Verhovna Rada, dominated by 
pro-Yanukovych deputies, suddenly postponed voting on the six legislative proposals. 
On 13 November 2013, the Verhovna Rada did not pass the expected legislative 
proposal on the release of Tymoshenko for treatment abroad. The next session was 
held on 19 November – a day after the November FAC, which was supposed to agree 
on signing the AA. 
The problem in Brussels formats seemed to be that the member states did not 
know much about what was happening on the ground in Kyiv. Germany was the first 
country to start warning that there were negative signals. Furthermore, as observed by 
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an interviewee, “Ukraine’s ambassador to the  EU Yeliseev, also the adviser of 
Yanukovych, in the autumn suddenly became very pessimistic and passive, and he 
started to signal that maybe Ukraine and the EU could sign the AA in Vilnius, but 
postpone its provisional application” (Interview No. 30, 23.05.2014, PermRep). In 
addition, “we got news that the Putin – Yanukovych 9 November meeting in 
Yalta/Sochi took five hours – “one can only guess what Russia was doing at the time. 
Commissioner Füle went to Kyiv on 14 November to try to push for Westrewelle’s 
solution. He believed that the Ukraine’s Foreign Minister was better” (ibid).  
The Verhovna Rada postponed voting until 19 November – a day after the 
November FAC meeting. In this situation, the 18 November FAC could not take a 
final decision whether to proceed with the AA signature or not. The HR Ashton 
stressed that the Tymoshenko case needed to be addressed. Lithuania, the EU 
Presidency, insisted that “Ukraine has already moved on very important segments [..], 
and the Commission has provided quite a positive assessment, so this is good news.” 
Westerwelle warned that the time was slowly running out: “Last-minute moves are 
not reasonable, they are extremely risky.” Consequently, EU ministers agreed that “it 
is now up to Ukraine to act, they have to decide if they want to belong to Europe or to 
Russia.” From its side, Latvia called Ukraine “to do everything necessary to be able to 
sign the AA at the Vilnius summit;” Rinkēvičs encouraged the EU to continue 
supporting Ukraine economically, but described the Russian pressure on the Eastern 
Partnership countries as ‘unacceptable’ (19.11.2013, Baltic Times). 
After the November 2013 FAC member states engaged in the last set of 
mediating efforts. Sikorski and Bildt travelled to Kyiv to review possible further 
developments. On 19 November Sikorski stated that the EU was doing all it could to 
ensure the signing of the Agreement. Sikorski hinted at Poland’s flexible approach – 
instead of discussions on the fulfilment of conditions, Poland wanted to focus on 
helping Ukraine to resolve economic problems and implement the AA (Ukrinform, 
19.11.2013). On 19 November, the Head of the EU delegation in Ukraine, Tombinski, 
send signals that “the EU is very positive about signing the AA in Vilnius,” and that 
“Brussels is doing everything to reach the final agreement.” On 20 November, the 
Commissioner Füle encouraged the Verhovna Rada to adopt the remaining legislative 
pieces. 
These very last attempts were interrupted by Yanukovych’s decision. On 21 
November, the Verhovna Rada rejected all of the six legislative proposals, refusing to 
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allow Tymoshenko to go abroad. The same day the Ukrainian government announced 
a suspension of the signing of the AA in Vilnius. The decision was said to have been 
taken for the ‘reasons of national security,’ as well as the need to reverse its declining 
trade with Russia. Ukraine’s government announced returning to the dialogue with 
Russia on the Customs Union. In a reaction to the statement, on 22 November the HR 
Ashton expressed the EU’s disappointment with Ukraine’s decision. The HR saw this 
as a disappointment also for the people of Ukraine:  
We believe that the future of Ukraine lies in a strong relationship with the EU 
and we stand firm in our commitment to the people of Ukraine (EEAS; 
22.11.2013). 
This is evidence that at the final stage the EU side despite all its controversies reached 
a compromise and came up with a unified message to the Ukrainian society, not 
allowing Yanukovych again blame the EU for the failure with signing the AA.  
It should be noted that Yanukovych’s withdrawal from the AA became a 
historical turning point – it provoked the so-called ‘Euromaidan’, demanding 
Ukraine’s closer integration with the EU and the consequent Russian aggression on 
Ukraine. In May 2014, a new Ukrainian President was elected. These political 
changes in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s military intervention in the country, led the 
EU to act more strategically towards its Eastern neighbours. The EU-Ukraine AA was 
signed on 27 June 2014 at the highest political level. The signature of the AA was 
welcomed by Latvia: “The AA with Ukraine is forming a new phase in relations with 
the EU, creating new opportunities to deepen already close and intense relationships” 
(MFA of Latvia, 30.06.2014). On 14 July 2014, the Latvian Saeima ratified the AA. A 
few days later, the Ukrainian President Poroshenko praised Latvia’s speedy 
ratification of the AA: “These days in Ukraine’s history are of critical significance, 
and at this moment we highly value the support and solidarity of Ukraine’s fiends in 
Europe” (MFA Latvia, 16.07. 2014). 
Nonetheless, this trumpeting was too early. The situation returned to the point 
zero, when on 12 September 2014, Ukraine and the EU (Commissioner de Gutch) 
agreed to delay the DCFTA from entering into force, which is the strategic part of the 
AA, “due to Russian concerns” (Rettman, 12.09.2014). This confirms that indeed “the 
EU policy towards Ukraine has been related to the broader geopolitical context” (FT, 
23.02.2014), where for Russia, keeping influence over Ukraine has been almost an 
existential imperative, whereas for the EU Ukraine is lower priority. 
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5.5.7. Conclusions 
This chapter explored the ways in which Latvia could influence EU policy-making on 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It is suggested that this sub-case, despite the 
officially stated high political priority represented low preference intensity for Latvia. 
Although Latvia was able to only partly project its national preference to EU foreign 
policy, it succeeded in that the EU after a long delay came up with a unified position 
supporting the AA signature ahead of the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit. Latvia 
could influence the outcome under conditions of favourable EU institutional 
environment – the preference convergence with other member states, allowing for 
acting together as a group of like-minded countries. 
The findings of this sub-case showed that in a situation of low preference 
intensity Latvia employed only a few of the hypothesized uploading mechanisms. The 
main mechanisms were joining the like-minded coalition, presenting arguments and 
cooperative bargaining. As there was no need for a well-elaborated national position 
for arguing or bargaining, Latvia did not use the mechanism of bolstering domestic 
uploading capacity. Likewise, it did not actively employ consultations with other 
member states and lobbying EU institutions. It relied on formal interventions in EU 
working parties by presenting general arguments, similar to those of like-minded 
member states with higher intensity of preferences – Poland and Lithuania. Thus, 
Latvia’s individual interaction reinforced coalition’s common uploading efforts.   
Thus, the sub-case study confirms that Latvia could principally rely on the 
arguing mechanism. Without strong domestic pressure and given the favourable 
institutional environment, i.e. the Germany’s similar position with no risks of losing 
out in the negotiation outcome the national representatives could rely on the arguing 
mechanism with no need to use the bargaining mechanism. Regarding the conditions 
under which Latvia was able to exert influence, a big member state’s interaction was 
decisive in the sense that “Germany joined the like-minded coalition, helping to reach 
the favourable outcome (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA). This allows for us 
arguing that big member states indeed matter for smaller states’ uploading. 
However, not only endogenous but also exogenous factors influenced the 
development of the EU common position on the AA. Russia’s increasing pressure on 
Ukraine in 2013 framed the EU debate, stimulating the EU to shift towards a more 
strategic approach.  
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To conclude, the findings show that a member state’s preference projection is 
driven by the intensity of national preference. The lower the intensity, the less 
uploading mechanisms tend to be used by a member state. Thereby the preference 
projection is driven by strategic considerations in pursuit of those preferences. 
Furthermore, EU foreign policy-making matters for preference projection. Despite the 
increasing role of the Brussels-based institutions in EU foreign policy-making, the 
constellation of other member states’ preferences, in particular, the big ones, are of 
crucial importance. They largely determine the uploading possibilities of the smaller 
member states.    
6. CONCLUSIONS 
By exploring Latvia’s uploading efforts in EU foreign policy, this study engaged in a 
growing body of research on Europeanization in foreign policy and, in particular, to 
its uploading dimension, which deals with a member state’s influence on the EU 
level. By building on the concept of Europeanization, rational choice institutionalism, 
the scholarship on decision-making in EU Council, and on smaller state’s influence in 
the EU, this study explored the role of individual member states in developing EU 
foreign policy. This general interest was translated into two research questions:  
1) 1) Given its intensely held preferences, how can a member state influence EU 
foreign policy-making and its outcome? 
2) In what ways can a member state project its preferences into EU foreign policy, 
in situations where member states have conflicting interests? 
The argument was that a member state can influence EU foreign policy-making and 
outcome through six mechanisms: (1) presenting arguments, (2) cooperative 
bargaining, (3) contacting other member states, (4) using coalitions, (5) lobbying the 
EU institutions, and (6) bolstering the domestic uploading capacity
17
. 
In answering the research questions, the study used Latvia’s uploading efforts 
in the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbours within the three sub-cases. It 
identified Latvia’s national preference intensity and influence on the outcome, and 
then traced whether and which of the hypothesized six uploading mechanisms were 
involved. 
                                                 
17
 This mechanism is different from the previous five. EU policy-making can be described as 
‘continuous negotiation,’ where the first five mechanisms concern negotiating techniques, whereas the 
last of them make the others effective, influencing the outcome indirectly. 
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6.1. Case I: The EU Sanctions on Belarus (2011-2012) 
This sub-case analysed how Latvia projected its national preference by strongly 
objecting to EU economic sanctions on Belarus. Latvia had intensely held preferences 
in this sub-case due to its geographic proximity, intense cross-border trade and 
economic interdependency with Belarus.  
Influence on the outcome. The analysis proved a correlation between Latvia’s 
national preferences and their reflection in EU decision outcome. While Latvia was 
not able to fully upload its preferences, i.e. to halt EU economic restrictive measures 
against Belarus, it ensured that its main preferences were respected; i.e., its economic 
interests did not suffer, and most of Latvia’s concerns were taken into account. The 
results illustrate that influence means the Europeanization of the national foreign 
policy, in order to prevent unacceptable EU proposals. This resonates with the 
previous findings that uploading can be a ‘proactive strategy to manage the EU-level 
constraints’ (Müller 2011:20) and to avoid the EU decisions that conflict with 
member state’s national interests (Miskimmon 2007). 
Uploading mechanisms. In this sub-case Latvia used all the hypothesized 
uploading mechanisms except building or joining a coalition. Given EU foreign 
policy-making environment, when influential member states pushed for the EU 
sanctions, Latvia became isolated and could not rely on common uploading efforts of 
coalition partners. This sub-case thereby most clearly revealed that utilization of all 
the available hypothesized mechanisms facilitated uploading. Especially, cooperative 
bargaining turned out to be an efficient mechanism. Likewise, it was of critical 
importance to bolster the domestic uploading capacity to ensure additional weight. 
Lobbying EU institutions was essential to signal where during the drafting stage of 
policy proposals lay the Latvian ‘red lines.’  Most important was to, contact the 
influential and interested member states which proved to be indispensable.  
This sub-case analysis enables us to argue that a member state in a situation of 
conflicting interests can better realize its preferences by using cooperative bargaining. 
Evidently, during the policy-making process Latvia decisively shifted from arguing 
towards bargaining. Presenting general arguments did not help in its uploading efforts 
since Latvia’s arguments did not resonate with the audience any more. Furthermore, 
the results indicate that with regards to bargaining, its cooperative form is indeed 
more common as it was in the case of Latvia. 
187 
 
Apart from cooperative bargaining, it was of the utmost importance to use 
(though only at the late stage) additional informal uploading mechanisms – lobbying 
EU institutions and contacting influential member states. The findings show that by 
improving its domestic uploading capacity in the form of developing well-elaborated 
reasoning to defend the national position, as well as closer coordination of all of its 
uploading activities, Latvia could influence the outcome. 
In sum, this sub-case shows that national preference intensity explains the influence 
on the outcome. This can be concluded by quoting one interviewee, “It is a paradox 
that in the Belarus case Latvia alone could gain the maximum benefit. This was 
because the higher the importance, the more energy a state would invest” (Interview 
No. 5, 17.01.13, MFA). Isolated by others, Latvia’s preference reflection on EU 
decision outcome is clearly visible, allowing us to conclude that this was indeed 
brought about through Latvia’s influence, and not a ‘lucky break.’ This sub-case 
proves that a member state can better influence EU foreign policy through combining 
various uploading mechanisms. Even when it modified its approach at a relatively late 
stage in the process, Latvia succeeded in turning policy-making to its favour by means 
of the available mechanisms. Hence, evidence confirms the first hypothesis
18
. 
Finally, this sub-case study shows that Latvia could not abort the EU policy, 
but had to settle for modifying the existing EU proposals. This resonates with what 
Duke (2001:36) had found that “smaller states may not be able to set agendas, but 
they are able to modify them.” 
6.2. Case II: The EU-Russia Visa-free Travel (2010-2014) 
The second sub-case analysed how Latvia projected its intensely held national 
preference onto EU foreign policy-making on a visa-free travel perspective with 
Russia. Latvia had intensely held preferences due to its geographic proximity, which, 
on the one hand, included very dynamic cross-border trade with economic 
interdependency with Russia, but on the other hand, entertained security-driven 
concerns. However, due to the lack of immediate domestic pressure (from the 
business or other interest groups), this preference represented medium intensity. 
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 H1: Given intensely held national preferences, a member state can influence EU foreign policy 
through six uploading mechanisms: (1) presenting arguments, (2) cooperative bargaining, (3) 
contacting other member states, (4) using coalitions, (5) lobbying the EU institutions, 
 and (6) bolstering the domestic uploading capacity.  
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Influence on the outcome. The analysis indicated that there was a correlation 
between Latvia’s national preferences and their reflection in the EU decision 
outcome. Not only Latvia held a consistent position throughout the EU policy-making 
process, but its preferences regularly became reflected in EU common positions in 
each negotiation round as they resonated well with a number of other member states’ 
preferences, allowing for the success of a blocking minority. The results illustrate that 
influence not only means the ability to Europeanize national foreign policy, but also 
that small member states such as Latvia can inject their ideas into the EU decisions. 
Uploading mechanisms. In this sub-case Latvia used a great deal of the 
hypothesized uploading mechanisms: presenting arguments; cooperative bargaining; 
contacting other member states; joining coalitions; bolstering the domestic uploading 
capacity. Under the conditions prevailing in EU foreign policy-making environment, 
when there was a formal QMV voting rule, however the like-minded coalition was 
large enough and included an influential member state, this sufficed to create the 
blocking minority. Thereby Latvia could effectively use the like-minded coalition. 
Bolstering the domestic uploading capacity was also of critical importance, involving 
political support and consensus, and smooth administrative coordination procedures. 
As a result, Latvia already at an early stage could interact with a well-elaborated and 
high-quality national position. Moreover, Latvia pro-actively used consultations with 
other member states, making use of like-minded coalitions and making formal 
interventions in EU working parties. This involved presenting expertise-based and 
technical arguments. Latvia’s arguments resonated well with the audience and 
therefore were beneficial for the formulation of the EU common position. 
It can be concluded that Latvia’s national preference intensity was crucial for 
uploading. It was also substantially facilitated by the foreign policy-making 
environment and constellation of a large group of other countries’ preferences, which 
went along with those of Latvia. 
6.3. Case III: The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (2011-2013) 
The third sub-case analysed how Latvia projected its intensely held national 
preference by strongly supporting the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement. Latvia had intensely held preferences due to its geographic proximity 
with Russia, specifically, with Russia’s ambitions to re-establish influence in the post-
Soviet space, where Ukraine was perceived as a pivotal component. Thereby Latvia’s 
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preference intensity was driven by broader, ‘first order’ security concerns. For this 
reason, the signing of the AA was ranked high among the government’s priorities in 
EU foreign policy. Nonetheless, in my assessment, without strong domestic interests 
of particular groups, the intensity of this Latvian preference in the EU was low.  
Influence on the outcome. The analysis showed a correlation between Latvia’s 
national preference and its reflection in the EU decision outcome. While Latvia was 
not able to fully project its preference – there was a too long of a delay in completion 
of the AA with an exceeding number of conditions – Riga succeeded in the sense that 
its preferences were indeed reflected in the EU unified position prior to the Vilnius 
Eastern Partnership Summit. 
Uploading mechanisms. In this sub-case Latvia used only a few of the  
hypothesized mechanisms. The ones mostly used were joining coalition, presenting 
arguments and sometimes also cooperative bargaining (together with coalition). The 
like-minded coalition with a big member state Poland in the leadership was of great 
help to Latvia. Given the preference convergence, Latvia did not put much effort into 
bolstering the domestic uploading capacity to elaborate national position. In EU 
formal working parties, Latvia could simply replicate the position of Poland and other 
like-minded countries. Also, it did not actively use consultations with other member 
states or utilize lobbying. It relied on formal interventions in EU debates by 
presenting general arguments, and thus reinforced the coalition’s uploading efforts.  
The results of three sub-cases studies on Latvia’s uploading show that the intensity of 
national preferences indeed mattered. The preferences purposefully projected in EU 
foreign policy-making, when intensely held, were reflected in the EU decision 
outcome. The uploading mechanisms varied depending on preference intensity, as 
well as on the EU institutional environment. The findings confirm that the second 
hypothesis that more uploading mechanisms help to secure the outcome
19
. 
Furthermore, the EU institutional environment channelled preference projection, 
constraining or facilitating uploading. Furthermore, the sub-cases showed that in 
terms of influence Latvia was able only to modify the existing EU proposals. This 
resonates with Duke’s (2001) findings that small states may modify agendas without 
having the chance to set them. However, modification can also be a form of influence.  
                                                 
19
 H2: The higher the intensity of preference, the more of the above uploading mechanisms are 
mobilised in helping a member state attain its preferred outcome. 
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6.4. Overall Results Concerning the Research Questions   
The results of the three sub-cases allow for the identification of similarities and 
differences, as well as general trends and lessons from Latvia’s uploading efforts. 
Regarding the intensity of national preferences, the findings show that there 
tended to be a mismatch between the Latvian government’s officially presented strong 
preferences and their actual intensity. While this study did not explore the national 
preference formation, the three sub-cases implicitly demonstrate that the domestic 
economic interests mattered more in the case of Latvia’s intensely held preferences in 
EU foreign policy. This can be summarized by quoting a foreign policy practitioner: 
“The AA with Ukraine was not very high among Latvia’s foreign policy priorities, in 
difference from Belarus [EU sanction case] with strong domestic transit business 
interests involved” (Interview No. 3, 13.01.2013, MFA). Thereby the empirical 
evidence of this study on a state’s preference intensity is consistent with Moravcsik’s 
(1998) liberal intergovernmental approach that insists that national preferences are 
determined primarily by the domestic economic interests.  
Uploading Mechanisms  
This thesis not only confirmed the relevance of hypothesized uploading mechanisms, 
but also allowed us to further specify them. The choice of Latvia’s uploading 
mechanisms was linked to preference intensity in a particular EU policy dossier. 
These findings are demonstrated in the table below, which suggests that with higher 
preference intensity more of the available uploading mechanisms were utilized.    
Uploading Mechanisms Intensity of the national preferences 
Case I (high)  Case II (medium) Case III (low) 
Bolstering domestic 
uploading capacity 
1 1 0 
Presenting arguments 1 1 1 
Cooperative bargaining 1 0 0  
Building or joining 
coalitions  
0 1 1 
Contacting other 
member states  
1 1 0 
Lobbying EU 
institutions 
1 0 0 
Table 7: Intensity of preference and the employed uploading mechanisms 
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The hypothesized uploading mechanisms tended to complement and mutually 
reinforce each other, allowing for better uploading. The findings show that when a 
member state was challenged by the so-called Putnam’s ‘two level game’ (1988), i.e., 
when “national representatives are squeezed between the domestic and the EU 
pressure,” the tendency is to use all the available uploading mechanisms. These 
findings resonate with the previous research showing that utilization of more 
mechanisms allows small member states to upload (Panke 2010b: 800). 
Furthermore, use of a broad variety of uploading mechanisms is an important 
precondition not only for small state successful uploading (Panke 2010a), but also for 
the three most influential member states – Germany, France and the UK in their 
efforts to influence the European Security and Defence Policy (Major 2008:265). This 
resonates with the findings of Lamoreaux (2014), who showed that the case of Russia 
and the Baltic States indicates that big and small states do not act very differently. 
Consequently he “calls into question many of the assumptions made by small-state 
scholars about the difference between large- and small-state action and argues for 
changes within small-state studies” as a part of international relations discipline 
(Lamoreaux 2014:565).  
The findings of this study show that the six hypothesized mechanisms tended 
to being applied by Latvia at different moments in the uploading process. During the 
formal interventions, arguments were presented at the early stage, when the member 
states’ initial positions were only presented and compared. Whereas at a later stage, 
when the limits of arguing had been exhausted, under the deadline constraints and a 
need for the EU to deliver the expected foreign policy decision, e.g. shortly before the 
FAC meetings, then there was a shift towards bargaining. This was especially evident 
when a member state was ‘squeezed’ in the Putnam’s two level game. On the other 
hand, if preference intensity remained low, i.e. if the national representatives were not 
under domestic pressure, they could rely on arguing. Presenting arguments during the 
formal interventions in the Council working parties to signal the issue salience was 
the most typical uploading mechanism. This resonates with the previous findings that 
actors who are not pressured by the decision-making situation are ‘safe enough to 
argue,’ but when they seriously fear losing the preferred outcome, they incline 
towards bargaining (Naurin 2007). 
Furthermore, the results illustrate that when a member state engaged in 
bargaining, it opted for a cooperative form of bargaining. There was the same 
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tendency when Latvia had to interact alone being isolated by other member states 
(Case I), when it offered proposals for a compromise, as well as when Latvia together 
with the like-minded coalition engaged in bargaining situations. Interestingly, 
cooperative bargaining was also stimulated by the EEAS. To facilitate the 
compromise, the EEAS indirectly offered ‘package deals’ to the member states’ for 
further consideration as elements of broader package deals incorporated in its 
proposals for the EU Council Conclusions (Case I, Case III). This especially 
happened at the very late stage and under time pressure. Cooperative bargaining 
tended to be the way out of the deadlock and was usually employed at the final stage 
of EU foreign policy-making. The results illustrate that cooperative bargaining is not 
only a useful uploading mechanism but also an efficient way of reaching the EU 
compromise. This resonates with the findings in previous research that cooperative 
bargaining is the most common way of uploading in the CFSP (Thomas 2010), and 
that package deals help to reconcile different elements of EU common position while 
also allowing each country to ‘keep the face’ (Major 2008:266). In addition, it 
resonates with the findings from the scholarship on EU Council negotiations, which 
highlight cooperative bargaining as typical mechanism (Thomson & Holsti 2006). 
Apart from using the formal uploading mechanisms – presenting arguments 
and cooperative bargaining, such informal uploading mechanism (or condition) as 
bolstering the domestic uploading capacity was indispensable. This mechanism 
describes a supportive function such as administrative coordination, or political 
consensus, indirectly helping in improving the prospects for successful uploading. 
Domestic capacity is needed to elaborate a high quality national position. In 
particular, this was of crucial importance when Latvia had specific interests and 
domestic pressure, which could not resonate with the audience (Case I) or when it 
sought injecting its ideas at an early stage of EU policy-making (Case II).   
One of the most important mechanisms for Latvia as a small country was the 
use of coalitions. These tended to be flexible ad hoc issue-based coalitions. Most of 
all Latvia joined coalitions initiated by other member states. National preferences had 
more chances to be projected after being ‘multi-lateralized.’ The like-minded 
coalitions tended to be more influential if supported, even at the very final stage, by a 
large member state, which assumed leadership. Preference convergence was 
important for creating a like-minded coalition. The findings are consistent with what 
Rūse (2011:220) found in an earlier study, namely that preference convergence is a 
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precondition for framing the common position or undertaking other joint activities on 
the part of like-minded peers. 
Contacting other member states, especially the big ones, to gain their support 
was also essential. The sub-case studies reveal that Latvia’s uploading success 
directly or indirectly depended on Germany’s similar national preferences from the 
outset or its strategic choice to support Latvia’s specific domestic concerns, as we 
could see in Case I.  
Another informal mechanism was lobbying EU institutions. The findings show 
that Latvia used lobbying only exceptionally – in the case of strong domestic pressure 
and being fully isolated by other member states. Findings of the Case I demonstrate 
that without the like-minded coalition partners Latvia had to put its own efforts in 
lobbying the EU institutions, notably, the EEAS. This can be summarized by quoting 
an EEAS representative who described Latvia’s lobbying behaviour: “The Latvian 
representatives themselves are hiding away and escape from pro-active lobbying in 
Brussels. For a successful influence, the formal interaction should be combined with 
informal lobbying” (Interview No. 13 28.06.26, EEAS).  
To conclude, the following lessons for the policy makers can be formulated:  
A member state may influence EU foreign policy outcome by using various uploading 
mechanisms. First, it needs a clear vision of what it wants (domestic political 
consensus) in EU foreign policy. Second, it needs domestic administrative capacities 
in terms of expertise and smooth coordination procedures to develop high quality 
national positions. There is a clear linkage between the domestic coherence and 
successful uploading. As precisely summarized by a practitioner: “Good cooperation 
among all involved decision-makers is the central activity to succeed – cooperation is 
a tremendous resource” (Interview No. 9, 06.02.2013, PermRep). 
Third, with well-developed reasoning a member state may interact in EU 
foreign policy-making, combining various uploading mechanisms – presenting 
arguments (general, technical and expertise-based), cooperative bargaining, 
contacting other member states, building or joining coalitions, and lobbying the EU 
institutions. Lobbying is especially important to ensure that ‘everyone in the EU 
knows’ about a state’s highly salient policy issue. Developing stable long-term 
relationships with the staff of the EEAS presumably suits a small member state’s 
needs best. The EEAS operates as an agenda-setter and drafts the policy proposals, 
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thus there is an opportunity to influence the decision-making already in its 
formulation stage. Hence, establishment of the EEAS does make a difference for 
smaller states. 
No less important is the use of like-minded coalitions to reinforce individual 
uploading efforts. Although formal voting is not common in EU foreign policy-
making, there are some overlapping areas, which are decided by QMV rule (Case II) – 
then the coalition can establish the blocking minority. Furthermore, the early coalition 
building provides more advantages in terms of uploading. It involves mutual 
exchange, sharing information and comparing national preferences. My conclusion 
therefore is that the earlier a member state starts to use the above uploading 
mechanisms, the more likely it is to produce successful uploading.  
That is, a member state needs good support from its capital and better skills, 
and domestic capacity to ‘play the Brussels game.’ Importantly, small states should 
prioritize and then put all the efforts in their priority areas, as summarized by an 
EEAS representative: “If you have sharp ideas you can do a lot! Small states could 
push much stronger, but they give up too quickly to prefer a neutral compromise. 
Overall the Baltic countries prefer rather a bad compromise than nothing” (Interview 
No. 15, 12.07.2013, EEAS). 
EU Institutional Constraints  
In this study ‘institutions mattered’ in that the EU institutional environment 
constrained uploading, in line with the concept of Europeanization and rational choice 
institutionalism. The EU institutional environment was understood as formal and 
informal rules of decision-making, as well as the other EU actors’ preferences.  
In terms of decision-making rules, this study covered the time-period after the 
Lisbon Treaty had entered into force and the EEAS had become operational to ensure 
that the conditions were kept constant. Thereby this study also captured how the new 
EU institutional framework influenced the relationships between the national and EU 
foreign policies. The findings indicate that despite the substantially strengthened EU 
institutions, member states continue to be major players in developing EU foreign 
policy. This resonates with previous studies that member states remain central 
“despite the increasing role of Brussels-based institutions” (Gross 2009:4), and that 
the informal consensus rule of EU foreign policy-making determines that the big 
member states own informal power (Tallberg et al. 2011:21). 
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The three sub-cases revealed that Latvia’s ability to attain the preferred 
outcome was primarily constrained by the big member states’ preferences and their 
uploading efforts. Consequently, Latvia’s preference projection was possible if either 
there was preference convergence with some big member states or Latvia gained 
specific support regarding a particular issue from an influential member state. As 
concluded by one practitioner, “Surely, the High Representative before each EU 
foreign ministers’ meeting calls to the ‘big guys.’ If we as a small country want to 
push for some initiative, we need to detect [the] atmosphere in the big capitals. The 
only way to proceed is if the ‘big guys’ support it. We travel to Berlin before going to 
Brussels” (Interview No. 14, 07.09.2013, MFA). In particular, the findings of his 
study show that Germany was a central actor, at least in EU foreign policy-making 
towards the Eastern neighbourhood. All three sub-cases demonstrated that Latvia’s 
uploading was possible in as far as Germany’s preferences were convergent or if 
Germany made a strategic choice to support Latvia’s positions. 
This confirms that, given the informal nature of EU foreign policy-making, a 
member state needs to combine the formal uploading mechanisms such as presenting 
arguments and bargaining with informal means. In parallel to the formal 
interventions, one need to employ such mechanisms as lobbying EU institutions, 
contacting other member states, in particular the influential ones, and using coalitions.  
6.3. Shortcomings 
While this study provided clear results, one should recognize some of its 
shortcomings, such as the research design (evaluation of a single member state’s 
influence on the outcome) and constraints associated with the collection of empirical 
observations regarding the national diplomatic positions. 
First, it was challenging to make a clear distinction between a member state’s 
influence and ‘luck.’ If we define influence as when preferences are reflected in EU 
final outcome, it might be that preferences were reflected in the outcome largely 
because of the preference convergence. Although process-tracing methodology 
controls for this eventuality in some measure, it cannot be entirely ruled out that a 
member state achieved its preferable outcome without exerting influence. In other 
words, the EU final decision outcome could reflect a member state’s national position 
just because other influential actors also took the same position. For example, in Case 
II, when Latvia succeeded to keep its position constant trough the policy-making 
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process, it was partly thanks to Germany’s similar position, which was crucial to 
maintaining the blocking minority. Likewise, where in Case III the Latvian preference 
on EU-Ukraine AA signature was reflected in EU decision, one may ask to what 
extent it was specific Latvia’s contribution, given that two big member states – 
Germany and Poland – were in the leadership. Thereby the EU foreign policy 
decisions might have been influenced also by other member states not analysed here.    
Another problem could be the potential bias in the empirical observations 
provided by the interviews. EU foreign policy-making usually takes place behind the 
closed doors, and therefore interviews with the direct participants are often the only 
source of information. Moreover, interviews were mostly conducted with Latvian 
policy-makers. An additional source of possible bias is that the author of this study 
herself is a participant of Latvia’s foreign policy-making. Hence, one cannot rule out 
that interviews contain biased elements. That being said, the potential bias has been 
methodologically addressed by interviewing officials from the EU Commission, the 
EEAS, and the rotating EU Presidency. To gain more profound and objective 
information it would have been necessary to also interview the representatives of 
other member states, who partook in EU working groups. However, this study did not 
opt for this methodological approach as it would have been complicated to acquire 
data from all the 28 member states and could again create some bias. 
6.4. Prospects for Future Research 
With regards to broader implications of this study, it introduces important uploading 
mechanisms in EU foreign policy from a rational choice institutionalism perspective. 
In treating independent variable endogenously, this study assumed that national 
preferences are fixed. It explored the preference projection and influence on the EU 
foreign policy of a small, new member state – Latvia. A possible future research 
project could try to further probe ‘smallness’ and ‘newness’ as explanatory variables. 
By keeping ‘smallness’ constant one could compare the experiences of Latvia with 
that of Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Ireland, and in this way test the impact of 
‘newness.’ namely – how long the member states stay ‘new’ (given more than decade 
of their membership). Is there a difference in uploading success of intensely held 
preferences of new member states, and, if yes, how could it be explained? 
By providing empirical evidence on how uploading mechanisms such as 
presenting arguments, cooperative bargaining, contacting other member states, 
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building or joining coalitions, lobbying EU institutions, as well as bolstering the 
domestic uploading capacity to project preferences onto the EU foreign policy, this 
study contributes to the scholarship of rational choice institutionalism. The developed 
framework can be applied to investigate other member states. Interesting questions for 
further exploration could be: Do other countries increasingly upload their national 
preferences in EU foreign policy? Do the large member states, despite their structural 
power, use the same uploading mechanisms as small ones?  
Furthermore, there is also an increasing demand to investigate how 
‘institutions matter’ in terms of Europeanization in foreign policy. Given the complex 
nature of EU foreign policy-making under the Lisbon Treaty one needs to explore 
how the new decision-making rules (e.g. extended use of QMV), as well as the new 
institutional actors influence relationships between the national and EU foreign policy 
and thereby the process of Europeanization in foreign policy. 
Notwithstanding the need for further investigation in the above-mentioned 
areas, the most pressing issue remains the further in-depth studies on individual 
member states’ role in EU foreign policy-making. This urgency is only increasing due 
to the recent fast-moving developments in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, Russia’s 
invasion in Ukraine in 2014 and the subsequently deteriorated Europe-Russia 
relations. A return to old-fashioned geopolitics seriously challenges EU foreign 
policy-making, providing an impetus for the EU to take common (and painful) 
decisions on serious economic sanctions against Russia, its former strategic partner. 
This enhances the urgency of exploring individual member states’ specific national 
preferences, and ways of uploading the latter and influencing the EU common 
decision outcome.  
This study has thus contributed to the largely unexplored field of uploading 
process of Europeanization in the area of foreign policy. By revealing some of the 
important uploading mechanisms, the study also drew attention to the conditions – the 
EU institutional environment in terms of the policy-making rules (formal and 
informal) and the preferences of actors. Given the complex nature of EU foreign 
policy-making under the Lisbon Treaty and the Union’s engagement in the 
international arena, there is an urgent need to further explore the ways in which 
member states inject their preferences and ideas into EU foreign policy. It would be 
relevant to investigate how member states operate under the new institutional 
framework. Furthermore, given the current turbulent developments in EU Eastern 
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neighbourhood, and what appears to be an increasing role for individual member 
states rather than the EU as an aggregate actor, indicates that further research on 
member state roles in EU foreign policy is necessary. A comprehensive analysis on 
the interaction between the national and EU levels will certainly be a challenging field 
for future research.  
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ANNEX I List of Interviews 
 
Number  Time and place 
1 December 28, 2012, Latvian PermRep, Riga 
2 January 15, 2013, Latvian PermRep, Riga 
3 January 16, 2013, MFA, Riga 
4 January 16, 2013, MFA, Riga 
5 January 16, 2013, MFA, Riga 
6 January 18, 2013, MFA, Riga 
7 January 18, 2013, MFA, Riga 
8 January 29, 2013, MFA, Riga (phone) 
9 February 6, 2013, Latvian PermRep, Brussels (phone) 
10 February 13, 2013, MFA, Riga 
11 February 13, 2013, MFA, Riga 
12 May 20, 2013, MFA, Sweden, Stockholm 
13 June 28, 2013, EEAS, Brussels (phone) 
14 July 9, 2013, Lithuanian MFA, Vilnius (phone) 
15 July 11, 2013, EEAS, Brussels 
16 July 11, 2013, EEAS, Brussels 
17 July 11, 2013, Latvian PermRep, Brussels 
18 July 11, 2013, official, EEAS, Brussels 
19 July 12, 2013, official EEAS, Brussels 
20 July 12, 2013, official EEAS, Brussels 
21 July 12, 2013, Latvian PermRep, Brussels 
22 July 11, 2013, Latvian PermRep, Brussels 
23 August  6, 2013, EEAS, Brussels (phone) 
24 August 16, 2013, PermRep, Brussels (phone) 
23 Deeember 16, 2013, Ministry of the Interior, Riga 
24 December 17, 2013, MFA, Riga 
25 February 10. 2014, MFA, Riga 
26 January 16. 2013, MFA, Riga 
27 March 20, 2014, MFA, Riga 
28 March 30, 2014, Ministry of Economics, Riga 
29 April 5, 2014, MFA, Riga 
30 May 23, 2014, Latvian PermRep, Brussels 
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ANNEX II Questionnaire to the Latvian respondents 
1. National preferences, initial positions 
Preferences, positions 
- Would you describe your initial positions on the following EU policy issues:   
(1) EU sanctions towards Belarus 2011/2012; 
(2) EU – Russia visa-free travel 2011/2012 
Domestic interests as a basis for intensely held preferences 
- Being aware of the broad EU foreign policy agenda, how did you single out 
particularly important issues for Latvia?   
- On these issues, did you need to represent any specific Latvian domestic 
demands/interests?  
- Were these issues important/ sensitive to particular domestic interest groups/ 
business representatives? 
Intensity of preferences  
- Why did you want (a, b) in the issues (1), (2)?  
- Could you mention some reasons for why it was important for Latvia? 
 
2. The EU foreign policy-making process 
Intensity of preferences 
- Did your initial position remained constant during the discussions? 
- Did others’ (opposite) position have any impact on you? 
Behaviour in the decision-making process 
- How did you plan your activities to promote your interests on these issues? 
- Would you characterize your concrete contributions?  
- Did you feel that the manner other EU partners (member states/ institutions) 
behaved could have influenced the decision outcome?  
- In your opinion, what are the main factors for successfully influencing the 
outcome?  
Mechanisms/ strategies of preference projection 
Bargaining/arguing 
- How would you characterize the language, speech acts and interventions most 
commonly used for gaining others’ support for the national positions?  
- Did you always need to provide detailed justifications for your positions?  
- Have you ever considered using your veto rights as the last resort?  
- Did you show flexibility for the sake of compromise?  
Diplomatic tactics 
- Apart from the formal EU decision-making formats (COEST, PSC, COREPER, 
FAC) have you put additional efforts to promote your interests?  
- Did you seek contacts with the key EU institutions (EEAS)?  
- Did you seek contacts with any influential member state? How would you 
characterize effect of this interaction?  
- Did you seek coalitions with like-minded peers? Would you mention some 
countries to whom Latvia have cooperated the most on the issues (1), (2), (3), (4)? 
Building the uploading capacities 
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- Given the high priority of issues (1), (2), (3), (4), how regularly Latvia had a high 
quality national position (with detailed arguments and justifications)?  
- How did you pulled your domestic resources in preparing a well-elaborated and 
strong national position?  
- Did you feel that a lack of domestic coordination and knowledge, as well as 
conflicting interests (of line ministries) diminished Latvia’s ability to successfully 
influence the decision outcome?  
 
3. The CFSP institutional environment 
Key actors 
- In your opinion, which actors were crucial in directing the CFSP decisions 
towards concrete outcome? Large member states? European External Action 
Service as a chair of meetings/ preparing draft proposals?  
- Are you satisfied with the leading role of the EEAS and HR? Does it help all the 
member states to meet their concerns?  
Decision-making rules 
- How would you describe the CFSP policy-making process in terms of formal 
(unanimity) and informal (consensus) decision-making rules?  Are you happy with 
consensus rule?  
 
4. Decision outcome 
- Do you think that the Latvian government eventually managed to influence the 
outcome on the issues (1), (2), (3)? 
- Given the fact that these issues were of particular importance, in what respect 
Latvia influenced the content of outcome? Would you specify? To what extent if 
compared with your initial position? 
- Given the conflicting interests (issue (1), to what extent did the final EU 
compromise reflected the Latvian interests? 
- In your opinion, what is a higher value for Latvia – good reputation (solidarity, 
commitment to common norms/values) or securing national interests?  
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ANNEX III Questionnaire to the EEAS and the Commission’s respondents 
The EU foreign policy-making process 
Latvia’s behaviour in the decision-making process 
- Would you characterize Latvia’s concrete contributions?  
- Did you feel that the manner Latvia and other member states behaved could have 
influenced the decision outcome?  
- In your opinion, what are the main factors for the member state successfully 
influencing the outcome?  
Mechanisms/ strategies of preference projection 
Bargaining/arguing 
- How would you characterize the language, speech acts and interventions most 
commonly used by Latvia for gaining others’ support for the national positions?  
- Did Latvia show flexibility for the sake of compromise?  
Diplomatic tactics 
- Apart from the formal EU decision-making formats (COEST, PSC, COREPER, 
FAC) did you feel that Latvia put additional efforts to promote its interests?  
- Did it seek contacts with the EEAS?  
Building the uploading capacities 
- Given the high priority of issues (1), (2), how regularly Latvia had a high quality 
national position (with detailed arguments and justifications)?  
- Did you feel that a lack of domestic coordination and knowledge, as well as 
conflicting interests (of line ministries) diminished Latvia’s ability to successfully 
influence the decision outcome?  
 
5. The CFSP institutional environment 
Key actors 
- In your opinion, which actors were crucial in directing the EU decisions towards 
concrete outcome? Large member states?  
Decision-making rules 
- How would you describe the CFSP policy-making process in terms of formal 
(unanimity) and informal (consensus) decision-making rules?   
 
6. Decision outcome 
- Do you think that the Latvian government eventually managed to influence the 
outcome on the issues (1), (2)? 
- In your opinion, what is a higher value for Latvia – good reputation (solidarity, 
commitment to common norms/values) or securing national interests?  
 
7. Is there anything more that is relevant?  
 
 
